

THE
PROSPECTIVE REVIEW.

No. XI.

ART. I.—CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY IN ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS AND MODERN WANTS.

1. *Die religiöse Glaubenslehre nach der Vernunft und der Offenbarung für denkende Leser dargestellt, von Dr. K. G. Bretschneider.* (An Exposition of the Doctrines of Religious Belief according to Reason and Revelation, for the use of reflecting Readers. Halle, 1844. 3rd edition corrected and enlarged.)
2. *Das Wesen des Christlichen Glaubens vom Standpunkte des Glaubens dargestellt, von W. M. L. de Wette.* (The Essence of the Christian Faith, surveyed from the ground of Faith. Basle, 1846.)
3. *A Vindication of Protestant Principles, by Phileleutherus Anglicanus.* J. W. Parker, London: 1847.

IT is a difficulty inseparable from mixed sciences like Politics and Theology, which belong equally to the spheres of speculation and action, that they impose the necessity of considering at once what is theoretically true and what is practically possible. This difficulty results from the noblest attribute of the Human Mind, and of Society which is its embodied expression—that they are progressive, and that the few who devote themselves to thought, must inevitably outstrip in many of their conclusions, the capacity of the multitude whose attention is absorbed by the means and conditions of immediate execution. When we quit our

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closets to act on the world, we are compelled to ask ourselves, not what views can be made intelligible and conclusive to men who have enjoyed our own opportunities of reflexion and inquiry, but how the living convictions of faith and duty may be impressed most efficaciously and lastingly on the mass: we are obliged, without any relinquishment of good faith and sincerity, to make some distinction between the freedom of the Academy and the demands of the Church. Yet the speculative and practical elements of the question must never be kept wholly asunder; they have a mutual influence; one qualifies and beneficially regulates the operation of the other. Uncontrolled speculation is revolutionary and destructive in its effects; a stiff adhesion to the actual and established involves a short coming of the most valuable and necessary truth. Great mischief has arisen from their separation.

Established Churches and such as are tied down by their constitution to a definite system of opinions and usages, are in one sense less in danger of overlooking the claims of the present and the practical; but on the other hand they are prevented by the same circumstance from discerning and acknowledging new and higher views of truth, and they tend to perpetuate the state of things in which they find a reason for their own immobility.—Where religious bodies and the teachers who guide them, disown creeds and make truth their only object, a different result ensues. Here the individuality of the inquiring mind, and the *idiosyncrasy* that grows out of local or limited association, naturally predominate for a season over the general wants and aspirations of the religious life. Forced into existence by strong reaction against the reigning dogmatism and exclusiveness, societies of this description have a tendency to become severely intellectual in their conception of religion. Faith with them is admitted suspiciously at the close of a logical process, instead of being plucked with holy grateful joy as the fruit that grows spontaneously on spiritual experience. Their members are free, independent thinkers—each taking his own course, and proudly tenacious of it; an aggregation of insulated atoms, having little in common but their attachment to the free, circumambient element in which they can move about at will. These effects have been especially conspicuous, where the Pro-

testant principle of the sufficiency of Scripture has been carried out in a one-sided spirit to its utmost limits, unqualified by the influences of large general culture or the traditional restraints of usage and institution. Studied in a spirit of rigid rationalism, and cut off from the long train of historical development connecting the events which it records, with the present condition of mankind, and yet accepted at the same time as a final absolute rule of faith and practice—Scripture could yield no elements for creating and cementing and perpetuating a society fitted to endure through all time. Its interpretation could only terminate in producing a more accurate and vivid apprehension of the words and acts of Christ and his immediate followers; and as these, taken in their literal, primary sense, were often found inapplicable to the circumstances of modern Christians, the usages that have grown out of them, however natural and beautiful in themselves, the baptism of infants, the commemorative supper, even public worship itself—have in some cases been laid aside, because no clear words of positive institution could be adduced from the sacred text on their behalf: and thus nothing was left to represent Christianity in the world, but the simple idea of Christ as a prophet from God, who two thousand years ago died and rose again from the dead to establish the fact of a future life.

It cannot, we think, be denied, that the prevalence of these views has issued in a certain negative bareness and dryness, unfavourably affecting the communions that have been most under their influence, chilling and nipping the free outburst of a warm and genial religious life. We hail with joy many signs of a change in this respect. It augurs well for the future. Nor would we be insensible to the merits and services of the honest and intrepid men who laboured in the opposite direction. They did their work—the work which the 18th century allotted them—and we are grateful for it. They helped to sweep away much rubbish, that lingered in the opinions and practices of the world. We merely assert, that they contemplated only one side of the religious life, and left another equally important almost wholly out of view. When we observe, what interest is

excited in multitudes—how Churches are thronged—with what zeal religious associations are entered into and religious objects are pursued—wherever a benevolent earnestness and simple-minded conviction can ally themselves with forms and usages that are endeared by venerable remembrances and speak powerfully to the imagination and feelings—we cannot doubt, that there is an element of power and vitality on this side of the religious life, which the rationalist has altogether overlooked, but which the social philosopher and the thoughtful student of human nature will not fail to take into account in meditating on the future possibilities of refining and elevating mankind. To combine and reconcile in one view of religion the claims of intellect and of feeling, is, it must be admitted, a delicate and difficult problem; yet one, we think, which has been needlessly encumbered. It will be more easily solved by simple truthfulness than by artifice. Whether any aid can be furnished towards so desirable a result by some views which we shall take the liberty of expressing in the ensuing Article—we must leave our readers to judge.

No writer of modern times has investigated the records of Christianity and the dogmatic systems grounded on them, with so entire a disregard of practical consequences as Strauss. He even prides himself on this recklessness (*Rücksichtslosigkeit*) as giving him a fairer claim to be considered impartial in his conclusions, than those who are confessedly swayed by ulterior considerations. And we willingly acknowledge it a positive advantage to truth, that one mind at least, evidently earnest and sincere, should have boldly addressed itself to the question, how the Christian records came into existence, and what they mean, unbiassed by any reference to the possible effect of the result on existing opinions and institutions,—and that this side of the subject should be laid bare in its whole breadth. Our objection is less to the critical procedure of Strauss, than to the radically false system of philosophy, as it seems to us, which lies at the bottom of it, and which has so entirely pre-occupied his mind as to prevent his seeing any question that comes before him, in more than a single point of view. His works, with all their pre-

tension to impartiality, are eminently dogmatical and one-sided. Nevertheless, the impression they have left on the mind of Europe, is remarkable. Directly or indirectly we trace their influence in all quarters, where theological learning has ceased to be a mechanical routine, and made any advance towards the character of a science. England is notoriously slow to receive impressions from abroad. The ray of light which issues from Germany or France, is long ere it reaches our intellectual hemisphere. But a change is coming over us. In the pages of learned and accomplished men, closely connected with our Church and our Universities, we can often trace the ripple, faint perhaps but distinctly visible, of that mighty agitation of the waters which the sudden descent of Strauss's book occasioned.

The works, noticed at the head of this Article, are all considerably subsequent to the last publication of Strauss, and all, without being directly controversial, have distinct reference to his theories, and oppose the pantheistic philosophy on which they are based. Those of Bretschneider and De Wette are the works of veterans in the field of theological literature, whose influence was powerful and widely-diffused through Germany, long before the name of Strauss was known. De Wette's bold criticisms on the books of Chronicles and the Pentateuch, written when he was a very young man, were given to the world with a commendatory preface by Griesbach, as early as 1806.* Issuing from the old rationalistic school, both in their day have been active labourers in that free theological movement, which may be considered as having reached its final term in the speculations of Strauss; and now at the close of life, they have gathered up the positive results of their studies in one connected view, and given them to the world as a completed expression of their own theological system, and as a protest against the destructive tendencies of more recent theories.

Bretschneider retains most of the proper rationalistic character. Religion is with him a branch of the higher reason (*Vernunft*) in which he supposes a primal revelation

* Beiträge zur Einleitung in das Alte Testament. Halle, 1806.

made to man of the fundamental ideas of God and a divine law and a future life. In addition to this original and universal revelation he admits a special, mediated through the minds of prophets, which brings out, animates and strengthens the principles of the former, and of which we have the record in the Bible. In his philosophical system Bretschneider is a Necessarian; and he disposes of the question of the existence of evil, by regarding the Universe, under the providence of God, as a progressive development of good, in which evil appears only as a transition-process to some form of good, else unattainable. The truth of Christianity he tests by its coincidence with the principles of universal reason. From a comparison of his two sections on the Historical and the Speculative Christ, it is quite evident, that he considers the Trinity as altogether a product of the speculative spirit of the Church. The doctrines which constitute the substance of Christianity and in which the living spirit of its Founder has been perpetuated, he supposes to have been shaped in their earliest enunciation by the popular beliefs and conceptions of the age of Christ, which linked them to the convictions of contemporaries, and served as media for their transmission to a future age. Bretschneider's statement of his views is clear and simple, free from mysticism and exaggeration, and expressing a cheerful, ingenuous mind, but not marked by originality or any depth of spiritual feeling. One of the most pleasing and satisfactory parts of his volume is his summary of the natural arguments for human immortality.*

De Wette belongs to a different school. Less simple and explicit, he is more subtle and deep, and shows more of genius, than Bretschneider. In high and many-sided cultivation, he is perhaps the most accomplished theo-

* Some few instances of inaccurate statement occur, which have excited our surprise. He says, p. 298, that the expression 'Son of Man' *never* occurs in the Evangelist John. The following among other texts will suffice to prove him in error. John i. 52; iii. 13; vi. 27; viii. 28. Again, he tells us, p. 332, that the expression *ἡ ἐκκλησία* is found only once in the Gospels, and refers to Matth. xvi. 18. It occurs twice Matth. xviii. 17, though used, it is true, in a different sense. Is he moreover, p. 377, quite justified in affirming absolutely, that none of the Jews in our Lord's time had any expectation of a suffering Messiah? See Gesenius on Isaiah, Comment. c. lii. 13.

logian of his age. The pervading principle of his system is radically different from Bretschneider's. He finds the primary element of religion, not in reason (*Vernunft*) but in feeling (*Gemüth*), which reason subsequently attaches itself to, and through the aid of conceptions derived from the material world, shapes into objects of distinct belief.* Schleiermacher maintained a similar view, and made it his point of divergency from the earlier rationalism. To us this definition of religion seems profound and just: it goes to the root of the subject, separating the essential from the adscititious; marks off distinctly the separate province of philosophy; and shows how, when religion and philosophy combine, a compound is the result, differing in some respects from both—theology.

In the development of a view so fundamentally just De Wette, we must confess, disappoints us. He wants perfect freedom and simplicity. He is embarrassed by a foregone conclusion. He constructs his system with too evident a determination to bring out a given result. The Church is constantly before his eyes. When we consider the extreme boldness of his critical and exegetical principles, we cannot understand on what ground he accepts certain statements and views, *simply* because they are Scriptural (§ 57. p. 297). We ask for his final authority. Is it Scripture? is it reason? is it the primal consciousness of spiritual truth in the human soul? We have no doubt, it is the last. But then he is not self-consistent; or at least assumes, what his own principles forbid, that the simple words of Scripture, against evidence on the opposite side, can be taken as a pure expression of that conscious-

* We want some single, well-defined term in English, exactly corresponding with the German *Gemüth*. Is it not almost identical with the Greek *θυμός*? that original temperament of our nature by which we are fitted to experience *emotion* at the aspect of certain objects or under the consciousness of certain relations—distinct from *intellect* which coldly apprehends and compares them, and is secretly guided and impelled by *Gemüth*. *Gemüth* is the seat of the affections, and is closely connected with the will. When it is affirmed, that religion has its root in *Gemüth*—what is meant, we apprehend, is this; that on the first *conscious* aspect of the great agencies of the Universe, there arise in the mind spontaneously feelings of awe and subjection, and an instinctive reference to vast spiritual might, which are anterior to the exercise of the reasoning faculty—rather stimulate it into activity, shape and direct it. This primary feeling constitutes the *religiousness* of man, and always continues so, under whatever heaps of artificial divinity it may lie buried.

ness. In disposing of the philosophical questions of liberty and necessity and of the existence of evil, De Wette is less decided and plain-spoken than Bretschneider, and hesitates, as it appears to us, in coming to a positive result. His language is that of a Libertarian. Man's destination, according to him, is to occupy a place in the kingdom of God. This is the great idea of the moral creation. — But the minute synthesis, not always the counterpart of a very rigorous analysis, and often founded on superficial distinctions, with which the Germans distribute the materials of their scientific works and their Academic prelections, sometimes renders it difficult to catch the related points and connecting principle of their systematic digests.

On the pre-existence and miraculous conception of Jesus Christ, De Wette's own views evidently do not pass into the limits of the properly miraculous. In regard to the latter, while admitting some inexplicable operation of the Spirit of God, he puts it on the same footing which must be assumed at the birth of all remarkable men, whose peculiar endowments cannot be resolved into the influences of their age. The pre-existence of the Logos he thinks is taught by John—perhaps in the Epistle to the Hebrews—but not by Paul. The real force of the doctrine, however, is explained away by his declaring, that it means no more than this—that the revelation and redemption in Christ must not be regarded as an event which originated and was completed in time, but had its foundation in eternity—in the eternal truth, eternal will and eternal world-plan of God (§ 63. p.329). He lays great stress on the atoning and propitiatory efficacy of the death of Christ, as entering largely into the *positive* of Christianity, and important for its moral influence on the mass of believers. After having read with some attention what he has written on the subject in this work and in his earlier treatise '*de Morte J. C. expiatoriâ*,' we confess ourselves unable to form a distinct conception of the spiritual fact which he supposes to be expressed by this popular doctrine, or to find that his own views in their ultimate result attach more than an historical value to it, as an idea corresponding to and satisfying the mental demands of the first generation of

converts and of those who in after times have stood on the same grade of spiritual advancement. His theory seems to us made up, partly of a mere adoption of the words of Scripture, partly of an arbitrary blending with them of the later assumptions of theology. We can understand the primary anthropomorphic idea of expiation, and admit its value in the religious development of the human race, and we believe that it makes its appearance in the New Testament. We can also enter into, venerate and sympathise with the beautiful martyr-spirit of the historical Jesus, and comprehend how the example of such heroism and self-sacrifice, with its glorious spiritual adjuncts and anticipations, must attract human sympathies and be the mightiest of all influences for purifying and ennobling them. But we do not see how one of these ideas can be translated into the other; and we think theologians had better give up the attempt, and leave them apart and irreconcilable—as expressing different conceptions of the character and government of God, and adapted to different stages of human progress.

De Wette has reserved the last section of his work for his exposition of the Trinity. We may say without fear of contradiction, that it is unorthodox. The doctrine of the two natures he pronounces unbiblical, untheological, unscientific (§ 63). His views are strongly anti-Arian, but do not affirm more than Sabellianism. The design, he says, of a faith in the Son and the Spirit, is to bring us to a more perfect faith in the Father, for this is the final and completed faith (p. 492).

Some curious instances occur of De Wette's refusal to entertain certain views, merely from their incompetency to become articles of ecclesiastical belief. In speaking (§ 61) of the resurrection and ascension and of the close connexion of these events with each other, he alludes to the disposition of some writers following the indications of Paul (1 Cor. ix. 1; xv. 18) to understand both of them in a spiritual sense, and the objection to this view, from the strong assertions of the Evangelists and especially of John, that Jesus rose bodily from the dead, and in proof of it, was handled by his disciples and ate in their presence. But, he continues, if we suppose these narratives to have

come to us at third or fourth hand, we may conceive how they might be modified in this way, and how the expression that the apostles had handled him with their hands, might be introduced, with a polemic design for the confutation of those who understood the resurrection idealistically; the verse 1 John i. 1, is actually directed against Docetism. It is scarcely possible to doubt from the whole context (see p. 316), that this is De Wette's own suspicion. Observe, how he averts the conclusion. 'But how little this conjecture can reckon on approval, and that it can never become the Church's view, it is unnecessary for me to remark.* We do not inquire now whether the conjecture be well-founded or rash; we have only to notice the author's reasons for rejecting it; and we cannot but ask, on what basis are Church doctrines to rest? on reasons and probabilities approving themselves to the instructed, or on deference to established prejudice? The same strong Church feeling narrows his views in other respects. He sets out, like our own Arnold, from the assumption, that the State in a Christian country must itself be Christian; as if an abstraction were a person, and could have a faith. He would therefore make the baptism of all infants (Israelitish children of course excepted) compulsory; the parent must have no choice in the matter: and on the same ground, he contends with some warmth, that all Jews in a Christian country should be excluded from the privileges of citizenship.

Phileleutherus Anglicanus in venturing on some points of perilous controversy, has borrowed the *nom de guerre* of Bentley on a similar occasion — only not disguising by it, like his celebrated predecessor, his connexion with the Church of England. He is evidently an accurate, well-read scholar, of a liberal, inquisitive spirit. The leading idea of his pamphlet is, that philology in its present improved state faithfully applied to the Biblical records, furnishes the means of removing the misunderstandings which

* In the same spirit (§ 58) speaking of the difficulty of reconciling the divine and human elements in Christ, he reminds the extreme adherents of the opposite sides of the question, that from the theological point of view, they have not to consider a historical problem, but what is the doctrine that can be upheld in the Church (*die in der Kirche gelten kann*).—P. 300.

have produced so many religious parties, and of bringing men back to such uniformity in their conceptions of Scriptural truth, as should induce all Englishmen at least to return into the bosom of their Mother Church.

There is nothing new in his idea of the importance of philology to the right apprehension of an historical religion; though in his application of it, there is much, we admit, that does strike us as *very* original. With unequivocal indications scattered over his pages of a bold and acute understanding, truth obliges us to declare, that we have seldom read a book more abounding in groundless assumption and untenable inference, or written with a more visible purpose to make good a contemplated result. We do not question the sincerity or even the disinterestedness of his attachment to his own Church, but he must pardon us for thinking, that so strong an affection diminishes his claim to our trust in his construction of the history of Christianity, and disqualifies him for always applying with unbiassed accuracy of hand, that philological instrument to which he ascribes such wonderful effects. We cannot subscribe to his view of the liberal *intentions* of the founders of the English Reformed Church, or persuade ourselves that in leaving vague and indefinite certain questions in the Articles and Homilies, they had any distinct reference to the future possible determination of them by an improved philology. We believe, that this laxity on particular points did not result from a tolerant spirit, but from the compromise rendered inevitable by the meeting of different theological elements in the same ecclesiastical system, and that if either party could have gained the ascendancy, it would have been more decidedly exclusive. After all, our author himself tells us, (p. 20,) that the general tenor and context of the Anglican formularies *expressly exclude* Romanists and Unitarians, Anabaptists, Pelagians, Arminians and Calvinists! This is a tolerably large *Index Expurgatorius* to be put forth by the most liberal of all Churches, founding itself on the great Protestant principle of the sole sufficiency of Scripture, and professedly recognising the right of private judgment and free inquiry. Who are left in all Christendom as objects of her sisterly embrace, it is difficult to see, except the Lutherans, and perhaps the Greeks. If we remember right, some of our old Divines,

when the Puritan controversy sprang up, showed a great liking for the Eastern Church and theology. We fear the poor Waldenses would be shut out, as coming under one or other of the proscribed descriptions.

Anglicanus treats with extreme freedom the narratives in Genesis anterior to the history of Abraham, and shows, we think convincingly, that they must be regarded as purely mythic. The notion has long been familiar in Germany. Buttmann, to go no further back, proved the fact twenty years ago.* But how are we to reconcile with this view, his strange and unsupported assertion, that as the creation of the woman out of the side of Adam typifies the relation between the Church and her Head, as Baptism is depicted by the ark of the regenerator Noah, and the Lord's Supper by the victim of substitution at the sacrifice of Isaac, we are to believe, that Christianity can be derived from the earliest no less than from the latest book of the Canon, and that while we reject the supposed history as fictitious, we must cling to the prophecy as true (§ 21, note 4, p. 139). We ask, on what authority is this interpretation put into the original narrative, which *reads* like simple history. The assumption of some later editor having *euhemerized* the symbolism of the original vaticination, is altogether gratuitous.

There are other examples of unwarranted assertion, and of the want of an uniform, self-consistent principle of Scriptural interpretation, in the book. The author allows himself to reject as popular superstition the doctrines of demoniacal possession and the personal existence of the devil; but tenaciously adheres to the literal meaning of the passages which affirm the incarnation and propitiatory sacrifice of Christ. We want to know his principle of distinction between the two cases. In both, the language seems to us marked by the same characters of undoubting simplicity and conviction. Neither is he justified in assuming that the pre-existence of Christ and the atoning efficacy of his death, are taught in the same way and with equal clearness in all the books of the New Testament. 'Every act,' he says (p. 71), 'which is predicated of God before the coming of Christ, is said to have been performed by the divine Λόγος, or Hypostasis, that is, by God acting and

* Mythologus, I. v. vi. vii. viii. ix.

manifesting himself in a personal capacity and relatively to this world.' There is a mixture of truth and error in this statement. It is true, that throughout the Old Testament, God is represented as sustaining a personal relation to his chosen people; that in this intercourse he uniformly manifested himself as the Logos, is a mere assertion, suggested by later Rabbinical refinement, and contradicted, we venture to think, by fact.

It is a bold undertaking even for a Churchman, at least of the school of Anglicanus, to contend that the three Creeds represent the substance of Christian doctrine, and that no one can rationally be offended at them. His plea for the 'much abused' and 'grievously misunderstood' Athanasian Creed is really pathetic. He is off and on with it, like an old love, that he cannot find in his heart to part with, and yet thinks it might be better all things considered to relinquish. He has no objection to the *Quicunque vult* 'continuing to be sung or said on the appointed days without mutilation or omission,' and yet at the same time would not consider our loss irreparable, if, in Archbishop Tillotson's phrase, we were well rid of it.—(P. 106.)

We are not over-sensitive about names, if it is once clearly understood what they mean. But we must observe, that Anglicanus conveys a false impression to the world, when he speaks of the modern representatives of the English Presbyterians and their co-religionists in America, as Deists (see p. 102, with notes 6 and 8). We have no Pharisaic wish to dissolve the bonds of human brotherhood with conscientious Deists.—We have known excellent men among them.—But we protest against this absurd confusion of terms. There are at the present day two parties among the Unitarians; one believing in a special communication of religious truth to the world through the Jewish and Christian dispensations, not otherwise attainable by the human mind, and confirmed as divine by miracle and prophecy; the other, acknowledging an inherent religious element in man, susceptible of the immediate action of the Divine Spirit, which has been developed into power and activity, and brought into harmony with reason and conscience, by the wonderful train of excitements and influences providentially appointed in Judaism and Christianity

—equally with the former class believing in the reality of a revelation made directly by God to the human soul, but not attaching the same importance to the outward attestations of supernatural agency. Neither of these classes, whether their views are right or wrong, not Theodore Parker with all his startling boldness—has any affinity whatever with the modes of thinking on religious subjects, which have been always deemed peculiar to English Deism.

The works under review, especially the last and that of De Wette, have seemed to us to possess considerable interest, as disclosing in a very marked way that conflict of tendencies which we noticed at the opening of this Article. They want thorough consequentiality in the working out of principles. They exhibit bold graspings after truth, borne down by the countervailing force of respect for what is established. In books on the Evidences of Christianity, we have often been struck with the amazing disparity between the narrowness of the premises and the breadth of the conclusion. In the writers before us, the resistless progress of biblical philology has led to an opposite result; they lay down and practically apply principles which, carried out to their legitimate results, would go far beyond their own conclusions, and must involve an extensive remodelling of the received theological system and of the institutions by which it is upheld.—We have no quarrel with a wise conservatism; the capacity, the habitudes and the established associations of the people must all be considered in the quality of the religious aliment supplied to them. It may sometimes suffice to enforce a great practical truth, borne witness to by the natural reason and conscience of men, without displaying the whole mental process by which we have ourselves been brought to regard its obligation as divine. Its popular accompaniments and recommendations may be left to produce their own effect on the popular mind. Still less should passing doubts, mere conjectures and surmises, which are but elements towards the formation of future opinion—be paraded before a multitude incompetent to appreciate them. But there should be no disingenuousness—no holding out of signs that give a false impression of the convictions within

—no shuffling evasion of inferences clearly deducible from a principle once distinctly enunciated. Men soon detect inconsistency, and are disgusted. It is a wretched delusion to put ourselves in a false position, out of a pretended concern for the moral and religious interests of the world. It is truth that must save the world, not falsehood; sincerity that must win its confidence, not duplicity. Where the outward life and the inward principle are seen to be in harmony, trust and reverence are secured; and the fair example will exert the highest moral influence. A great authority of the ancient world has finely said, in exposing the false philosophers who decried all pleasure in their public discourses, though secretly yielding to its blandishments, lest the people should pursue it to excess;—‘honest words not only convey the clearest ideas, but exert the happiest influence on life; for since they are in harmony with practice, they are believed, and incite those who understand them, to pursue the same course.’*

To us it seems the dictate of wisdom and simplicity, to renounce every attempt at constructing theological systems, and to view the Bible merely as the record of a great historical development of religious feeling and belief—the manifestation of a divine spirit working itself into visible effect through a long succession of changing forms. If the directing hand of God is visible any where in human history, it is assuredly here. When we consider, what are the ideas which the Bible most prominently exhibits to us—what criticism has proved of the influences under which its several books were written—and what has been the peculiar character of the effects produced by its devout study on the sentiments and conduct of mankind—we conclude, that it has been the one great design of the successive dispensations which it records and attests, to cherish in man’s heart a reverential faith in one supreme conscious and intelligent Spirit—the Mind of minds—sustaining a close personal relation to his rational offspring, and providing from their first creation for the gradual evolution of higher states of moral and spiritual advancement—the view

* Ἐοίκασιν οὖν οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἶδέναι χρησιμώτατοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν βίον· συμφδοὶ γὰρ ὅντες τοῖς ἔργοις, πιστεύονται· διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς ξυμμέντας ζῆν κατ’ αὐτοὺς. *Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. x. i.*

limited at first to the present world, but afterwards opened through Christ into the boundless visions of eternity. There is a religious element in man, yearning after communion with higher natures and struggling to free itself from the adhesions of sinful contamination, which the belief in a Divine Being, such as the Bible holds forth to us, at once holy and compassionate, meets and satisfies and draws out into greater activity. The mere perception of order and system in the Universe, apart from the presence of conscious intelligence, does not produce religion. Religion implies an object for the affections, something that the human heart can trust in, revere and love—mind corresponding with mind. This is all that we mean, when we say, that true Theism contemplates God as a person. Christianity which consummates the series of Biblical revelations, is religion in the purest sense, because it speaks to the universal heart, not only by exhibiting God in the most amiable and venerable of all characters, but also by exemplifying in Christ the relation that should eternally subsist between God and man: and every one who earnestly strives to put himself into that relation, who owns himself in the spirit of Christ as a child of God, and who lives devotedly to the high ends of a moral and spiritual existence—deserves admission, we think, whatever be his theology, into the kingdom of God, and is entitled to the name of Christian. In our view Christianity so conceived and absolute Religion are identical.

We are aware, that there are speculative difficulties connected with the doctrine of a personal Deity, which the broad and popular view of the Bible does not dispose of. They must be left to the philosophical intellect, with the single limitation, that it does not ignore the psychological fact, that man has ever made to himself a God, of which all the popular religions are a diversified expression. The Biblical idea of God centres in the just mean between polytheism and pantheism. The imaginative Greek saw will and intelligent activity everywhere. His world was peopled with a thousand invisible agencies. The sunlight that rested on the thymy slope—the thunder that reverberated round the cloud-capt peak, the teeming bosom of earth, every whispering leaf, every gushing well, bespoke

the presence of the inspiring God.* But the popular heathenism rose not above these fair illusions to the perception of a sovereign unity and a presiding moral law. Even with the philosopher it was the work of the intellect, which heart and will with difficulty accompanied. What Christians call *devotion*, a blending of affection and moral consciousness, was rarely experienced. On the other hand, more refined spirits, aiming at a comprehension of the Universal, have dissolved the Biblical idea into the desolate vastness of Pantheism. In the effort to expel every anthropomorphic element from the conception of God, they have deprived it of substance and reality. 'You ascribe to God,' says Fichte,† 'personality and consciousness. What then do you mean by personality and consciousness? No doubt, what you have found and recognised in yourselves, and marked by this name. But the least attention to the mode in which you form this idea, will show you, that you do not and cannot in any way entertain it, without an associated feeling of limitation and finiteness. Thus you convert the Infinite Being, by investing him with this attribute, into a finite being, a being like yourselves; and you have not, as you intended, acquired the idea of God, but only multiplied the idea of yourselves.' The objection is clearly and forcibly stated; but it seems to us to carry with it its own answer. That we cannot divest ourselves of the idea of God—that wherever we turn our eye in this orderly and animated Universe, we are met by the reflection of a spirit akin to our own—is to us a proof that such a spirit must exist; to doubt it, is to resist a primal law of our being; on the same ground, we might deny the existence of a material world. That we ascribe to such a Being personality and consciousness, is inevitable; we know mind under no other conditions; we cannot otherwise conceive of will or even of intelligence. This is the living point which

* Schiller has thrown himself back with exquisite grace into the feelings of the old Hellenic mind in his well-known poem, 'Die Götter Griechenlandes.' Compare also a beautiful passage in Wordsworth's *Excursion*, (Book iv.) beginning, 'The lively Grecian in a land of hills,' etc.

† Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung. Quoted by Strauss, 'Christliche Glaubenslehre,' i. p. 504.

links our human consciousness with the belief in God as a kindred reality. We do not indeed embrace the perfect idea of God. That is impossible. How should the finite grasp the Infinite? But we have a sense, an apprehension of God, as he exists *relatively* to us. We feel that we can hold communion with a Mind, transcendently surpassing ourselves in wisdom and goodness. To have a belief in Sovereign Mind—an object of rational adoration and trust—is all that we contend for. That suffices for Religion; but without that, Religion is impossible.

The question at issue with the Pantheists, is the great question of the age; and it is in opposition to their view of the Universe, that we regard the preservation of the Biblical idea of God as so important. Men of holy and devout minds (and it is impossible to deny that Spinoza and Fichte were such) have no doubt been driven, in their strong disgust at anthropomorphism, to the pantheistic theory. But we do not see how it can be denied, that the tendency, though taken up by minds naturally religious, was in itself irreligious, and led in other cases, where intellect alone was active, to what De Wette well describes as *Nihilism*. No one whose views and feelings have been formed under the influence of Christianity, can contemplate without deep emotion the possible alternative—whether there shall continue to exist among men, a sustaining and comforting principle of religious belief, in close alliance with an earnest and reverential sense of duty, and exhibiting an object for the highest affections and sublimest hopes—or whether the light of a presiding Intelligence shall die out of the Universe, and the pale hue of moral indifferency shall creep over the manners and institutions of Society, men's thoughts and actions no longer lovingly surrendered to the recognised will of perfect Wisdom and Goodness, but embraced as a particular set of phenomena in the eternal cycle of necessary Causation.*

* See the preface to the 3rd edition of Neander's *Leben Jesu*, with the interesting extract it contains from the biography of Niebuhr. 'A Christianity,' says this distinguished historian, 'without a personal God, without immortality, without human individuality, without historical faith, is no Christianity for me, although it may be a very ingenious and very acute philosophy.'

The correction of this Pantheistic tendency, which at the present day widely pervades the educated mind of Europe, must be sought, we apprehend, less in reasoning and philosophic speculation, than in cherishing the fresh and vigorous life of the religious element in the heart—in cultivating a spirit of pure and lofty devotion. The sense of religion, like that of beauty, is a natural feeling, though capable of development. Both are strengthened by free, spontaneous exercise; both, it is true, require the guidance and correction of the judgment; but both may be deadened and almost destroyed by too much questioning and analysis—too curious an inquiry into their sources, too formal and pedantic an application of the principles of rigid logic. There exists within us the deep consciousness of their existence. Why cannot we be satisfied with that; and simply endeavour to train and perfect by reason, the material which nature herself has provided? As the æsthetic sentiment acquires strength by habitual familiarity with the objects, whether natural or artificial, which furnish its appropriate gratifications; so the religious principle is cultivated by the exercise of those affections, and the entertainment of those views of man's being and condition and relation to the outward world, which most solemnly and affectingly realise the universality of a divine presence to the mind.

For this end we cannot imagine any discipline so effectual as the divine history and poetry of the Bible. We all know the influence of a beautiful literature early imbibed into the young and enthusiastic spirit. How many poets and heroes have owed their first inspiration to the songs they were taught by a nurse or a mother to repeat, or to some history whose exciting page arrested their childish eye in its aimless wandering over the newly opened page of knowledge! The Greeks fed the minds of their youth with the pride of Hellenic blood and the ambition of great deeds, out of the rich poetry of Homer. How is it, that the Bible with its unequalled treasures of beauty and sublimity, is to thousands a sealed book, viewed with a nameless kind of awe almost approaching to aversion, but without love or reverence or enthusiasm? No classical scholar ever left the University, with the same feeling of deadness and indifference towards Virgil or Pindar or

Homer, as thousands entertain for life towards the Bible. His memory teems with the graceful expressions and bright thoughts of the polytheistic literature of Greece and Rome: perhaps he has not one living association with the grander poetry and wisdom of Isaiah or Job. Let it be granted, that the refined influence of the Hellenic mind should have a large share in the higher culture of our youth; it will not be denied by a Christian, that the literature of the Bible has still higher claims, and should produce a far deeper effect. But how is it, so wide a difference exists between the two cases? We believe the whole reason to be this; that the monuments of the heathen mind are studied, as every literature ought to be, with a free, open, fearless spirit, with constant reference to the spirit of the age which produced them, with readiness to admit all the results which they spontaneously yield, with no apprehension of stumbling on conclusions which ought not to be obtained: whereas the Bible is fairly put out of the limits of human judgment and sympathy; it is tried by laws and interpreted on principles that would be acknowledged in no other case. There it lies, insulated and inexplicable—a thing *sui generis*, gazed upon with superstitious wonderment, cut off, in the popular faith, from every affinity with the great general heritage of the human spirit.

Now the whole efficacy of the Bible at this day, as a religious discipline for the mind—as a vehicle for the infusion of the holiest sentiments and convictions—depends, as it seems to us, on its being freed from the trammels of this artificial criticism. We would have it studied honestly and fearlessly from one end to the other, like every other literature—as a simple record of what men, placed under peculiar circumstances, once thought and did and sang. Thus only can it attract the regards of the earnest and the truthful; thus only can it fulfil its high function of ministering *true religious feeling* to the mind of man through successive generations; thus only will its central brightness of monotheistic truth, reflected from an infinity of objects, and broken into many-coloured rays by the various media through which it is passed, become conspicuous in all its richness and variety. We

would have no arbitrary restraints and limitations laid upon those who are entering on its thoughtful study. We would trust it alone with the natural piety and reverence of the human heart. We would have critics lecture on the old Hebrew psalmody and oracles, as they lecture on Homer, Dante and Shakspeare. We have the antique chronicles of the Israelitish race interpreted as freely and as naturally as Herodotus or Froissart. We would understand the words of Christ not less than those of John and Paul, with the same freedom and truthfulness and with the same unperverted reference to the influences under which he lived and taught, with which we now criticise and interpret the Memorials of Socrates. We have no fear of the result. If there is religion in the human heart, and religion in the Bible, as we believe there is in both, let them only meet in perfect simplicity and honesty, and the power of religion will be strengthened among men. Much, no doubt, that is now superstitiously cherished, will and must go; many forms of speech, the natural and unconscious utterances of a by-gone age, but become a dead formula for us, will have to be rendered into their modern equivalents. It matters not; the living Spirit will only come out more clear and strong from the refining process—to season human hearts, and build up in them an enduring faith in the Father, merciful and just, provident through all time of the moral welfare and progress of his children.

It is distressing to think, how the best interests of humanity have been perilled by the injudicious solicitude of those who have undertaken their protection and advocacy. What is the ordinary procedure of apologists? They take in succession the different canonical books of Scripture; they construct an argument, sometimes good, sometimes defective, for establishing their genuineness; then, from the circumstances of the author so ascertained, they infer that whatever he has written, is not only entitled to implicit credit, but must be understood exactly as he has stated it; and because his narrative is intermingled with the miraculous, they claim for every part of it, the direct sanction and authority of God. They are not content to leave what is really divine in it, to produce its own impression; but in the officiousness of their zeal

put forth arguments in its defence, which only excite suspicion by giving way at the first test of criticism. We confess, we have often trembled for religion, when we have noticed the conduct of even its honest advocates. Miracles are urged as the exclusive evidence of divine revelation; they are set *in limine*, and if we will not accept them, we must be shut out from the temple. In the name of truth we protest against such conduct in the friends of religion and the Bible. It is not only unreasonable and unjust, but dangerous; and we are certain, that many who pertinaciously adhere to it, do not see the consequences to which it must lead. We by no means deny the possibility, metaphysical or historical, of miracles. We believe that *spirit*, certainly in God, and possibly in man, has a power over material forces and laws, to which it is impossible for us to pretend to assign a limit.—But miracles, whatever place they may actually hold in the Biblical history, are thrust forward by most Christian Apologists into most disproportionate importance. They are not proofs, but mere impressions on the sense; and when they are represented as confirmations of divine truth, it seems to be forgotten, that their credibility cannot be greater than the strength of the argument proving the genuineness of the book wherein they are reported, and that this rarely exceeds a simple preponderance of probabilities.

We refer those of our readers who can consult the original, to the excellent and calmly reasoned observations of De Wette on this subject (§ 60). We would gladly, if our space permitted it, extract the whole of them. We must content ourselves with a concluding paragraph. It will be seen, that he is no denier of the possibility of miracles. ‘A moderate and judicious scepticism may be safely conceded to the believing inquirer into the Christian Scriptures: and it is a sensitiveness indicating a deficiency in education and mental freedom, no less than in charity, when many believers feel annoyed at such a treatment of the miraculous histories of the Gospels. What they wish, were they distinctly conscious of it, would properly be this, that the Christian community should only consist of such, as either do not think at all on this subject, or else have succeeded, with

their mode of viewing it, in putting down or dispelling all doubts: that they desire, in fact, a separate Church, to the exclusion of all the rest, which is as unreasonable as it is harsh. The result of a sober criticism of the Gospels amounts to this, that the traditions of the miraculous are substantially historical—that Jesus did work miracles; and this result is confirmed by the fact, that the Apostle Paul not only speaks of his own miraculous powers, but also attests their existence among the first Christians.' (P. 311.)

Phileleutherus Anglicanus remarks in a spirit equally enlightened and charitable (§ 44. n. 14): 'We think it a mistake to assume that the miracles are, *for us*, the evidence of the divine mission of Jesus. Had there been no such wonders, the Christian religion would not have been less true. We are convinced that the miracles were not merely parables—that an *act* in every case accompanied the instruction which was given; but there are some who cannot convince themselves of this, and for them the religious truth takes the place of the historical.' In a similar strain the late Dr. Arnold expresses himself in a letter to Dr. Hawkins.* 'You complain,' says he, 'of those persons who judge of a Revelation, not by its evidence, but by its substance. It has always seemed to me, that its substance is a most essential part of its evidence, and that miracles worked in favour of what was foolish or wicked, would only prove Manicheism. We are so perfectly ignorant of the unseen world, that the character of any supernatural power can be only judged of by the moral character of the statements which it sanctions; thus only can we tell whether it be a revelation from God, or from the Devil.'—We feel a satisfaction in confirming our own views by such authorities as these.†

* Arnold's Life and Correspondence, ii. p. 221.

† It is remarked by Bretschneider (Glaubenslehre, § 40), that the use of miracles as a scientific proof of revelation, has come into vogue chiefly since the commencement of the last century. The older Protestant theologians attached a very subordinate importance to them. He quotes Chemnitz and Gerhard. The latter says expressly, '*miracula, si non habuerint doctrinæ veritatem conjunctam, nihil valent.*' Luther saw their true value. He laid most stress on the spiritual miracle of the Gospel. Outward miracles he regarded as *signs*, needful at the founding of the Church to excite and fix attention among the ignorant multitudes, who required to be attracted in this way, as children are tempted (such are his own words) by offering them apples and pears.

When the Bible is once laid open, like any other literature, to free but not irreverent search, we shall still want men to act as the living organs of its spirit—men whose own hearts and wills are in direct communion with that spirit, and who have conviction and enthusiasm to propagate its sanctifying influences in the earth. Let it not be thought profane, if we say that the modern preacher, in relation to the co-existing civilisation, should in some degree be endowed with the faculty, and exercise the functions, of the ancient prophet. Religion should be the governing inspiration of his being—the power from which he acts and speaks—the gifted vision in which he sees all things. But how are such spirits to be discerned, elected, and devoted to the work? We know that they exist; but they are not of every day or of every place. In some Churches there is a practice of admitting to the ministry those only who afford what is deemed satisfactory evidence of religious conversion. The test, we fear, is generally an artificial one, and measured by a creed. But the idea though misrepresented and misapplied, expresses a truth. We do want for the ministry, men of religious hearts and an earnest spirit. It would be presumption to undertake to show, how such men are to be found; it will hardly be deemed less so, to suggest how they cannot. We are, however, decidedly of opinion, that it is undesirable to draw men into the ministry, as a decent means of future subsistence, by too freely offering facilities for the preliminary education. We gladly acknowledge, that many excellent men have been put into the road of distinguished public usefulness by this means; but such men would have been eminent, and have forced their way into life, without the system of eleemosynary aid, which tends, we are convinced, in its general result to the production of formalism and mediocrity. We object, as a rule, to devoting young people from an early age, before they have had sufficient experience to test adequately their own tastes and powers, to a vocation—which above all others requires a peculiar aptitude of feeling and disposition and a certain moral enthusiasm and spiritual-mindedness, to make it successful—which, if well sustained, is one of the noblest—if followed mechanically, is perhaps the meanest—of all human employments.

We should like to see the whole system of exhibitions and bursaries remodelled. If men are really in earnest to enter on a certain course of life to which they feel themselves called, for which they feel themselves gifted—they will be sure in some way or other to accomplish their object. The toil and the struggle will test their ability and their steadfastness; and if they succeed at last, they will only be more eminently qualified for the work, by this severe disciplinary process. Instead of securing from the commencement to the close of the Academic career, a certain amount of annual assistance, of which the conditions are with no great difficulty fulfilled, and which is only forfeited by gross misconduct or proved incapacity—we should like to try the effect (we have a persuasion it might work well) of converting the same sum into premiums of various degrees of value, to be obtained after thorough examinations for work actually *done*—funds not given beforehand as an inducement to study, but study fairly earning its own recompence in a proportionate allowance of funds. It seems to us, that bounty is bestowed in the wrong place: it would be better to do *less*, in the way of pecuniary assistance, for the introductory studies of the ministry, and *more* to place the ministry itself on a comfortable and respectable footing in the world, exempt from depressing cares and anxieties, and furnished with ampler means of usefulness and moral influence. We artificially force into existence a supply of well-educated minds, and then suffer numbers of them to pine away, because we provide no soil for them to take root in, no cherishing atmosphere to draw out their powers and mature their fruit. Were there reasonably assured spheres of competent maintenance, affording free, unembarrassed scope for the exercise of high moral and spiritual endowments in the inculcation and diffusion of Christian truth, minds of energy and devotedness would come forth from their retirement and fit themselves for them; and the accession of such minds, drawn from different ranks, would render the spheres themselves more honourable and more productive.

There exists in some quarters an irrational prejudice against persons quitting a secular employment, after they have reach-

ed manhood, for the service of the ministry. They are looked upon as a sort of irregular practitioners, who have not passed through the needful course of training. But these after all are the men most likely to produce a deep and beneficial effect on their contemporaries. Some of the best preachers have been furnished by this class. They take up the ministry, because they are full of zeal for truth and goodness, and desire to act with healing influence on the mass of human crime and woe. Their knowledge of the world, their acquaintance with its affairs, and their experience of its realities, have supplied just that kind of discipline, which is required for practical usefulness, and which those whose sole preparation has been studious and scientific, who have seen the world through the coloured medium of books and systems, often feel the want of through their whole lives. Access afforded them to the necessary theological instruction, and suitable preliminary attainments in the languages and the elements of science being insisted on, before they were permitted to partake of it—conjoined, we must add, with a sounder public opinion in congregations preventing the engagement of incompetent and illiterate men—we do not believe, that a large increase of ministers of this description would at all tend to lower the intellectual and cultivated tone of the vocation, and would certainly infuse into it new life and earnestness. A religious mind is essentially a refined mind. A high sense of duty and of the important objects set before them, would awaken in such men an enthusiasm for study, and a quickness to turn every opportunity of knowledge to the best account, which would achieve in the course of a few years a far larger amount of actual attainment and thorough self-culture, than is often attained in the dull and sluggish career of an ordinary mind through the whole period of school and college life. Besides, though there will ever be need of learned theologians, men who go to the original sources for their knowledge—(and such will never fail in a free country)—we have now chiefly in view, men of a different class—preachers—men whose element is practical religion—men deeply imbued with the Scriptural spirit and conversant with the treasures of their native literature—sufficiently enlightened and instructed to be above fanati-

cism, and capable of handling the main points of philosophical and theological controversy, but eminent rather for the gifts of fervent utterance and deep moral influence than for either taste or capacity to engage in critical subtleties or studious research.

We must add a word or two on the course of academic instruction for the training of ministers of religion. The conductors of such a course will naturally be the men of learning and study. Here, then, will be the critical point of contact between the scientific and the popular world. We have said, that the admission to such a course should be guarded by the demand of such prerequisites of attainment, as would exclude incompetent pupils, and prevent the instruction from being lowered and debased to meet their capacity. It should be sufficiently long to embrace a comprehensive view of the chief branches of religious and theological knowledge, and incentives might be applied to a closer study of one or more or all of these, by offering scholarships, or premiums for proficiency, of the kind already described.

The field of theological instruction naturally divides itself into three great heads. There is, first, the study of the Scriptures. We need not add anything to what has been already said, on the spirit in which this should be conducted. It has sometimes appeared to us an error and a deficiency in the laying out of a theological course, not only that too much time was devoted to an exposition of the merely critical apparatus of Scriptural study, (of which the sources should of course be indicated) instead of carrying the pupil at once to the heart of the Biblical contents, and enabling him to penetrate to their living spirit,—but also, that, when the Scriptures had been fairly laid open, and the student shown how to use them, it was supposed that the theological education was complete. This is the old Protestant notion of the sole sufficiency of the Scriptures. The Scriptures are undoubtedly the foundation of theological knowledge; but we may fearlessly affirm, that he whose knowledge was limited to them, however sound and critical it might be, would not understand Christianity in the whole length and breadth of its historical significance, and would be wholly incompetent

to encounter innumerable questions that must come before him at the present day.

The second head, therefore, of a theological course would be—the history of Religion, and especially of Christianity, exhibiting that long course of successive developments of doctrine and usage and feeling—one great radical belief working at bottom through its whole extent—which links the age of the Apostles with the present condition of the world.

But there is a third and a more important head of instruction, indispensable, as we regard it, to complete the education of a minister and a practical theologian, which has been omitted, at least for the last generation or two, in the Academies of those who have been called the rational Dissenters, or only very inadequately represented by that most unsatisfactory of all subjects, as usually treated—the Evidences. We could not describe it as Divinity lectures—though under that name something like it was taught in the Academies of Taylor and Doddridge and Jennings—for these were occupied with the exposition of a system mainly doctrinal. Neither would the German designation, Religious Philosophy (*Religion-Philosophie*) express exactly what we mean, for it implies something too purely speculative. Practical theology, again, would too much exclude the speculation. Nevertheless all these terms represent certain elements of what we feel to be needed. If narrowing our view for the moment to Christianity alone, or considering the subject of Religion in general as an appendage to it, we were to describe our first head as Scriptural Christianity, and our second as Historical Christianity, we should describe our third as Christianity considered in relation to the actual state and demands of society.

We have been too much in the habit of considering Christianity as a thing of the past; and that view of it injuriously narrows its influence over us. It is, on the contrary, a present fact, a living interest in the midst of us; and only he who has been taught so to contemplate it, who has considered all that it involves and implies, and studied it in its connexion with our manners, our institutions, our literature, our tendencies—will be able to fill his place wisely in the vast and complex system of the world, and

see how the Church, as one of its manifold elements, can be made to ennoble and purify it. Setting out from an acknowledged fact, the subject will, from its commencement, carry along with it a greater air of reality. It will first branch off into psychological analysis, and pass onwards to wide philosophical views, blended with the results of Scriptural and Historical Christianity; and will then descend again to a nearer view of the actual face of the religious world, its churches, and its sects, its Christian and philanthropic associations, the constitution and usages of the particular religious body, to whose wants the whole course of instruction has a more immediate reference — its dangers, difficulties, responsibilities and prospects—the obligations of public worship and Christian ordinances, and the influence of personal example and activity in the general furtherance of the religious life. Led through such a course by an experienced instructor, young men would not find themselves completely at sea when they stepped out of the Academy into the world. They would be conscious of a mediating influence between the abstract propositions of science and the concrete demands of practice. They would bring with them some previous sense of their position in the world; and if on all controverted points they could not be expected to have made up their minds, they would, at least, stand secure for a time on provisional ground, and without relinquishing their mental freedom, link themselves in the bonds of cheerful duty with the great world of human action and sympathy.

ART. II.—ENGLAND'S WEAK POINT.

Political Economy and the Philosophy of Government; a Series of Essays selected from the works of M. de Sismondi; with an Historical Notice of his Life and Writings, by M. Mignet. London: John Chapman, Newgate Street, 1847.

AN American from the United States cannot live many weeks in this country and hear our free sentiments, without learning the alarm and disgust with which we view the slavery upheld by their Southern citizens: and we generally regard it as wholesome to those vain-glorious republicans to become aware of the opinion which pervades all Europe on this subject. We fear it must be retorted, that over the whole civilized world, wherever the opulence and strength of England is admired and envied, reproach and scorn is cast upon us, not only for the misery of Ireland (which must not here be touched), but on account of the degradation of the British poor, in town and country. In vain do we plead this and that excuse. When the fruit is bad, the foreigner pronounces condemnation, without troubling himself to ascertain what blights the tree: this labour he generally casts upon *us*; and to us assuredly it belongs. Sometimes the reproof comes upon us from hearts so pure and minds so calm, that if we could but learn wisdom from them it would be a most choice privilege. At any rate, when such men speak, their words deserve to be well pondered, and the more so, because they do not gratify our self-complacency. Even when they wholly fail of suggesting a remedy, we must not infer that we are exculpated from devising one ourselves, if they have faithfully pointed out the public evil.

Such are a few of the self-reproving thoughts which an Englishman may feel on perusing many of the pages of Sismondi; a writer of first-rate merit in history and politics, and one whose sympathy with the poor and discernment of the true good of men and of nations must give weight to all his moral convictions concerning the right and wrong of our results. On some of these we intend particu-

larly to dwell. In political economy, however, as understood by English writers, we are unable to feel any respect for his writings: and this part of the subject we are forced to dismiss before proceeding to the other. Our science he is pleased to name *chrematistics*, (or, as he misspells it, *chresmatistique*,) a term which in Aristotle means, "the art of money-getting." Although the word *economy* has long borne in English the sense of *parsimony* or *frugality*, and the Greek notion of "the moral government of a house" is no part of its popular acceptation, the author is angry with our Economists for not including Politics in their science. His Economy is, in fact, identical with the science of Human Government; for it is, he says, a providing for the *happiness* of man in society. Yet surely the "chrematistics" have as much right to treat of wealth, as he of man's social welfare. It would be as fair to complain of a mathematician or chemist for not aiding us towards Virtue, as to declaim against a political economist who has plainly announced the scope of his treatise, because it does not lead a nation towards Happiness.

When and where the Economist has a right to rule in Politics, is often a delicate question of practical statesmanship: nor is a better example needed, than a Ten Hours Bill, where (rightly or wrongly) the interests of morality are alleged on one side, and pecuniary claims on the other. But there are extreme and clear cases as to which there is no doubt. If a well-meant political measure is discerned by the Economist to act fatally against the pecuniary *rights* of whole classes and in its rebound to injure all, he here is able to speak with the solemn voice of a moralist and a legislator, although his immediate function is to pronounce concerning Wealth, and not concerning Virtue or Happiness.

As we have commenced by expressing a total disrespect for Sismondi's Political Economy, it is incumbent on us to state some reasons; but it would be tedious and very unprofitable to refute in detail the endless fallacies and absurdities which entangle every page which he writes on the subject. Although a few parts of his argument refer to France, in which the Government fosters manufactures by monopoly, he generally has England in view in his criticisms, and frequently notes that we are the most eminent

example of all that he is stating. The false facts concerning us on which he proceeds, are a perfect curiosity; exceeding in ingenious blunders our most ignorant and fanatical Protectionists. He assumes as certain truth, that a manufacturer who desires to undersell his neighbours has power (with that intent) to lower the rent which he pays to his landlord, the interest of his borrowed capital and the wages of his workmen: that by this process the wages have been beaten down to the lowest sum which will support human life; that they keep sinking with the cheapening of food, clothes and other necessities,—with the increase of capital and with the improvements of machinery: that skill in the workman is needless, and unskilfulness does not affect the value of the fabric: that the master suffers during a strike so much less than the men, that the men have no chance of making a *fair bargain* with him: that workmen are gradually giving place to steam-engines, which threaten to supersede human beings entirely: that our complicated machinery is principally devoted to produce delicate fabrics which the poor cannot wear: that we habitually produce more than persons desire to consume, if they had the means: that there is a glut of food, as well as of manufactures, and that the landlords' rent is perpetually sinking, from the system of large farms and over-production; that the actual consumption of food in England is immensely decreasing, from the inability of the poor to purchase: that to the doctrine and persuasion of our Economists, we must ascribe the introduction of large farms, large capital and improved machinery. We need hardly add, that every one of these supposed facts is false, and most of them monstrously false. But his mistakes as to the theories of those whom he is opposing, are equally flagrant. To take two eminent examples, which may seem enough to prove that he had never read the original works of Ricardo and Malthus: he treats all our Economists, (mentioning these two several times by name,) as teaching that Rent is one of the elements which determine the price of an article (p. 171); and in another passage he affects to give the definitions of Rent as enunciated by these two writers; but is so vague or erroneous, that his translator is forced to correct him in a note (p. 160). He further

undertakes to refute Malthus's doctrine of population, but so entirely mistakes it, as himself to do nothing but restate Malthus's own conclusions (p. 230); which are,—that not only is there an ultimate and distant limit to the possible multiplication of human beings on the earth; but there is at every time a pressure of population against food, unless each individual exercises a prudential restraint on himself, so as not to marry until he has a reasonable prospect of being able to support a family. Sismondi so often repeats this, that we look upon it as a moral certainty that he had not even cursorily turned the pages of the author whom he is depreciating. And here indeed is one preliminary absurdity; that while engaged in a science which (he says) is to establish what *ought to be*,—such as his fundamental proposition, “Income ought to increase with Capital,”—he supposes himself to be in collision with our science, which professedly teaches only what *is*. For all the corollaries of our Economists concerning happiness, whether right or wrong, are undoubtedly mere offshoots and unessential to their science.

We shall only add, that his practical recommendations (when he condescends to give them) are generally of so visionary a nature, as to imply a total ignorance of the concerns which he is criticizing. Every tiro in our Economy knows that wages rise, in consequence of the desire to find employment for new capital. Sismondi deprecates this process, and dreads too much capital. Capital, says he, is a good thing; but there may be too much capital; *if that, and not the demand for consumption, excites production* (p. 243). So, the manufacturer is first to learn whether people want more or cheaper calico, before he makes it! as if there were any way of ascertaining the public need, except by sending the article into the market, with the price affixed. In order (it seems) to lessen the dangerous growth of capital, he admires the Egyptian invention of building “pyramids, which could not be sold in the market” (p. 177); and this he describes as “taking something from the rich to pay wages to the poor.” In the same spirit he wishes government, when work is slack, to employ the poor in public works, unproductive or productive, indifferently (p. 221). Lastly, he arrives at the con-

clusion, that the sovereign authority of every state should ascertain the collective incomes of all the individuals of the community, and should regulate the production of each class by the wants of consumption, as in a private family; should watch over and restrain particular interests to make them subservient* to the general interest, and never lose sight of the formation and distribution of income. It will indeed be a sad day for England, when our statesmen take on themselves to regulate production and income. But this is a practical absurdity that could not be whispered in the councils of a vast and complicated empire. Here therefore we take leave altogether of Sismondi as an economist; yet we have a few words for his translator, who has prefixed an elaborate preliminary essay of considerable ability, with far greater caution and knowledge than his author, and in a kindred philanthropic strain.

The translator so far sympathises with Sismondi's declamations against competition, as more than once to assume that there is some other measure of the *worth* of a man's labour than that which competition furnishes. We are not able to find what this is. In lower or in higher life alike, competition settles the workman's due. Literary labour is ill repaid in Germany, because of the abundance of men competent to execute it. Sculpture was cheap in ancient Greece, designing is dear in England, from the operation of the same principle as that which makes melons dear with us and cheap in Persia. The translator writes, p. 69:—

“Slavery itself is only the extreme form of the influence and the power of property; and one can hardly see how he who says you may take advantage of † a glut of labour to pay a man *less than his*

* The word *subservient* is here chiefly objectionable.

† A transient glut of labour cannot happen, except by a sudden loss or locking up of capital or by a sudden and short immigration. Even in these cases, it may be impossible or cruel to keep up the wages. After a year of calamitous speculation, like 1825, men with lessened capital *cannot* pay the same wages as before. If hungry Irishmen rush in during harvest time, is it mercy or cruelty to refuse to employ them? They cannot be employed without lowering the wages of others. When the glut of population is permanent, the wages must permanently sink, unless a part of the people is to be starved outright. Will the translator call this sinking of wages taking *an unjust advantage* of the times?

labour is worth, and to gather to yourself an undue share of the profit, can deny that you are justified in availing yourself of the condition of the slave."

This sentence appears to us to involve confusion of thought on a highly critical subject. Our present position is not only not analogous, but is intensely opposed to that of slavery: its very sufferings arise from just the opposite causes. The slave is bound too closely to his master; the operative not closely enough. The slave always gets what supports him as an animal, and never more, however great the value of his work: the free workman is never sure of animal support, yet may receive far more, because he gets on the average what *his work* is worth, whether much or little. The slave complains that the law will not allow him to refuse to work for his master; is the operative's complaint at all like this, when he demands that the law shall force the master to hire him, and dictate the rate of wages, without the master's agreement? But, says the translator,* there is a *glut of population*: so that the operative cannot make an advantageous bargain! As he also says that there is a *glut of commodities*, we might leave these two assertions to refute themselves, were it not certain that he is not so ignorant as to include *food* among the redundant things. If however the evil is a deficiency of food, it is clear that no legislative dictation to master manufacturers can cure it. If the screw is to be applied any where, it is to the establishments of the rich; who, if the executive

* We think the translator mistakes, in common with his author, when he urges (p. 105), that since "the commodity brought to market by the workman is *life*, and he must sell it or die," therefore the workman cannot get a just price from his master. This is the extreme and exceptive case. After a little prosperity, workmen are rich enough to bear a strike which inflicts severe loss on the masters, as the latter know by frequent experience; and they are in consequence wise enough to anticipate strikes by raising the wages *whenever the course of trade will allow that to be done*. In fact, they often continue for months to pay wages at a loss rather than lose or irritate their men. But Sismondi and his translator alike know, that a strike must fail, when it demands higher wages than the master is able to pay. If the legislature may step in and interfere with the contract of the parties, because the men's *life* is a "commodity which will not keep," the principle would seem to include the sale of mackerel, milk, and other perishable articles. Parliament might dictate how many strawberries each family in London should eat, and at what prices. But to be serious, fixed capital, if not used, entails a loss so severe, that the masters who possess it are always sufficiently amenable to the men.

could possibly enforce such a law, would with benefit to the poor be allowanced as to the daily consumption of their families and servants.

But here we come to the critical question, what sort of restrictions it is *just* for the legislature to impose on one class for the supposed benefit of another. Sismondi egregiously errs in thinking that rulers can settle questions of political economy by a computation of what is *expedient*: on the contrary, the first and overwhelming question is what is *just*. He in fact allows it to slip out that even on the field of Politics our practical economy has here the advantage of his; for he confesses (p. 219) that "*it was not justice which dictated*" the monopolies of the trades; the rich, says he, had a double cause for complaint; yet in the end it was not they, but the poor, who complained most loudly; and "their clamours are still so great, that it is scarcely possible* to think of re-establishing such regulations." It is wonderful that this did not show him how vain is the attempt to prosper by that which he confesses to have been injustice. In England, it is the proved injustice of monopoly which has ruined and blasted it. A direct tax upon one class to benefit another, may sometimes be a right thing; it is a kind of poor-law. But to take ten times as much from one as you give to another, with an uncertainty after all who gains, or how much, is a public iniquity. A conviction of this, we say, has finally condemned the old system in England. Yet it is not uninstrucive to trace the steps by which our rulers proceeded. Mr. Huskisson first induced parliament to relax the restrictions on foreign manufactures, upon finding that the executive government was defied by the smuggler. Differential duties favouring the West Indies were further abolished as unjust to the East Indies; and in other respects the doctrine of doing justice to our colonies forced on many relaxations. The laws forbidding the exportation of machinery were repealed, partly because no legal definition could hinder the machines from being carried out in

* Such expressions indicate, what indeed is perpetually implied, that *nothing but the resistance of public opinion* would have hindered Sismondi from reverting to the old monopolies and endless restrictions. We cannot therefore receive the translator's assurance, that his author did not *wish* for this.

parts, but principally by force of the argument, that the prohibition was unfair to the machine makers. The progress of intelligence at length made it clear, that monopoly in every shape and form is essential injustice, to bring good out of which, is to engage in the experiment of "cheating the devil." Now if we are asked, why the evil of this did not develop itself in other ages, we answer, first, that it *did* develop itself in proportion as communities ceased to be isolated. If two petty nations are separated by "mountains, mutual fear" and mutual ignorance, neither seeks to traffic with the other, and the laws which prohibit it are needless and inoperative. But the moment their enmity or ignorance is lessened, and an individual of one nation finds the advantage he can derive from trafficking with one of the other, he feels himself to be injured by a law which forbids it; and with the growth of a free and bold spirit will grow a defiance of the law, or a secret sense of its injustice, undermining patriotism. The state of isolation is one of barbarism, national hatreds and hostility; but from the cessation of that state down to the present day the far more deadly wars which have afflicted Europe are in great measure ascribable to the principle of monopoly, which (next to church property) has been the grand cause of war; while the establishment of the opposite principle would have been a most cogent guarantee of peace. In short, the doctrine which has triumphed in England is not only not a subtle device of false expediency, but it does not found itself upon expediency at all. Its basis is the rock of mutual and universal justice,—between individuals, between corporations, between classes of men, and between nations. If some of its results are for the present painful, then we rest in Faith on the conviction, that we have only to follow on in the same course, and find out *what beside* is just, and all will come right at last.

But herein we are free to admit that many of our leading writers on Political Economy are defective, and practically mislead in too readily assuming the basis of English property to be just. They rightly maintain that a man ought to be able to sell freely *that which is his own* in the market of the world, and get the highest price for it; but they are apt to assume (or appear by their tone of reasoning to

assume) that that is certainly a man's *own** which the law has hitherto regarded as such. It is but recently that our law held black men to be the chattels of white. A planter was at liberty to sell the children apart from the mother, and rend away at his caprice the wife from the husband; and our lawyers, as lawyers, were bound to justify it. On this we now look with horror; but who shall say that the next generation may not feel the same horror at the power now possessed by a British or Irish landlord to unpeople his estate. *His estate, in sooth!* The land on which God intended our nation to live, is counted as the private property of an individual! And what is his proof of ownership? He appeals to certain parchments, certain decisions of judges, or certain acts of parliament. And can a parliament of landlords in ancient times vote away to itself the nation's land, and bestow on itself the right of expatriating those who live on it? We have heard of the omnipotence of parliament, as of the impeccability of the sovereign: but everybody knows that this means merely that the constitution has provided no check on the power of the one nor punishment for the misconduct of the other. We well imagine the wrath which many a landlord and lawyer would feel at reading our words; but the wrath of a slaveholder at the idea of revolutionizing "domestic institutions" is as great, and can equally appeal to the sanction of a sovereign legislature and to the common topics of Conservatism. We *submit* to the law, while it exists as such; but we are not bound to *justify* it: nay, when we see what is legal to be oppressive, we are bound to protest on fit occasion against it. Unless Economists refrained far more anxiously than they are wont to do, from all comment on the desirable and the just, they ought not to have reasoned calmly and approvingly on the pecuniary gain to the landlord from Scotch and Irish clearances, and to have entirely

* In like manner parents have been allowed by law to sell a child's labour in the market, almost as if the child were a slave. The child is the parent's to foster, to protect and to instruct, but not theirs to make money by. If it proved requisite for the protection of infancy, it would be just to forbid the parent to receive any part of that which the child earned. A father who neglects to feed, clothe and otherwise support his own child, forfeits a large part of a father's rights. Some Economists might seem almost to think that they were bound to hold that children are their parents' *property*.

ignored the moral injustice done to the people. Rights in land should grow up with the growth of the nation ; should be adjusted and defined in the progress of time by the customs of the country. Out of these, a fixed system of law ought to form itself, which will protect the poor from the rich, as well as secure the rights of the rich over the poor. But English law has utterly neglected one side of this reciprocity. It has turned the baron's *fief* (or Trust) into the squire's *real property* ; the *land-lord* into the *land-owner* : and most of our Political Economists, going beyond the law, assume that land is a man's own, as much as a book or a coat ; as if no one else had moral rights in it but he, because the law has neglected *to define* the rights of others. That which ought to have been settled by custom, in the course of ages, unhappily cannot now be laid down by the acuteness of a legislator : but since the law is here flagrantly defective, public opinion is needed so much the more vehemently to stigmatize those who take advantage of the law against the industrious and unoffending. To applaud, on economic grounds, the iniquity of these wholesale ejectments, is an offence against morality. Such, we believe, are just causes for Sismondi's indignation. His simple and eloquent denunciation of all such practices cannot be too much read : we only lament that in this book it is mixed with so much that is erroneous, misleading and inflammatory.

We cannot refrain from quoting the following :—

“ The English lawyers have constantly assimilated all political rights to properties, and have defended them under this title. They wished to recognise a property in the political rights of the lords, as they pretended to see one in the exclusive rights of certain burghesses to elect members of Parliament, or municipal magistrates ; as they pretend to see one in the right of the church to its dignities and revenues ; forgetting that when functions are instituted for the advantage of the people, to the people belong the funds by which they are remunerated. English lawyers have scarcely been willing to admit that the community, when it makes progress, has had the right to suppress powers which were burdensome to it ; at least they wished that if the functions were suppressed, the remuneration attached to them should be retained. At the same time, instead of giving attention to institutions different from their own, in order to

guard equally the interests of all those affected by them, they would consider only the single person who obtained by them a pecuniary profit, and they placed this profit in the same class as the possession of a field, or of a house.

"The vast extent of seignorial domains is not a condition peculiar to England. In all the empire of Charlemagne throughout the west, whole provinces have been usurped by warlike chiefs, who obliged the conquered, slaves, and sometimes their companions in arms, to cultivate them for their advantage. In the ninth and tenth centuries, Maine, Anjou, Poitou, were for the counts of those three provinces, three great farms rather than three principalities. Switzerland, which in so many points resembles Scotland, in her lakes and her mountains, in her climate, which so often prostrates the hopes of the labourer, in the character, usages, and habits of her children, was at this period divided among a small number of lords. *If the counts of Kyburg, of Leutzburg, of Hapsburgh, and Gruyères, had been protected by English laws, they would have been now precisely in the condition in which the earls of Sutherland were twenty years ago: some of them, perhaps, might have had the same taste for improvements, and many republics would have been driven from the Alps to make room for flocks of sheep.* But whatever might have been in its origin the right of the counts, the legislation of the whole of continental Europe has not ceased guaranteeing and ameliorating the condition of the feudatories, of the vassals, of the serfs, strengthening the independence of the peasant, covering him with the buckler of prescription, changing his customs into rights, sheltering him from the exactions of his lord, and by degrees raising his tenures to the rank of properties. The law has given to the Swiss peasant the guarantee of perpetuity, whilst to the Scotch lord it has given this same guarantee in the British empire, and left the peasant in a precarious condition. Compare the two countries, and judge of the two systems."

So likewise, we apprehend, our economists are greatly in the dark as to the possible prosperity and happiness of an agricultural population which has a firm tenure of its own soil: perhaps the most valuable part of Sismondi's essays to an Englishman, is where he insists on this subject. As we have no such population before our eyes, we are apt to be incredulous concerning its advantages; or because our own people have not habits adapted to such a system, we hastily conclude that it can never succeed. Sismondi had so intimate an acquaintance with Switzerland and with Italy, both as they are and as they once were, that he has

a right to speak with authority on such a subject ; and his testimony is extremely interesting and important.

"The *château* in France was the residence of the only man who formerly was free in the country ;—the gentleman, who, behind his moats and his walls, secured himself from oppression. The *castello*, in Italy, was the residence of the free men of the country, who associated together to defend themselves, of freemen who had surrounded their abode with a common inclosure, and who had sworn to hasten at the sound of the same bell, to repulse the same enemies. Let us enter these castles ; they are mostly in ruins, and contain scarcely more than twenty or thirty houses. But the solid and strong walls of these houses of three or four stories high, have resisted war during five centuries, as well as the injuries of time. In general only one story is inhabited ; those who there hide their humble household seem embarrassed with all that space in which they are lost. These houses had been built for men of a very superior condition to those who now inhabit them. They represent an order of men which no longer exists in the community ; which is not found in England, in France, in Holland, in countries where workshops seem overflowing with wealth, any more than now in Italy. *These men of a straitened but independent condition worked with their own hands, in gathering the fruits of their fields, and of their vines ; but they did not divide them with any one ; they reckoned on their own influence to direct the councils of their commune, and on their own swords, when necessary, to defend them ; they felt such an assurance of the stability of their own fortunes, and of those of their children, that they wished to build houses that might last for ever. The Val de Nievole, where these castelli arise round Pescia, their little capital, is not larger than the domain of more than one British peer,*" &c. * * *

"That rural happiness, the picture of which history presents to us in the glorious times of Italy and Greece, is not unknown in our age. Wherever are found peasant proprietors, are also found that ease, that security, that independence, that confidence in the future, which assure at the same time happiness and virtue. The peasant who does, with his children, all the work on his little inheritance, who neither pays rent to any one above him, nor wages to any one below him, who regulates his production by his consumption, who eats his own corn, drinks his own wine, is clothed with his own flax and wool, cares little about knowing the price of the market ; for he has little to sell, and little to buy, and is never ruined by the revolutions of commerce. Far from fearing for the future, it is embellished by his hopes ; for he puts out to profit for his children, or for ages to come, every instant which is not required by the labour

of the year. Only a few moments, stolen from otherwise lost time, are required to put into the ground the nut which in a hundred years will become a large tree; to hollow out the aqueduct which will drain his field for ever; to form the conduit which will bring him a spring of water; to ameliorate, by constant attention, all the kinds of animals and vegetables by which he is surrounded. This little patrimony is a true savings-bank, always ready to receive his little profits, and usefully to employ all his leisure moments. The everlasting power of nature makes them fruitful, and returns them to him a hundred fold. The peasant has a strong feeling of the happiness attached to the condition of proprietor. Thus he is always eager to purchase land at any price. He pays for it more than it is worth, more than it will return perhaps; but what a reason he has to esteem at a high price the advantage of thenceforward always employing his labour advantageously, without being obliged to offer it cheap; to find always his bread when he wants it, without being obliged to buy it dear.

"It is Switzerland particularly that must be gone over, that must be studied, to judge of the happiness of peasant proprietors. Switzerland must be known, to be convinced that agriculture, practised by those who gather the fruits of it, suffices to procure great comfort to a very numerous population; great independence of character, the fruit of an independent situation; great exchange of what is consumed, the consequence of the well-being of all the inhabitants, even in a country where the climate is rude, the soil moderately fertile, and where late frosts, and uncertain seasons, often destroy the hopes of the labourer. Whether we pass through the cheerful Emmenthal, or bury ourselves in the most distant valleys of the canton of Berne, we cannot see without admiration, without being affected, those wooden houses of the least peasant, so vast, so well closed, so well constructed, so covered with carvings. In the interior every detached chamber of the numerous family opens into large corridors; each room has only one bed, and it is abundantly provided with curtains and with coverings of the whitest linen; furniture, carefully kept, surrounds it; the closets are full of linen: the dairy is large, well ventilated, and exquisitely neat; under the same roof are found provisions of corn, of salt meat, of cheese, and of wood; in the stables are seen the most beautiful cattle in Europe, and the best attended to; the garden is planted with flowers; the men as well as the women are warmly and properly clad—the last preserve with pride their ancient costume, and bear in their countenances the marks of vigour and of health; they are striking from that beauty of feature which becomes the character of a race, when for many generations it has suffered neither from vice nor from want.

Let other nations boast of their opulence ; Switzerland may always with pride place its peasantry in opposition to it."—P. 134.

The eagerness of the peasant to purchase land will often lead him to buy with borrowed money ; to his own frequent misery : but the state may easily hinder this, by declaring all mortgages null and void which are made upon landed properties less than a certain size ; in which case no usurer will be found to lend to the peasant for such a purpose. Equally might the law forbid the subdivision of land by pronouncing sales, gifts or bequests void, which attempted to constitute estates smaller than a certain limit : and in case of the proprietor dying intestate or his will thus becoming void, it might either award the whole to his eldest son, or order it to be sold entire and divided among the widow and children. So much we throw out, chiefly to indicate, that if we applied ourselves seriously to the aim of constituting a peasant proprietary, (which is evidently to our mind a great want of Great Britain, and still more urgently of Ireland,) it would not be impossible to devise remedies for the evils which are so confidently predicted as certain to follow from the measure. Such little proprietors would in no case supersede the rest of our English system, but they would improve it. They would give our labourers and little tradesmen something to save their money for. They would allow small farms to be consolidated, without ejecting the little farmers from the country and depressing their sons into day-labourers. Such peasant owners would fill up a gap between rich farmers and their workmen ; and the elevation of the country people would save the towns from becoming drains into which the misery of the country flows. This is at present the deformity and the foul spot on England. The towns cannot be much improved, till the country is made to maintain its own poor ; made, not by acts of Settlement, which will be often mischievous and as often evaded, but by a continuous development of rural industry. Without this, a morbid increase of our towns will go on, to the demoralization of the masses and ultimate extreme danger to property in town and country.

There is no state of serfdom or slavery, but, when esta-

blished, finds its ingenious advocates. If we believe Trans-Atlantic politicians, American negroes are a people much to be envied for their safe and unanxious tranquillity; and we are assured by our Economists, that a day-labourer who lives on wages, enjoys a happy security unknown to the petty freeholder, who is exposed to the contingencies of a bad or good harvest. This doctrine has been propounded in the pages of the Economist, (a very valuable weekly paper,) and was recently enunciated with great authority, by a learned Professor in the Statistical Section of the British Association at Oxford. "It is an axiomatic principle with Economists," said he, "that the labourer *ought not* to be exposed to the uncertainties of the crop;"—whence he drew a decided condemnation of a plan for co-operative peasant-cultivation. As we apprehend this to be a new and spreading fallacy, a few words against it will be here in place.—First, the wages-system does not and cannot give to the labourer the security pretended. If several harvests are bad, prices must rise, and wages cannot rise in the same ratio; the labourer must of necessity suffer something. Next, it not only is not an evil, but it is a positive good, for the labourer to suffer, if *his* crop fails in a worse degree than those of his neighbours: for in no other way will he learn to use due diligence against those mischances which human care can avert. Thirdly, if it be a good thing for the peasant to acquire prudence and forethought, then it is also good that he should be forced to make the superfluities of one season fill up the shortcomings of another: nor is this too hard a task for him, when he unites the income of labourer, farmer and landlord. Fourthly, we allege, that this combination of several sources of income is precisely what he wants to give stability to his position. A rich man's property is then safest, when it is derived from numerous sources differing much in kind; and this we believe is a current maxim of traditional prudence. A little freeholder who eats his own produce and changes away the surplus, depends in part on the absolute quantity of his crop, in part on its price in the market, and in part on the relative price of his other few necessities or comforts. Except where he is exposed to the inroads of enemies, or has to

pay interest on a mortgage, (which is worse than a rent, and ruins his whole position,) he is so much more independent than a day-labourer for wages can be, that to pity him for having no landlord or wage-payer appears almost hypocritical. Morally, politically and economically, a mixed and complicated condition of society appears to be far more stable than any simpler forms can be. We must not be supposed to wish that *all* our peasants should be proprietors, and that there should be *no* large farms and landlords; but neither do we desire that uniformity of the latter system which our Economists inculcate. We desire to bring back or introduce the Cumberland or the French and Rhenish systems; each according to circumstances; each in a certain proportion, not such as to destroy large farms. It is the *little* farms, the miserable tenures at will, which we wish to see give way: unless anywhere the Lombard plan may be adopted in them. Let them in part be consolidated, in part turned into freeholds: abundant room will remain for all that is good in our present state. When town and country, manufactures, commerce and agriculture, each in its most various developments, good of their own kind, conspire and combine in one system, the whole will then be strongest, and the weakness of any one part most easily relieved.

To effect the improvement at which we point,—besides a willingness on the part of the humane and enlightened landlords to co-operate,—several legal changes appear to be essential: *first*, at least such a relaxation of the laws of Entail, as shall enable all landowners to dispose of a certain proportion of their estate in peasant freeholds: *secondly*, a simplification of the laws of real property, which is for many other reasons urgently needed: *thirdly*, (we imagine) the cancelling of all right of parish relief to every freeholder; and perhaps some other modifications of the Poor Law. Whenever a majority of the English landlords please, they will be able by these enactments, or such as these, to bring about in the course of half a generation without convulsion or difficulty an immense rural revolution. And the sooner it is done, the better for the happiness, moral welfare and permanent security of the nation.

But there is another rural reform of collateral import-

ance, pressed by Sismondi and his translator, which will be quite new in conception to most readers: it is that of giving to the cultivator some proportionate remuneration in the crop, and engaging him fixedly by the year. The evils of hiring men by the week and by the day are exceedingly great; and would hardly need to be detailed, only that our familiarity with the system blinds us to its evils. This is a topic, common alike to town and country; and falls under a principle which reaches all ranks of the mercantile world. We must therefore for a moment enlarge. It is proved by Economists, it is conceded by Parliament, that the State cannot exercise prudence *for* individuals. Nothing then can save us from utter ruin, if the individuals do not exercise this necessary virtue. But our present way of going on discourages prudence, by making it quite uncertain to each, whether his self denial will meet with any reward. The dangerous system of *credit* among the traders, as of *tenant at will* among farmers, and the *hand-and-mouth* system of engaging workmen, are the great and essential causes of our national demoralization. If the present publication shall have impressed readers with the abominable tendencies of this mal-arrangement, it will have effected a really important work. In his denunciation of a *Proletary* caste, Sismondi has put his finger on the sore place of England; but the grievous evils of it are not (as he constantly implies) the result of any encouragement by our legislature, or doctrines of our *Economists*; they result from the want of legislation, and from the fact that whole masses of population have grown up without any political organization at all. Undoubtedly it is a stigma on our age and nation, because it pervades all society. The tenant at will, the household servant hired by the month and turned out on the streets, the peasant day-labourer and the manufacturing operative, all tell the same cruel tale.

Every day-labourer lives on the brink of pauperism. Where his wages are high, he is generally only the more improvident: he has learned to trust to the luck of the market, the changes of which he cannot foresee. As he has no tangible and substantial property, he has far less attachment to the soil and its institutions than he might

have; and this, with his constant liability to be thrown on to the public charity, makes it a legitimate aim for a statesman to discourage by mild but steady enactments this mode of employing labour.

The translator informs us that the system of making labourers joint adventurers in a concern, which has long been so successfully practised in the mines of Cornwall, has been introduced by Lord Wallscourt in his *Irish* estates. Its operation has been such as to stimulate the supine peasant into active industry, and to shed prosperity and gladness over a district that was formerly the abode of famine and despair. In reply to inquiries, Lord Wallscourt said: "I have tried the plan *for seventeen years*, and have found it to answer much beyond my hopes; inasmuch as it completely identifies the workmen with the success of the farm, besides giving me full liberty to travel on the Continent for a year at a time; and on my return, I have always found that the farm had prospered more than when I was present." Lord Wallscourt's practice, it is added, is to reckon every man the investor of as much capital as will yield at five per cent. per annum the sum paid to him in wages; but, we presume, these Irish wages must be very low. If an English peasant receives ten shillings a-week, or £26 a-year as wages, this would make his share in the farm equivalent to that of having invested more than £500 in it; which could not be, except perhaps where very large capital was spent and very few hands employed in great production. But if the *principle* were once introduced generally, experience and competition would soon settle the proportions. Such an arrangement essentially implies that the contract is by the year; and this extension of the time of service, if joined to the custom of giving a quarter's notice of dismissal, would in itself effect a great moral revolution. The translator makes the valuable suggestion (p. 85), that as the hand-and-mouth system demoralizes the population and endangers pauperism, it is justifiable and appropriate to lay a heavy tax upon it by some regulation of the Poor Rates. Of the justness and importance of the principle we do not for a moment doubt. The aim should be, to throw the burden of workmen and their families, when they become paupers, either on those

masters, in town or country, who have hired them by the day or week, if this is the masters' fault ; or on the men themselves, if it is the men's fault. Where a principle is sound, we feel confident that there must exist some mode for making it available by law, in spite of technical difficulties. Public opinion here has to be formed : but it perhaps is not inauspicious, that discontent with the Poor Law is so rife ; for although we hold the old Law to have been far worse than the present, improvements which are greatly needed would be less feasible, if that which exists had any powerful support and less active adversaries.

The extreme unwillingness of manufacturers to allow their pecuniary concerns to be publicly examined, will, we fear, put an insuperable impediment in the way of giving to their workmen a remuneration proportionate to the success of a concern, as long as the present system of credit continues ; besides, that hitherto there have been periodically years of suffering, in which many firms lose instead of gaining. The operation of the wages system has been, in so far, to cast this risk entirely on the master, and give greater steadiness to the *rate* of the workman's remuneration, though not to his absolute income. It would be a fatal thing to allow the men a voice, in the question, whether to suspend or lessen work ; yet it would be scarcely possible to give them a proportionate interest in the business, without their claiming a right to go on producing without intermission. These appear to us formidable obstacles to this arrangement, which some have warmly recommended, in our principal manufactures. But no such difficulties exist, against hiring workmen by the year, in a great variety of trades ; and we are persuaded that thousands of well-disposed masters would do this, and the law would find means of inducing others to it, if the extreme importance of it were rightly understood.

We may scarcely have realized how we should ourselves be affected by an analogous change of circumstances. One who earns from day to day not much more than the day's expenses, who has no independent resources, and who can with difficulty save in the year enough to support a month's failure of work, while it is quite uncertain whether there will be such a failure, seldom has the self-denial to provide

against the possibility. The majority will not be so prudent; and they set the example of expensive habits to all, so as to increase the danger of the position. As Sismondi remarks, p. 152:—

“Ignorant of those commercial interests which they serve, of the wants of the distant markets for which they work, they are engaged or dismissed in consequence of mercantile revolutions which they can neither calculate nor foresee: *they are the victims of all the reverses, of all the mistakes, of all the extravagance, of their employers*.* their own prudence and good conduct are no longer a security to them: their condition is become precarious and dependent, and it is no longer in their own keeping.”

Out of this again rises the too rapid increase of their numbers. Foresight being powerless to save them from misery, but powerful to fill them with anxieties, ceases to be a virtue: a blind trust in Providence, and a blind enjoyment of the present, is the only resource for human nature. When to all this is superadded the prospect that children while still of tender age will be able to earn for their parents more than their food and clothes cost, young people are indisposed to delay marriage even for the one or two years which would enable them to make serviceable preparations for their after-comfort; and while such incitements are at work, the growth of population, independently of immigration from the country, will need a perpetually expanding trade, and industry more and more productive, to feed the new mouths on equally liberal terms. Although the vituperations of manufacturers by Sismondi, for “desiring to work for the world” and for “bringing into existence” multitudinous and puny families, are apt by their exaggeration to drive us into the party of their defenders, we see no one else whom the law can deal with as inciting an unhealthy growth of population, but the employers of the young children. On moral grounds, their work is to be deprecated, as interfering with their education, and as injuring parental authority. Man would become assimilated to the brutes, and family ties would cease before

* We knew an instance, not many years back, of a large firm in Gloucestershire, which failed, owing to the site being too far from coal mines. In consequence, a thousand persons were suddenly turned adrift, and had to migrate, they knew not whither, in search of work.

youths were fully adult, if a parent's care became physically needless as early as some would wish. It is a right of the child, it is also a privilege of the parent, that the child's sustenance should during tender years be the parents' burden. The State could not, without cruelty to all exceptive cases, directly forbid the work of children; yet it is most important to hinder the exception from becoming the rule; and, without committing the same fault as in the case of women working in mines, (against whom an *ex post facto* law was virtually made,) the State might discourage the employment of *future* young children for the parents' benefit or ease. It will be replied, that the evil is not confined to towns:—that country-boys eight years old are set all day to watch the rooks, and their little sisters still younger to work at gloves or a lace pillow. We know and regret it: but the moral evils are not so great in the country, first, because the child's work is worse paid, secondly, because the girls are not separated from the mother's roof. And, whatever the evils in the country, let a suitable remedy be sought, but they do not lessen or defend those of the town.

The only form which presents itself to our minds for discouraging and undermining the moral evils which we have enumerated, is a sort of extension of the Assessed Taxes. We are aware how difficult it is for those who are *without*, to settle any details so as not to be open to practical objections from those who move *within*. This is a common topic: the eye from without alone sees the defect or the evil in its full magnitude, and alone is likely to originate the principle of cure; the eye from within is needed to adjust the process. We would gladly throw on others the burden, if they were willing to take it up, of adopting our principle: and it is chiefly in order to give something tangible to our readers, that we adventure our own suggestion. Suppose a tax of a shilling a-week, and sixpence a-day, to be imposed on every master-tradesman or farmer for every labourer hired by the week or by the day; the shilling tax remaining, unless the contract with the workman is for the whole year. The effect of this law would be, to give a premium to steady and valuable workmen, with whom the masters would willingly make a yearly

engagement, and to expose all new and improvident hands or dissipated characters to the (relative) loss of the tax. In course of time, the tax would not fall on the masters at all, but on the untried or improvident workmen ; and the sums accruing to the Government should be reserved as a fund for relieving these very persons or their families when distress should fall upon them. The taxation of each trade should form a separate fund ; and the officers who gather it and hold the purse perhaps ought not to belong to that trade. Thus there would be the Spinners' Relief Fund, the Printers' Relief Fund, the Builders' Relief Fund, &c. The object of this division, is, that in case a different rate of taxation should prove desirable in different trades, it may be possible to apply this in detail ; and out of this arrangement, an organization of the trades themselves might grow up, if some voice in electing the distributors of the fund were given to the steady workmen. But this idea we throw out merely for consideration. It is here perhaps enough to insist, that the tax which we suggest would effectually incite the masters to struggle to avoid it, and yet not be too severe to be enforced. To a firm of respectable, but not first-rate size, employing 500 hands, the tax of a shilling a-week or 52 shillings a-year would amount to the annual sum of £1,300. Since it would be hard or impossible, in the first instance, to depress the wages and throw the loss on the men, such a firm would at once enter into contract with all its best men by the year : and since a yearly contract *at the existing rate of wages* would be a pure gain to the men, the master would bargain to advantage, and save a large part of the tax by the new contract. Suppose half the men to be thus put on a better footing ; the rest would, by the fact of the exclusion, be marked as of inferior worth ; and in the course of years, if they remained fixedly in this state, we conceive some fall of their wages must take place, so that the master would be ultimately relieved. At the same time, the tax, if levied on children as well as adults, would operate to discourage their labour, in as much as it would be relatively heavier. Without therefore proposing at once anything additional concerning children, we should be willing to wait and see how this would operate.

Unfortunately, this scheme is most obviously applicable, where the workman is paid by his time : but the system of piece-work is so extensively prevalent, and has so many advantages, that unless the principle can be adapted to it, we must admit that this, like many other closet-suggestions, does not meet the demands of the practical man. The modification required, is, to give a premium on *large*, in contrast to *small* orders of the master to his men : and here, distinct regulations for different trades become obviously essential, and we cannot venture even into an illustration, without getting beyond our depth. All that we will say, is, that provided only the State has a machinery which will enable it judiciously to regulate its assessment, the principle which we advocate appears to us to apply alike to piece-work as to working by time.

It may be objected, that if the workmen knew exactly what taxation the master would save by turning them into year labourers,—namely £2. 12. on each,—they would demand exactly so much additional to their own wages. We think this is not correct. At present, the workman is not employed every day or week of the year ; and no annual contract could be made by multiplying exactly the weekly wages into 52. Some average would be struck. Fixed holidays, as of yore, would be agreed upon, and the industrious workman would feel security, relaxation, and comparative freedom from care, to be too great a boon to be risked by struggling for a few more shillings forced out of his master's necessity. It would, we trust, be only the more worthless labourers, and those not likely to have the first offer, who would behave so senselessly.—Besides, it must be remembered that no law of so great importance could be carried in this country without much previous discussion : and masters would foresee it while impending, and before the rate of taxation was fixed ; nor indeed need it be fixed once and for ever ; but the principle being established as for ever, the rate might be held over, *in terrorem*, as likely to be increased, unless the lower sum proved effectual for its purposes. Wise masters would hasten to make a contract acceptable to all good workmen, before the law finally announced what was the loss contingent on failure of so doing.

Well aware as we are how specious upon paper many impossible schemes appear, there is no humility in adding that we bring forward our own plan with diffidence. Yet it is without diffidence that we say, and reiterate, that *a most serious evil exists, an evil of which there undoubtedly is some remedy, an evil which English intelligence is bound to remedy, an evil which has already greatly demoralized the nation and may ultimately work a violent political and social revolution.* Preachers are wanted to enunciate this authoritatively. Although the mischief is a moral one, our ministers of religion generally dread to dogmatize on doubtful ground, if they touch upon that which is also political. The most estimable and the lukewarm alike shrink from such topics; the fanatic turns them to the discreditable service of party, and the amiable enthusiast vapours over sentimental visions and sighs after impossibilities. Meanwhile, our people are degenerating, the bonds of society dissolving; and it is no man's duty or right to force the fact and its cause on public attention. The hands of the government are full of work, and Parliament cannot get through the railway schemes. In such a vacancy of true labourers in a great and critical cause, we are driven to cast an eye of melancholy satisfaction on firebrand demagogues and traders in philanthropy; as co-operators, if not in the ends which we desire, yet at least in arousing the public.

From this point of view indeed, we even look without disfavour on the banding of the operatives into Trade Unions. Hitherto their demands have generally been most senseless and ill-timed; their tyranny over their own members glaring and indefensible; their attempts to dictate to their masters unbearable. Nevertheless, without these Unions as thorns in their sides, the masters would be too contented with present things, and opposed to every change. Now, not only are they so kept in fear, that even the least merciful is forced to study the humours of his men; but this constant uneasiness may at length open the eyes of some to see what they need. For the very same *permanency of contract*, which will morally raise the workmen, will also free the master from "strikes,"—which now come just at the moment when he most deprecates them;—and in fact, no other principle can break up the union of men with

men, by making it less important than that of men with master. As long as the legislature neglects this topic, we shall look on the Trade Unions as a morbid, yet natural growth, by which the vitality of our social life struggles against existing evils.

We have touched above on the system of *Credit* as a great mischief to the mercantile community: we are aware that it is also, when legitimately used, of the very greatest convenience, and in its most cautious applications free even from anxieties. Yet, as it is certain that a sensible fraction of traders and of bankers will always be deficient in prudence precisely at the moment when prudence is needed, if there is any mild discipline of the State which will enforce this virtue by lessening the temptations to deviate from it, such an application of public law is surely desirable. Our taxes on Stamped Receipts are in principle ridiculous; for they are a tax on prudence or on receiving one's due. We bear with them, only because it is felt that the Government must have money. Would it be impossible (we ask under correction) to transfer these taxes and any others of the kind, so as to press entirely on the borrowing of money or deferring payment? The needy aristocracy would resist it, as far as the credit given to them by shops is concerned; but if the principle were first established in the greater money market, it would gradually find its way into retail trade. The first step would be, to tax what are called "bills of accommodation" in proportion to the length of time which they run; and (in so far as legal formulas can be devised) more heavily in proportion to the risk.

Our law is very merciful towards debtors and bankrupts, compared with that of antiquity. We would not have it otherwise. But it establishes a corresponding *right*, as over the trader, and *duty*, as towards the community, to take measures that men shall not become bankrupts. Even short of actual bankruptcy, a man inflicts a heavy evil on society, who by want of prudence miscarries in a large business, and sends adrift the innocent families who had submitted to him as their head. The law therefore would be strictly acting within its own limits, if it applied a sharp check on *working with borrowed capital*. Railways

are not allowed to borrow beyond a certain ratio to the capital paid up: and it is possible that the state of Ireland may convince many that there ought to be a law to limit the amount of possible mortgages on land.

If however no check to unwise borrowing can be gained from this side, at any rate such publicity of transactions might be insisted on, as to give greater health to the system of Credit. At present both the Bank of England and all the Railways are forced to publish their accounts. If the same were already customary with *all* banks, no one would think this hard; nor indeed would any mercantile houses or other great establishments. In a really healthy state no one objects to publicity; there seems therefore no reason why the principle should not be pressed gradually on so as to become in time normal to us. Not that we could advise any immediate measure as regards existing establishments. But there would be no hardship in an act ever so stringent, concerning all *new* banks; and a term of years might be allowed for the old ones to work themselves into the state in future to be prescribed.

If such regulations had been for some time in operation, publicity of all large concerns having become customary, the public feeling on this matter would undergo a change; direct taxation would be much less irritating than at present, and some prospect might be opened of the workman getting *one* part of his remuneration by a fixed salary, and *another* part in a fixed ratio to the profits of the concern. Although legislation cannot dictate such arrangements, it can prepare a sphere within which they become possible or natural.

Both Sismondi and his translator appear to us to do what is unwise, as well as unjust, in indiscriminate vituperation of the principle of "letting alone," instead of aiming to mark off the limits within which the principle is true. Herein they misrepresent the doctrines of our political Economy, we will not say as understood by a Macculloch or a Chalmers, but as legitimately deducible by the reasonings of the science. "*All* legislative interference (says the translator, p. 71) with the modes of letting and tenures of land, is contrary to the maxim *laisser faire et laisser passer*, and an infraction on the rights of pro-

perty." On the ground of Adam Smith and Mill, we emphatically repudiate this statement. To make it true, it should stand thus: "All legislative interference with the contracts of man and man, *if intended to dictate profitable employment or the ratio in which the parties shall divide their profit*, is contrary to the maxim of Letting alone, as taught in Political Economy." To add,—"*is an infraction of the rights of Property*," is quite ridiculous; as if it were Economical Doctrine and not Law, which has committed land to private hands and allows the landlord to let it to a cultivator. The Economist investigates only the pecuniary and material results of this enactment; he professes to be merely a *chrematistic*; why then insist on treating him as if he were a politician and a legislator?

If the importance of our subject were to dictate the limits of this article, there might be much more said both about rural industry and the minor trades;* but the principle, that the legislator ought to favour *steady occupation* and place pecuniary penalties, as far as possible, on all that fosters uncertainty, may be left with the reader to work out in detail. There is one consideration different in kind, which may here find place; viz., *the prodigiously increased importance given to the rights of neutrals in a war, in consequence of the extension of foreign commerce*. This appears to us to demand, not only the abandonment of several current Laws of War, but perhaps the executing of new commercial treaties with the states with which we carry on commerce. The old claim of Belligerents to be allowed to blockade a port or a coast and exclude the ships of neutrals, was always extravagant; yet was generally borne with, because the neutral suffered less by the infliction than by war to redress it; or perhaps because the suffering fell chiefly on individual merchants, who had little power over the government. But every fresh development of commerce has made this belligerent claim more iniquitous.

* In the work before us (p. 99) a statement is made on the authority of Mr. Charles Duveyrier's *Lettres Politiques*, that a certain M. Leclaire, a house-painter at Paris, pays all his men, in part by fixed salaries or weekly wages, in part by a sum which varies with the profits of his trade. "The result has been most prosperous both to himself and to his labourers: not one of whom, by working as much as three hundred days, earned less in the year than 1,500 francs (£60)."

Suppose (what is soon to be hoped for) a great interchange of mercantile benefits between England and Russia: a population of half a million in each country may have a vital interest in the continuance of this traffic; but France and Russia perhaps fall out, and forthwith the French forbid our merchant ships to sail on their usual voyages! So the Frenchman, in order to stab at the Russian, is to thrust his weapon through the Englishman's arm! This is the plain meaning of the principle: and we rejoice that, however rudely and (as to other circumstances) wrongly, it was resisted even to war against us by the North American Union. Commercial Treaties of the old sort, we would wish to believe totally exploded: no more of that kind will be made by us, to secure for ourselves monopolies or any such advantages over rivals. But commercial treaties to guarantee the security of a trade against the warlike interposition of a third party, is quite another matter. To continue our illustration;—if England and Russia agreed, each to convoy and defend to the best of its power the merchant ships of the other while seeking its coast, and to persevere in upholding the trade in spite of hostilities from any third party;—such a treaty, being made before either became implicated in war, would give no just cause of offence to any power. If afterwards the French made war upon Russia, they would be forewarned that we would not endure to have our merchant ships driven from the Russian ports and coast; and unless they desired to force us to join their adversary, they would not have the temerity to declare a blockade. Besides, if the nation which is most powerful by sea had entered into such a treaty with one leading state, the probability is that the rest would desire to make a similar treaty; and the present barbarous practice would vanish of itself among civilized communities. Not only would this bring a new steadiness to trade, but (what is equally vital) it would check that most dangerous tendency of hostilities between ill-conditioned states to spread a general war over all Europe.

But we have too long deferred to notice the purely *Political* Essays which the volume before us contains. Those to which we may particularly call attention, are, on Universal Suffrage, on the Executive Power in Free Countries, on the Aristocratic Element, and on Constitutional

Monarchy. As Greece to Aristotle, so Italy and Switzerland to Sismondi, has been a treasure-house of experience concerning political constitutions. Everywhere our author shows that delicacy of discrimination and maturity of judgment which his erudition and active mind might lead us to expect, combined moreover with what is rarer, originality of thought in treating of hackneyed subjects. This is particularly observable in his discussion of *Elective* and *Hereditary* Monarchy. He regards the former to have been as much undervalued, as the latter has been over-praised. Besides their other accidental and partly removable inconveniences, he finds in each a fundamental and incurable perversity: namely, the Elective Monarch is in permanent disaffection with the constitution, which he is always plotting to turn into an hereditary system; while the Hereditary Crown is certain in a few generations to lose all personal energy in the monarch, and most of the points which make monarchy better than republicanism. In the abstract, and for all new countries, Sismondi prefers a Republic in which Aristocracy has its due proportion of power; but is infinitely far from desiring to introduce it where the associations of a people's hearts are with Monarchy. There are *many* forms, says he, under which a people may live in freedom, who deserve to be free.—Concerning Aristocracy, he complains that we most improperly have allowed the name to be usurped by *hereditary nobles*, who have made it hateful to all Europe; whereas an Elective Aristocracy, in which age and public merit predominate, is that in which all that is characteristic of this class for good becomes most strongly marked. Indeed, one serious evil of hereditary monarchy, says he, is, that it turns the nobles into courtiers and fine gentlemen. Of a Parliament, he holds that its highest service is that of enforcing publicity and diffusing authentic knowledge of the conduct of magistrates; by means of which, long before it becomes strictly a legislative body, it conduces to good government.

To abridge or exhibit the substance of these interesting Essays, is impossible. But we with the greater cordiality recommend them to the reader's notice, as we have freely spoken our mind, where we believe the estimable and accomplished author to have erred.

ART. III.—PHYSICAL HISTORY OF MANKIND.

Researches into the Physical History of Mankind. By J. C. Prichard, M.D., F.R.S. Fourth Edition. Vol. I. 1841. Vol. V. 1847.

THIS work, in its present and probably final form, is a most remarkable example of progressive development. From an academical thesis it has grown into five goodly octavo volumes, the two last of about six hundred pages each. The scope of the work has been expanded, in the same proportion as its bulk has been increased. The sole object of the thesis was to maintain the doctrine of Blumenbach, which that illustrious man propounded in his own doctoral thesis *De generis humani varietate nativa*,* that the human race has only one original stock, from which all its actual varieties have sprung. The work before us is a collection made by the labour of years, and from a most extensive range of reading, of all the principal facts which characterize physically, morally and intellectually the tribes of civilized and savage man, in ancient or modern times. Combining these facts, derived from books of history and travel, with the aid of extensive attainments in philology and profound knowledge of natural history and physiology, Dr. Prichard has been enabled to lay the foundations of the new science of Ethnology, which groups and classifies the myriad races of man, according to their affinities of language and physical constitution. Whatever may be thought of the author's success in maintaining the primitive unity of mankind, this merit will always remain to his work, and the errors, if such they should prove, of some of his speculative views are the less to be regretted, since they appear to have stimulated him to the researches and studies which have produced these elaborate volumes. Indeed as the composition of them has proceeded, the primary object appears almost to have vanished from his view ; and instead of endeavouring to establish the original unity of the human species and their descent from a single pair, he

* Published in 1775. See Marx, *Gedächtniss Rede über Blumenbach*, pronounced before the Royal Society of Göttingen, Feb. 1840.

occupies himself wholly with the collection of ethnographical matter. Probably he found the difficulty of maintaining his original opinion increase as he advanced. The civilized nations of the ancient world are so closely connected with each other by the transmission of letters and art, and placed in such close juxtaposition, that if we are not too narrowly restricted in time, we can easily admit their identity of origin. And where arts and letters cease to give evidence of primæval affinity, language comes in to supply their place, and demonstrate a connexion between the rude Celt or Scandinavian and the polished races who used the Sanscrit or the Greek. But the endless varieties presented by the native American races, by those of Australia and Polynesia and the interior of Africa, baffle every attempt to connect them with a common stem, as their position refutes the notion of a common locality in the neighbourhood of Mount Ararat, a little more than 2,000 years before the Christian era.

There are unquestionably great difficulties in an inquiry into the origin of the human race; but they have been artificially increased. Scientific men refuse to know, what every one else knows, unless the knowledge is furnished to them in the way which they prescribe. Linnæus confessed that he had not been able to discover any character by which man could be discriminated from an ape; and Blumenbach exulted not a little in having established the distinction, that the *homo sapiens* has a chin, of which the *homo simia* is destitute. But the skeleton and its integuments do not make up the man, and nature has drawn a broader line between him and the *turpissima bestia* with whom Linnæus makes him share the name of *homo*, than the different angle of the teeth with the lower jaw. We never heard of a maiden, except in a figure of speech, who fell in love with a monkey, mistaking him for a *homo sapiens*; or a mother who could not distinguish her own infant from a young *macacus*. So in regard to the unity of the human species; it could never have been called in question if men had trusted to their own instincts and sympathies, and to common sense. These would have told them that the proofs of identity or diversity of species did not lie in a black, white or yellow skin, in lank or woolly hair, thick or

thin lips, a straight or crooked tibia, eyes set obliquely or horizontally in the skull ; but in the absence or possession of speech and reason, mutual desires and affections, religious capabilities, the sense of moral duty, and the capacity and desire of progressive improvement. No traveller has brought back a credible account of a people who were not in these respects identical with the normal man of the Caucasian race. We may safely anticipate that none ever will ; and therefore conclude that the human species is one in the only intelligible sense of the word. Dr. Prichard, like the rest of the naturalists, embarrasses himself with the attempt to give a definition of species ; but he applies himself to the right source of evidence, and by an ample induction of particulars shows that in the characteristics which we have specified, man in all countries, and in all ages, is and has been the same. Applying the same rule of classification to anthropology which is admitted in other branches of zoology and natural history, we think it cannot be doubted, that the races of men differ from each other only as *varieties*. We admit nothing historical into our definition either of species or variety ; in maintaining the unity of the human species, we assume nothing respecting the singleness of the original stock ; nor by calling the existing differences varieties, do we exclude the idea of original diversities. And we could be well content to leave the historical question, whether such unity or such variety be strictly primordial, among the inscrutable things of which we must submit to remain ignorant, because we have no history of the times to which they relate.

Here, however, the theologian interposes, and demands that we should believe, not only that the first generation of the human race proceeded from a single pair, but that their regeneration after the Deluge also sprung from a single stock. For it is not supposed that Shem, Ham and Japheth were respectively models of the physical peculiarities of the Asiatic, African, and European populations. Dr. Prichard refuses at the outset of his inquiry to be precluded by the authority of the Mosaic history from carrying on scientific researches into these questions. He says (vol. i. p. 7), "Those who hold with entire conviction the divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, are yet accustomed to receive

different portions of their contents, if not with different *degrees* of assent, yet with an assent modified by different considerations. The most sincere believers in revelation do not give precisely the same species of assent to those parts of the Sacred writings which relate to subjects open to the ordinary methods of investigation, such as matters of fact and historical testimony, as to those which relate to the nature and existence of invisible agents, the future state, and the relations of man to the unseen Powers, to which he is accountable for his actions. These portions of Scripture have ever been regarded as admitting and even challenging the most unwearied and severe scrutiny. To silence inquiry in such instances by an appeal to the Scriptures, seems to imply an apprehension lest something may be discovered that may prove them to be erroneous." These sentences are not very clearly expressed; we do not understand the distinction taken, between "different *degrees* of assent" and "assent modified by different considerations." Modified assent is partial dissent; and where historical evidence is spoken of, it can mean nothing else than admitting it to be in part sound and in part unsound. But Dr. Prichard seems to have shrunk from the distinct enunciation of the proposition, that the historical inquirer must be at liberty even to reject the authority of a portion of Scripture; and only allows his reader to inquire into independent evidence, lest he should seem to betray an apprehension that something may be discovered which may prove the Scriptures to be erroneous. Now we hold that all such inquiry is a "mockery, a delusion, and a snare," unless we are prepared to admit the alternative that there are historical errors in the Jewish writings, upon the same evidence as would suffice, if they had never passed for inspired. With this protest for liberty, though not so bold and decisive as we could have desired to see from him, Dr. Prichard, however, does proceed to inquire into the historical and scientific evidence of the unity of the human stock, waiving the authority of the Mosaic history. As we followed him over the globe, and saw the vast variety and striking contrast of the races of man, and could trace no change in their physical characteristics in the furthest range of historical records, we looked earnestly for some

information from him, how these things were to be reconciled with a belief in the Mosaic chronology, which leaves such narrow limits for the diffusion of man and the origin of his varieties in the post-diluvian world. We long looked, however, in vain, and began to think that in accordance with the advice of Quintilian, "*ab iis quæ non juvant oportet quam mollissime pedem referre*," Dr. Prichard meant quietly to leave it to the reader to reconcile for himself ethnology and Moses. At length, in the last pages of the last volume, we find a note on the biblical chronology, and especially on the shortness of the period which it leaves for the origin of nations. Though not inclined to believe Egyptian civilization to be of so high an antiquity as others, Bunsen for example, have ascribed to it, he still confesses that the interval which the biblical chronology allows is much shorter than the period of time which we should conjecture to be requisite for the production of such national diversities as those which are observed in the painted figures portrayed in the Egyptian tombs. The usual resource of those who have felt themselves pressed by this difficulty has been to adopt the Septuagint instead of the Hebrew chronology, and thus to extend the time between Noah and Abraham by about eight hundred years. Dr. Prichard justly observes, that nothing can be more in contravention of the correct and well-understood laws of critical inquiry, than the preference of one biblical text to another, on the ground of the facility of adapting it to historical facts; and that as the best critics are unanimous in preferring the authority of the Hebrew original to that of the Greek translation, in respect to other parts of the Old Testament, there seems no sufficient reason for any exception with regard to those passages on which the computation of dates has been founded. He thinks, however, that he has found a method by which, without injury to the authority of the sacred records, he may extend by some centuries, or perhaps by one or two thousand years, the period of time supposed to have intervened between the Deluge of Noah and the origin of the great Asiatic monarchies.

The ancient stumbling-block of those who desired to harmonize science and revelation, the six days' creation,

appears to Dr. Prichard capable of being very easily removed, if we only follow the "admired version of Dathe" in the second verse of Genesis.

"Dathe has remarked a fact, which is quite evident when once pointed out, that the word *יהי* in the first chapter of Genesis has the meaning of *ἐγένετο*—most nearly expressed by our word *became*. The words may be thus paraphrased: 'In the beginning—*ἐν ἀρχῇ*—God created the universe,' intimating that the world came into being, not by chance nor by any of the physical processes by which heathen cosmologists accounted for its origination, but by the fiat of an almighty Creator. 'The earth *had become* without form and void, an abyss enveloped in thick darkness, when the spirit of God began the work of renovating it.' If the writer had in his conception the interposition of a period of vast duration during which many creations had taken place, he could not have used more apt expressions."

We have sometimes wondered why commentators on Scripture alone have recourse to *paraphrase*, while it is thought sufficient to translate and illustrate all other authors; and we can find no reason for the difference but that the scriptural commentator has so often occasion to put meanings into the text, of which the writer had not the remotest thought. The specimen which Dr. Prichard here gives of paraphrase, in which the pluperfect *had become* is substituted for the aorist *became*, and "the spirit of God began the work of renovating the world," for "the spirit of God moved on the face of the waters," does not reconcile us to this mode of explanation. Dathe says nothing about *יהי* answering to *ἐγένετο*, but renders the second verse, "Post hæc vero terra facta erat deserta et aquarum profundis tenebris offusa;" and justifies his rendering of *Vau* by *posthæc*, by a reference to Numb. v. 23, Deut. i. 19. *Vau* is a most flexible particle in the hands of the Hebraists; there is not a subtle relation in the most cultivated and intellectual languages, which, if we may believe them, the Jews did not express by means of it; the learned Noldius reckons up seventy-four senses, besides *deficit*, which makes a seventy-fifth No.; and all the while the word is just as simple in its meaning as the Greek *καί*, or the English *and*. The English reader has a perfect equivalent for the Hebrew in the rendering of our common version; and if he interprets it without the aid of a paraphrast, we think

that instead of concluding that the writer had in his mind the conception of a period of vast duration, during which many creations had taken place, he will see in it a simple description of the chaotic state in which the earth was when the detailed process of creation began. We do not particularly examine what Dr. Prichard says respecting the composition of the Book of Genesis out of various documents, or the necessary uncertainty of a chronology founded on oriental genealogies, because these topics, though new to many of his readers, would not be so to ours. Admitting the fact that Genesis has been composed of anonymous fragments, he still appears to think that its inspiration is not made questionable by such an origin, and quotes the proem of Luke's gospel to show that inspired writers make not infrequent appeals to testimony. We might reply, "*nil agit exemplum litem quod lite resolvit*;" and that as a man who earnestly seeks to be believed always puts forth his strongest claim, an appeal to human testimony is conclusive against the possession of a divine inspiration. Indeed we can scarcely believe that Dr. Prichard uses the word *inspired* in its proper theological sense.

Two great difficulties arise when the results of his physical researches are confronted with the Bible history; one the shortness of the time allowed for the origin of existing varieties of the human race; the other the longevity of the Patriarchs. He had laid it down in his discussion of the means of determining the identity and diversity of species, that particular species have in general one limit in regard to the average duration of life; and he carries this out in his examination of the accounts of the various races. They resemble each other also in this, that the birth of children takes place, allowing for differences of climate, at the same age of the parents' life, among all other races of men, or varies only within narrow limits. How then can the Psalmist or ourselves, to whom threescore years and ten is the allotted length of life, claim identity of species with Terah, and Noah, and Adam, and Methuselah; or why should it have seemed a thing incredible to Abraham and Sarah that they should have a child at the respective ages of one hundred, and ninety, when Eve had borne children after a hundred and ninety years; and Shem, Ham, and

Japheth had been born to Noah when he was five hundred years old? Dr. Prichard has devised an hypothesis which gets rid of all these difficulties at once; it consists in the utter annihilation of all the chronology between the Creation of Man and the time when human life sinks to the level of its ascertained average. Conservatives occasionally become the greatest destructives. He enumerates the well-known discrepancies between the Hebrew text, the Samaritan, and the Septuagint, in regard to the ages of the patriarchs, and as he can find no reason for preferring one to another, notwithstanding his declared preference for the Hebrew, comes to the conclusion that they are all wrong.

"We may consider it almost certain that the discrepancies have been introduced by mistake, and that the original expressions denoting numbers have not been understood. This can be imagined on one hypothesis, viz., that the most ancient copies of Genesis, or at least of these particular documents, contained in the several sections, not the sums of years expressed in words, but some numerical marks, the real force of which had been lost in the lapse of time and through various accidents, and that attempts were made at later but different times and by various persons, to convert the numbers marked down by numerical signs, into words. The Jews of Palestine adopted one method, and those resident in Egypt another, while a third was preferred by the scribes employed in copying the ancient MSS. in the possession of the northern Israelites or Samaritans. It is evident that there was no certain principle of stating these sums of years, and that each party followed a plan different from that preferred by the others.

"If this supposition is allowed, it will afford a probable solution of many difficulties, and in the first place it reduces the preternatural length of antediluvian life within bounds compatible with the present constitution of nature. It may be supposed that the scribes who originally translated numerical signs into numbers expressed by words in the tables of the patriarchs, adopted some erroneous principle of interpretation which greatly augmented the numbers originally denoted by those signs."—Vol. v. pp. 565-6.

Now, as we presume that the writer or compiler of the Book of Genesis did not invent an arbitrary system of numerical signs, to puzzle his readers and transcribers, we must suppose that his autograph expressed numbers in

one of three ways, either in words at full length, or in alphabetical characters, or in conventional symbols. In our MSS. of the Old Testament numbers are always written in words at full length; and we have no reason to believe that they were ever expressed otherwise. Learned men have indeed supposed that alphabetical characters were used arithmetically by the ancient Hebrews, and have endeavoured in this way to account for some of those enormous numbers which appear, in defiance of credibility, in various passages of the Old Testament; but they are more naturally accounted for from patriotic and oriental exaggeration. If, however, alphabetical characters were once used in the text of Genesis, and it was thought expedient to change them for words at length, there could be no difficulty or uncertainty in the process. Their value is fixed by their place in the alphabet, and their place as well known to the Jews, as the succession of A B C to us. Mistakes might indeed be made, by taking a *Caph* for a *Beth* or a *Resh* for a *Daleth*; but this will not account for the longevity of Methuselah. If conventional symbols were used, we know of no system which there is the smallest probability that the Hebrews should employ but the Egyptian; that they *did* so we have no evidence whatever. But no such confusion as Dr. Prichard's hypothesis supposes could arise even in this way. The Egyptian system is a very simple one, and almost explains itself. The digits are expressed by strokes, the tens, hundreds and thousands by three characters as easily discriminated and remembered as the C, D and M of the Roman notation.* If the Palestinian Jews should have forgotten how to read the symbols in which the numbers of their own history and Law were written (for we presume these marks were not kept specially for patriarchal genealogies), surely when the Seventy arrived in Egypt they must have had no difficulty in recovering their true meaning; and theirs will be the correct numbers. But this Dr. Prichard denies. If he says that he refers to some system of notation, of which history has preserved no record and monuments no trace, we certainly

* The system of notation used in the Persian and Babylonian inscriptions has been constructed on the same principle. See Dr. E. Hincks's curious paper, Trans. of the R. I. A. Vol. xxii. p. 2.

cannot dispute his assertion; *ἐς ἀφανὲς τὸν μῦθον ἀνεπίκας, οὐκ ἔχει ἔλεγχον* but proof and disproof are equally impossible. We can by no means agree with him that there is no reason to suppose that the discrepancies which exist have not been introduced by intentional variation. The Septuagint regularly adds one hundred years to the age of the father at the time of his eldest son's birth, and deducts it from the length of his life after that event. Does this look like a mistake originating from the use of obsolete and misunderstood arithmetical symbols in the Hebrew text? Many mistakes may be made in the figures of an account, without impeachment of honesty, but when both sides are altered and the sum total made to agree, the intent is manifest. The reason for the change and the special mode of making it are both evident. The object was to gain time in the chronology, and this was attained by lengthening each generation by a hundred years, the *generation* being the age of the father at the birth of his eldest son; but there was no motive for lengthening the lives; they were portentously long already, and therefore a deduction was made in the second part exactly equalling the addition in the first. Could a fraudulent purpose be more manifestly shown? Mr. Sharpe in his History of Egypt has acutely observed that the sums by which the Septuagint has lengthened the Hebrew, taken together, just amount to 1460 years—the precise length of a Sothiac period. Does this again look like accident, or the misinterpretation of obsolete arithmetical symbols?

Dr. Prichard remarks that all these sets of dates (the Hebrew, the Samaritan, the Septuagint, the Ethiopic) must be wrong, *except one*. But there is certainly another possible case—that they are all wrong; the three versions as deviating from the original text; and the original text as having no historical authority. He would shrink probably from the latter supposition; after demolishing the whole chronology of the ante-Abrahamic period, he would retain the history as sacred and canonical. He may be assured, however, that he has done much more to shake the faith of reflecting readers in the historical character of this part of Genesis, than its direct assailants. He has shown that as it now stands it is at variance with the facts

and deductions of science ; and he has been able to remove this variance only by a violent and arbitrary hypothesis. This variance, which men of science have been slow to confess and theologians very bold to deny, being thus admitted on the most competent authority, the consequence we think is pretty obvious.

In one respect we very much prefer Dr. Prichard's to any other mode of getting rid of the difficulties of the Mosaic chronology. He makes a *tabula rasa*, as far as indications of time and the measure of its intervals is concerned, of all the period from the birth of Adam to the call of Abraham. By shortening the lives of the patriarchs he may seem to make the chronology still more embarrassing ; and this would be the case, but for his other supposition that there are gaps in the genealogies, and consequently that whole generations have disappeared. There is nothing to fix the number or the length of these gaps ; they may amount to centuries or *millennia*. The uncertainty thrown over the whole period may be distressing to the historian, who is thus left afloat in the ocean without compass or chronometer ; but it will give a welcome latitude to the physiologist, whom Dr. Prichard's Researches have convinced, that all the varieties of the human species have been produced by climatical and other causes operating since the creation of man. An addition of eight hundred or a thousand years to the time between Noah and Abraham will go but a little way towards satisfying one who reflects on the slowness of the rate with which such changes proceed, and the interval that would be required before the varieties "from being at first sporadic could have become so diffused by propagation, as to be found at length common to a whole family or breed, or characteristic of a particular tribe or race."* The ethnologist must imitate the boldness with which the geologist draws on the all but boundless resources of past time, to accomplish the changes in animal life and the structure of the globe which his science has disclosed to him. We cannot undertake to fix the proportion between the time necessary for the formation of a coal-seam and the degeneration of a descendant of Noah into a negro ; but we are persuaded

* Quoted by Dr. Prichard, vol. v. p. 552, from the New Quarterly Review.

that for this purpose it must be dealt out with the liberality of a geologist and not the parsimony of an historian. "However high," says Niebuhr, "we may rise towards the epoch of the beginning of the human race, still the annals of the Egyptians and the Babylonians would fill up but a small part of the inscrutable period during which nations must have been in no less active collision than in after times."* But these collisions of nations themselves presuppose a long anterior period, during which tribes springing from the same stock might acquire those collective peculiarities which first unite them into nations, and then impel them into conflicts with neighbouring nations. For all these events Dr. Prichard's hypothesis, carried out to its consequences, will leave us ample room and verge enough.

It is true the same result might be attained by a much simpler and as it seems to us more obvious and philosophical method; by supposing that the Jews, like every other nation of antiquity, have framed for themselves a mythical history, which with the lapse of time has been received for fact. This at once releases us from the necessity of any elaborate contrivances for reconciling their belief with probability and the laws of nature; and exhibits a phenomenon so universal and so natural, that it would have been a miracle if the Jewish literature had been an exception to it. But the transition from regarding the first chapters of Genesis as an inspired record, to treating them as only a picture of the popular notions of the age in which they were produced, is too violent to be made at once, by any large portion of the public. We are not sorry, therefore, that from time to time hypotheses are proposed, which smooth the descent from one of these opinions to the other; and make the gradients safer. The clerical geologists would have been suspended by their dioceses, or hooted from their pulpits, if they had not been able at first to profess that their discoveries confirmed the Mosaic account of the Deluge, and did not contravene that of the Creation. Time has familiarized men with the idea that they are not to look into Scripture for geology; and we hope that its professors will soon come openly to avow this, and cease to tor-

* Hist. of Rome, i. note 140.

ture the words of Genesis into a conformity with their science. Public opinion is so tyrannically intolerant, and its penal power so fearful, that we cannot expect the whole truth to be told, or even to be seen at once. But while we admit the temporary value of such intermediate stages of opinion, we are bound to declare our judgment that they are merely temporary, and have no solid basis.

Although Dr. Prichard's hypothesis provides the means of gaining time for the production of physical changes in man, it does not affect the Jewish account of the origination of the whole race from a single pair, except as it relieves the difficulty respecting their rate of increase. We conclude, both from what he does and what he does not say, that he receives it as historical truth. In his first volume, and at the outset of his inquiries, he says that "each species had only one beginning in a single stock; probably, a single pair, as Linnæus supposed, was first called into being in some particular spot, and the progeny left to disperse themselves to as great a distance from the original centre of their existence, as the locomotive powers bestowed upon them, or their capability of bearing changes of climate and other physical agencies, may have enabled them to wander."* And in the last page of his fifth volume, he says, "We derive each tribe among the higher and more perfectly organized creatures, whether locomotive or fixed, whether animals or plants, from one original point and from a single stock. We are, *à fortiori*, at liberty to apply this conclusion to the instance of the human species, or to infer that the law of nature, otherwise universal or very general in its operation, has not been in this transgressed, where such an exception would be of all cases the most improbable." We must say, however, that in following him through the proofs of this doctrine which he collects from the analogies of the animal and vegetable world, they have all seemed to us to fall short of the mark. They render it probable that the characteristic vegetation of the various zones into which the earth may be divided, has not been sown broadcast in the first instance over their whole extent, but has spread by diffusion from a centre. But that in

* P. 97.

each zone there has been only one centre, that each centre has been a point, and each point has contained a single seed—this has not been proved by any thing which he has brought forward; nor do we see how it ever should be proved, till some naturalist notes a species at the moment of its birth, and watches its diffusion throughout the zone in which its structure qualifies it to flourish. There seems to us an antecedent improbability, that the whole existence of a species should be perilled on the life of a solitary specimen, which the foot might trample or the worm devour. Species we know have a limit of duration; but the very traces of their extinction exhibit proof of the previous exuberance which guarded them from premature destruction. In regard to the origin of the human race, our repugnance has a deeper source. It seems extraordinary that men should so easily have reconciled themselves to the belief, that the first increase of human population took place by means of such unions as nature rejects and the laws of civilized communities condemn and punish. Setting aside the supposed authority of history, to estimate which it is only necessary to read in Dr. Prichard's work, how almost every nation attributes to its own progenitors the honour of being the primæval pair, there is nothing which compels or even renders probable the opinion, that the whole human race had but one father and one mother. The authority of Blumenbach has been alleged in favour of it; but all which that eminent naturalist maintained, was, that there is no more difficulty in deducing all the varieties of man, than of the dog or the ox, from a single type; he was very far from believing in the historical truth of the narrative in Genesis.

If the origin of the human race from a single pair be improbable to the historian, and indifferent to the anthropologist, it is a point of vital importance, however, to the orthodox theologian. Reason has long protested against the doctrine that all Adam's offspring have been made liable to eternal damnation, for the guilt which they contracted by his fall. The allegation that "the covenant being made with him as a public person, not for himself only but for his posterity, all mankind de-

scending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him and fell with him in that first transgression," has been met by the reply that the history, even taken literally, says nothing whatever of this federal capacity of Adam, or of his posterity being implicated in his transgression. And the moral sense of reflecting men has revolted in all ages from the notion, that the human race could be bound to the remotest times, and in the penalty of "most grievous torments of soul and body, without intermission, in hell fire, for ever," by a compact made without their knowledge or concurrence. These considerations have gradually weakened the foundations of the doctrine of original sin, and the consequent liability of man to the eternal wrath and curse of God. It is seldom presented now, except by coarse preachers to coarse audiences, in the form in which we have quoted it above from the Assembly's Catechism. But the foundation is not only weakened, it is utterly taken away, if the human race did not actually originate from a single pair. Like a pyramid placed upon its apex, the whole cumbrous pile of orthodox theology, whether Roman Catholic, Anglican or Calvinistic, rests upon Adam. If there never was a time when the whole human race was represented by a single individual, the question whether the covenant was made with him as a public person or not, falls to the ground. Even the refined criticisms of Dr. Taylor, designed to show that we suffer as the consequence, but not as the punishment of Adam's guilt, will be no longer needed, in order to clear the Divine character from the imputation of the most odious injustice. Take away the personality of Adam and the historical reality of the Fall, and the whole edifice of dogma crumbles at once into ruin. We may expect therefore that the attempt to call them in question will be bitterly resented.

It will be readily understood why we have confined this notice of Dr. Prichard's work to its bearing on history and theology. It would have been beyond our scope to have examined the vast mass of ethnographical matter which he has collected, and superfluous to have endeavoured to justify the opinion formed of his *Researches*, not only in England but throughout Europe, as one of the most valuable productions of modern scientific literature.

ART. IV.—THE MARQUESS WELLESLEY.

Memoirs and Correspondence of the Most Noble Richard Marquess Wellesley, &c., &c. By Robert R. Pearce, Esq. Bentley. 1846.

THOSE who write the lives of statesmen or soldiers must always find it difficult to separate the functions of the biographer from those of the historian. The deeds of their hero belong to the historian, in virtue of their intrinsic importance, and they belong to the biographer, as manifestations of character. The difference is simply this: the historian cares nothing for individual character, except so far as that may throw light on great national transactions; the biographer cares nothing for occurrences, except so far as these may throw light on the individual character.

There are some men whose actions interest us for no other reason but because they are theirs,—because we are interested in the man, and delight to hear of anything that is characteristic of him. Such men are the true subjects of biography. In writing of such, it matters not whether the deeds to be recorded are memorable or insignificant in themselves. A life of Shakspeare would be none the worse, for its dealing in paltry farmhouse or alehouse business and table-talk: a life of Milton would be none the better, for having its scenes laid in the Council-chamber of Cromwell. But such men are rare. The number of those, for whose characters we feel the true biographical interest,—an interest which merges the acts in the man,—cannot be very large. To excite such an interest, there must be some great force of intellect, some unusual gift of imagination, fancy, or passion, some remarkable goodness, some noble self-devotion,—in a word, something which it is good to know, that men may think more highly, more kindly, or more justly, of their common nature.

Now, with every respect for the merits of the Marquess Wellesley, we are not disposed to rank him with men of this class. Genius he had none: his mind was not remarkable for strength, versatility, or largeness: his virtues were not above the ordinary pitch. There is nothing in his character to dazzle the imagination, or very forcibly to

interest the heart. He was a man great by position, rather than intrinsically great. It was his fortune to act a conspicuous part, and he acted it well: but thousands, equally meritorious, pass, day after day, from the performance of equally arduous tasks, into oblivion. If the one be remembered, and the rest forgotten, it is not that his merit was greater, but that the business he was employed in was more memorable.

The work before us, then, is not so much of biographical, as of historical interest. It is valuable, chiefly for the insight which it affords us into the working of the machine of government, at home, and, still more, in India. It is history under the disguise of biography. This method of treating the subject certainly has its advantages. The professed historian, who must select a point of view from which he can survey a wide field, and represent its several parts in their due proportions, must needs stand at a distance, and lose sight of many details. The historical biographer offers us but a partial view; but then he brings us closer, and gives us a minuter and perhaps a more correct representation of that portion which lies within his range. In this respect, the value of the biography is independent of the character of its subject. We may use the mind of Lord Wellesley simply as the astronomer uses his telescope: we may look through it at the objects towards which it is turned. And, this being premised, the reader will be prepared to pardon us, if, in the present notice, he shall find the Marquess himself left a little too often out of sight.

The names of Wellesley and Wesley are both sufficiently well-known; but it is not so generally known that the one is merely a corruption of the other, and that the founder of Methodism and the conqueror at Waterloo originally spelt their names alike, and were descended, not very remotely, from a common stock. It was by mere accident that the careers of these two remarkable men diverged so widely. The father of the one, and the grandfather of the other, were private gentlemen of slender fortune. The head of the house was an old man and childless; and those estates, which eventually paved the way for the advancement of the Irish branch of the family, were first offered to

a member of the English branch. The story is told in Southey's *Life of Wesley*.

"While Charles Wesley was at Westminster under his brother, a gentleman of large fortune in Ireland, and of the same family name, wrote to the father, and inquired of him whether he had a son named Charles; for, if so, he would make him his heir. Accordingly, his school bills, during several years, were discharged by his unseen namesake. At length a gentleman, who is supposed to have been this Mr. Wesley, called upon him, and after much conversation asked him if he was willing to accompany him to Ireland. The youth desired to write to his father before he could make answer. The father left it to his own decision; and he, who was satisfied with the fair prospects which Christ-Church opened to him, chose to stay in England. John Wesley, in his account of his brother, calls this a fair escape; the fact is more remarkable than he was aware of, for the person who inherited the property intended for Charles Wesley, and who took the name of Wellesley in consequence, was the first Earl of Mornington, grandfather of the Marquess Wellesley and the Duke of Wellington. Had Charles made a different choice, there might have been no Methodists, the British empire in India might still have been menaced from Seringapatam, and the undisputed tyrant of Europe might at this time have insulted and endangered us on our own shores."—Vol. i. pp. 10, 11.

Old Mr. Wesley seems to have found some difficulty in procuring an heir. Unlike Mr. Dickens's Chuzzlewit, whose wealth only revealed to him the baseness of his cousinhood, Mr. Wesley gained from his position a view of the brighter side of human nature. His kinsman Charles remained faithful to his career, took holy orders, and became John Wesley's most valuable auxiliary. Nor was the old man more successful in his application to the Irish family; to whom he made the same offer in favour of one of the sons, an ensign in the army. The young Irishman declared he should be ashamed to quit the army during time of war. Here the matter rested: Mr. Wesley never renewed his intercourse; and the family were left to suppose that their cadet had disinherited himself. But, when Mr. Wesley died,

it appeared from his will that the youth's conduct had only increased his esteem : he left him his sole heir. The property was extensive, and the bequest was the foundation of the prosperity of the Colley-Wesley, or, as they are now to be called, the Wellesley, family. The second heir, a man of great ability, obtained the title of Earl of Mornington ; and, dying when his eldest son was just come of age, left, to the subject of this memoir, the dignity of an Irish peer, an estate deeply mortgaged, and a load of unpaid debts.

Richard Wellesley had already honourably distinguished himself at school and college. His high spirit had indeed led to his expulsion from Harrow School, by making him a ringleader in a dangerous riot ; but this youthful fault had been retrieved at Eton, where he was looked upon as one of the first classical scholars of his day. His contributions to the *Musæ Etonenses* are still read and admired by those who have a taste for such things. At Oxford, he maintained the reputation he had carried with him ; and laid the foundation of those scholarly tastes and accomplishments, which were a constant source of enjoyment to him through life. Lord Brougham tells us that his friend's model in oratory was Demosthenes, and that he was familiar with the *De Corona*, and was accustomed to exalt that noble work of genius at the expense of the orations of Cicero.

Lord Mornington's position naturally impelled him towards a political career. This was, in fact, the only course of life that could enable him to maintain the dignity of his title, unsupported as it was by any large hereditary fortune : it was suited to his taste and capacity ; it promised to gratify that thirst for distinction, which is the sure companion of academical successes ; and, in those days, even more than the present, it was a career that lay levelled and smoothed for any member of the aristocracy. He soon began to speak in the Irish House of Lords, and, before long, took a conspicuous part in the debates. His early speeches, we are told, were carefully written, polished, and elaborated ; and they were set off to advantage by a graceful, though at first somewhat too theatrical, delivery, and a clear and manly voice. We have his picture drawn by Sheridan, who thus describes one of his most successful

efforts:—"He remembered," said Mr. Sheridan, "to have seen the Noble Lord, with the same sonorous voice, the same placid countenance, in the same attitude, leaning gracefully upon the table, and giving an account, from shreds and patches of Brissot, that the French republic would last but a few months longer."—Vol. i. p. 115. The young nobleman was listened to with great favour in the House of Lords, and was soon encouraged to aspire to more than a provincial triumph. Quitting the narrow field of Irish politics, he sought a seat in the English House of Commons; and his wish, in those days of pocket boroughs, was readily gratified. Lord Mornington arrayed himself under the banner of Pitt, and soon displayed a very promising degree of ability; which his chief, who was not overburdened at that time with talented supporters, speedily rewarded with some subordinate appointments in the ministry.

Lord Mornington's first great speech in the English House of Commons, which established his reputation, is given at full length by his biographer, from a report corrected by the Earl himself. It is interesting, as the early effort of a man who afterwards became distinguished. In estimating its value, the reader must bear in mind that parliamentary speaking was in that day a very different business from what it is now. At present, the speaker addresses a somewhat business-like assembly, and also bears in mind that he is in fact speaking to the reporters and the public; he aims at influencing public opinion; and hence a certain practical style—a mode of speaking that really appeals to the understanding. Half a century ago, it is not too much to say that a parliamentary speech—unless in a very few exceptional cases—produced, and was expected to produce, no political effect whatever. No speaker hoped to gain a single vote by his arguments, and would be still less apt to think of gaining the opinions of the public; at all events, such hopes would be too faint and chimerical to influence his manner of speaking. It was not the cause, but the speaker, that was to be the gainer by the speech. Men spoke to display their talents, to gain influence, places, reputation, or popularity. Their business was to amuse or interest their hearers; and, as

they spoke to gentlemen and scholars, they naturally sought for their applauses by an emulation of the great orators of antiquity. The graces of diction and delivery were sedulously cultivated. Solid facts, and the plain tones of manly feeling, that go to the heart with no aid of elocution, were laid aside as out of place. Thus there grew up a somewhat factitious and artificial style of oratory. While the few great minds—the Pitts, Burke, and Fox, appeared to advantage in this stately robe of the rhetorician, ordinary men were in danger of making themselves ridiculous; not indeed by faults of taste, but by habitually using a force and pomp of language which was not supported by the thought. This tendency is very observable in Lord Mornington's early speeches. He thought it right to express everything strongly, energetically, and as Demosthenes would have expressed it. Unfortunately, the energy was only in the language; there was not force of thought, or depth of feeling to correspond. In such cases, the language produces the effect of affectation; as the speaker warms, the hearer grows cold; there is an instinct teaches him that the heart does not move with the lips; that the speaker's energy is unreal and insincere; and he disdains to have his passions treated as an instrument on which the placid performer may "play what stops he please." Lord Mornington's speech, however, was upon a subject that must have aroused some natural warmth. It was his part to dilate on the excesses of the French revolution, and the necessity of making vigorous efforts in prosecution of the war. He had the easy and pleasant task to prove the national enemy in the wrong. The same emotions which had inspired Burke's magnificent invective on the regicides, arrayed themselves in his cause. His speech, therefore, which was entirely in the prevalent taste, was received very favourably, was distinguished by being answered by Sheridan, and was published as a pamphlet, and much read.

For some years Lord Mornington continued to hold subordinate offices in Pitt's ministry. During this probation he gradually gained the esteem and confidence of the premier, who discovered in him great aptitude for business, and a rare and most valuable combination of

judgment and decision. He at length gave his young supporter a distinguishing proof of confidence in promoting him from the comparatively humble posts he had filled, to the responsible station of Governor-General of India; the resignation of Sir John Shore having left it vacant.

The seven years' administration of Lord Mornington is the era from which we must date the supremacy of Great Britain in India. Up to that time the British power was but one of three dominant sovereignties, and was to all appearance the weakest of the three. Nominally, the East India Company held sovereign sway in one district only, the country conquered by Clive, that is to say, the three provinces of Bengal, Orissa, and Bahar, watered by the Ganges, and forming the north-eastern corner of the peninsula; to which must be added a narrow slip extending along the coast to the south of Orissa, called the Northern Circars. We thus occupied a continuous but straggling territory, comprehending a long line of coast on the east, but scarcely penetrating inland, except in the direction opened by the waters of the Ganges. It was the most rich, but also the most exposed and unprotected portion of Hindostan. We had also our factories and commercial settlements on both lines of coast, each of which formed the nucleus of a little precarious sovereignty, extending a few miles into the interior. Of these, the settlements on the western coast, where we had been met from the beginning by a more warlike population, had never been very thriving. We had been expelled from Surat, the earliest station of the Company's trade; and the town and island of Bombay was almost all the footing we held. On the east, however, the settlement at Madras had been the means of bringing about a considerable accession to the British power by reducing the sovereign of the small district of the Carnatic to become our dependant and tributary. Such was the position in which Lord Mornington found the British power on his arrival in India. At his departure he left it nominally ruler of the largest portion of Hindostan, and virtually ruler of the whole.

The causes which brought about so great a revolution in so short a time, are not to be looked for solely, nor even

principally, in the character of Lord Mornington, or the great soldier that served under him. The military superiority of the British over the native armies had been established long before. The discovery made at Plassy, that an Indian army was a mob, had been repeatedly confirmed. Yet, since the days of Clive, the progress of the British power had been inconsiderable; a long season of apparent torpor preceded the sudden and brilliant revival under Lord Mornington. In fact, there were influences at work, not under the Governor-General's control, but which must be borne in mind, if we would form a correct estimate of his services.

In the first place, the anarchy which followed the fall of the Mogul empire may be said to have about this time reached its climax. When the servants of the East India Company first obtained permission to erect factories on these coasts, they found the whole of Hindostan subject, or apparently subject, to the rule of a single potentate. It is true that the august and formidable appearance of the Great Mogul even then was little better than a delusion. The dissolution of the Mogul empire has often been likened to that of the Roman; but the comparison seems not very just. The Moguls themselves may rather be said to have filled the parts of the Huns and Goths. Warlike and unsettled tribes from central Asia, of the same Tartaric race that still occupies the throne of China, they had been allured by the wealth of the timid Hindoos, had overrun the Peninsula with little opposition, and everywhere established themselves as rulers. There is a striking similarity between the irruptions of barbarians from Germany in the fourth and fifth centuries, and these from Tartary in the fifteenth and sixteenth. The process is precisely identical. A tribe or band descends the mountains, stops at the first great city, which holds out a promise of plunder, seizes all it can, establishes its leader on the throne, and settles there, compelling the womanish natives to till the fields, and do the work of slaves for them. But the conquerors are not left long in repose. A new swarm from the north follows in its track, is again tempted by the sight of flocks and herds, and tries its strength in battle with its forerunner. The vanquished go southward in quest of new

homes. Again and again the process is repeated. For years, perhaps for generations, the unhappy natives are afflicted with arrivals of fresh and hungry masters. All is movement; no settled form of government, no established laws, nothing but the law of the stronger. When the invading hordes have spread themselves over the territory, and are stopped by the sea, the wave of invasion recoils. For awhile the struggle for supremacy becomes now more serious, as the defeated have nowhere to betake themselves to. At length the contest begins to wear itself out; repeated struggles tend to centralize power; the tribes find it necessary to combine themselves for defence or attack; the sovereignty goes into fewer and fewer hands, till at length some one ruler, more powerful or more ambitious than his neighbours, gains a short-lived ascendancy, and gives a momentary solidity and unity to a vast extent of territory. Such is the history of Europe, from the fall of the Western Empire to the reign of Charlemagne. Such is the history of India, from Baber to Aurungzebe. The same words serve to describe both.

But the irruptions of the Tartars led to very different results from those of the Germanic tribes. The fusion of conquerors and conquered was much less complete; to speak more precisely, no fusion took place. In the West, the inhabitants of the old Roman world soon began to exert a powerful influence over their new masters; they converted them to their religion; they civilized them; they taught them laws, letters, and arts; and thus by degrees established, amidst the profound diversity of race and mode of living, a certain community of ideas, which at length grew into a community of national character. In the East, the Hindoo people and the Mussulman conquerors had absolutely nothing in common. The monarch despised the religion of his people; the people hated that of their monarch. Attempts were repeatedly made to suppress the Hindoo idolatry, and establish the purer worship of Islam; again and again the baffled ruler was driven back to a contemptuous toleration. The ancient civilization of India, the division into castes, penetrating every household, and enslaving minds from the cradle, wielded its pernicious influence unchecked. The Mogul

chiefs held their places solely by military force: they made no progress towards obtaining the esteem or affection of their subjects. They were aliens in blood, aliens in language, aliens in religion, and such to all appearance they might have remained for ever.

Such a state of things evidently gave no promise of stability. When the people viewed their rulers simply as so many foreign plunderers, using their superior force only to oppress, they would be apt to stand neutral in every revolution, and to look on calmly whilst their tyrants quarrelled amongst themselves. The Mogul could reckon on the obedience of his deputies and servants so far, and so far only, as he could compel it by his own immediate Musulman forces. Accordingly, when the extent of Aurungzebe's dominions made it necessary to parcel out the distant provinces amongst viceroys, it was everywhere found a most difficult task to prevent those viceroys from becoming independent princes. During Aurungzebe's lifetime his vigour kept his dominions entire, but it was by means of continual exertion. After his death his descendants, reared in the enfeebling atmosphere of a court, found the task far too much for them. The Viceroys, Subahdars or Nabobs were not content to claim a lifetime of their offices, they transmitted them to their sons, and by degrees became virtually independent, and laughed at the pretensions of the Emperors at Delhi. Every able and active Viceroy of a feeble Emperor had it in his power to become the founder of a dynasty. The sons of such a man, sinking by the fatal self-indulgence of savages into effeminacy and imbecility, sometimes turned the balance of weakness in favour of the Court at Delhi; but in that case some able Vizier, or some ambitious brother or uncle, would step in and add to the confusion. Another great cause of instability was the want of a steady rule of hereditary succession. Every King or Viceroy nominated his successor, with no regard for the rights of the eldest; if any one felt aggrieved he appealed to arms, and the death of a ruler was almost invariably the signal for the appearance of some half dozen candidates for the vacancy, each with an equally plausible title, and each with a band of greedy followers. The break up of the Tartaric sway in India

from internal causes alone, was as rapid and complete as had been its growth.

Rapid as it was, however, it was accelerated by attack from without. Tribes of Hindoo mountaineers, originally driven by their oppressors from their fertile and pleasant seats, and forced to confront hardships, and learn the arts of warfare and marauding, began now to find out the weakness of their ancient conquerors. The Mahrattas, descending from the hilly regions that skirt the whole western coast of Hindostan, ravaged the low countries, beat off the Mussulman troops sent to meet them, and at length growing bolder and bolder in their forays, carried terror to the very gates of Calcutta. They made themselves permanent masters of a large territory in the interior; Delhi itself, the capital of the Mogul, at last fell into their hands, and the descendant of Aurungzebe was driven into exile. The Afghauns made frequent incursions from the mountain regions in the North, and though they cannot be said to have gained any permanent footing in Hindostan, their irresistible onslaughts, like those of the Danes in Britain,—spread through the whole Peninsula a feeling of alarm and insecurity.

Such was the state of the Indian governments upon Lord Mornington's accession; a state obviously most favourable to the extension of British power. Not less favourable to the same object was the footing on which the British Establishments in India had recently been placed. The truth is, that the slow and almost imperceptible progress of British ascendancy, from the days of Clive and Hastings to that of Lord Mornington, and its rapid growth under the latter, are both attributable in great measure to causes that had their origin in Great Britain. So long as the British in India were simply the servants of a trading Company, their operations were feeble. Their masters were too intent on immediate pecuniary gain, to trouble themselves about any enlarged or far-sighted policy. They were too jealous of power to entrust much to their servants. They had a dislike to the centralizing of authority. They did not consider how necessary it is, when rule is delegated to a distance, to entrust the delegate,—so long as he is trusted at all,—with enough of arbitrary power to give to his

acts the harmony and consistency of a single mind. Their system was preposterous. They had three chief posts, or Presidencies, and each was in a great degree independent: each could levy war, and make peace, and sign treaties, and enter into alliances defensive or offensive, without leave asked of the others. To the Presidency of Calcutta, however, was given a certain controlling power, just enough to embroil it with the rest, and be a perpetual source of embarrassment. It happened, on more than one occasion, that the Presidency of Calcutta, and one of the subordinate Councils, both carried on negotiations at the same time, with the same native prince, and on the same subject, but without concert, even without each other's privity, and with entirely different views and results. This was not all. The President in each of these divisions was nothing more than the chairman of a Council, with no other advantage over his fellow-members than a casting-vote. He might be in a minority, as Hastings was for a long time; and then he was not merely a nullity, but was compelled to be the instrument of acts which he disapproved of, and had voted against. Worse still, the parties in the Council might be so evenly balanced, that the President should find himself in the majority to-day, and to-morrow in the minority; and thus it might be his business to undo in one day what he had done the day before. Such was the machinery for conducting the government of a country, in which, above all things, vigour and steadiness were requisite, and in times when orders from Europe could seldom arrive within a year of the occurrences on which they were founded.

All this was changed in the year 1784, by Pitt's India Bill; which, by the establishment of the Board of Control, virtually transferred the sovereignty of India from the Company to the King's Ministry. A complete system of centralization was established. The Governor-General, in whose nomination the ministry had a potential voice, had now no lack of arbitrary power. His Council could no longer control his acts; they might advise, but he was at liberty to follow their advice or not: he might even systematically absent himself from their deliberations,—as Lord Mornington did,—and leave them the insipid amusement of voting disregarded resolutions. The Governor-

General had absolute control over the Presidents of the other settlements, in all matters but what related purely to the local and internal interests of each province; and in all matters, without exception, that related to diplomacy and war. Thus the Governors-General, from being the mere upper servants of a private company of merchants, were raised to the rank of powerful princes. They now might wield all the resources of the British empire; and might wield them, during their tenure of power, without check or control,—excepting only the control of orders from home, which commonly arrived too late to be attended to, except as might be convenient.

This new constitution had no sooner come into operation, but a new spirit began to display itself in the Anglo-Indian government. A vigour, unfelt before, was diffused through every branch of the administration; a higher tone was taken in negociation; and the petty wars, in which the English happened at this time to be engaged, were terminated with unexpected rapidity and success. But now there came into play a new and most honourable hindrance to the growth of British ascendancy. Public opinion in this country began to pronounce emphatically in favour of non-aggression. The crimes of Clive and Hastings had inspired a horror which no motives of self-interest, or vanity, or ambition, could bribe into silence. Though the men had escaped punishment, the English people was resolved to be no longer involved in the infamy of such deeds. This feeling had penetrated the legislative body; and it is indicated by many of the provisions in Fox's and Pitt's India Bills. It placed a check on the enterprising spirit of Lord Cornwallis, and it perhaps shortened his term of power, and led to the appointment of a pacific successor. Sir John Shore was a very Aberdeen in his Indian policy; with this disadvantage, that he had to deal with men who always looked upon moderation as a sure sign of weakness, who proportioned their demands to that weakness, and whom it was only possible to keep within the bounds of justice and decency by inspiring them with a wholesome terror. The policy and the tone, which may perhaps be wise in European diplomacy, were quite out of place in treating with the princes of India. Shore,

in his honest wish to shun the labyrinth of Indian politics and intrigue, found himself entangled more than ever; with this only difference, that, where his predecessor had commanded, he was reduced to expostulate. The truth seems to be, that the English had now gone too far to recede; that their only choice lay, between abandoning their domains in India, and leaving the Peninsula to be the field of desolating warfare among its contemptible occupants,—which was not to be thought of,—and, on the other hand, asserting the majesty of civilization, and keeping the peace with a strong hand.

The time at length came, when that state of public opinion, which served as the last barrier to keep the British power in India from seeking its natural level, was to give way. The French revolutionary war broke out: Napoleon led his victorious troops into Egypt; and, flushed with success, boasted that he would rival the career of Alexander, and march through the heart of Asia into Hindostan. In India itself, French intrigue was everywhere bestirring itself. French adventurers or emissaries made their court with the native princes, who employed them to train their forces in the European discipline. Many of these men were allowed to organize bands attached to their persons, and whom they let on hire to any prince that might be at war with his neighbours. Such auxiliaries were too valuable not to be eagerly sought after, and well paid: territories were assigned for their maintenance; and their leaders became persons of importance in the state. Wherever they went, they fostered a spirit of hostility towards the British. It may appear unaccountable, that this peculiar mode of gaining influence should be monopolized by the French; but such was the fact. On several occasions, English governors, sensible of the weight thus acquired by their enemies, had encouraged Englishmen to go as private adventurers on the track of their rivals; but all such experiments proved failures. The French handiness, tact, and aptitude for intrigue, were wanting; and our emissaries were apt to succeed no further than to enrich themselves by commercial speculations.

Jealousy of the French triumphed over our averseness to aggression. The same French spirit of intrigue, which,

in the days of Dupleix and Clive, had driven us to take our first steps in the acquisition of Indian territory, now proved the occasion of those measures which gave us the supremacy of the whole Peninsula. It was no time for half-measures, when Napoleon was pursuing his career of rapid and unchecked conquest, striking the monarchs of Europe from their thrones, and changing dynasties with a rapidity that can only be paralleled in the history of Asia, and by the deeds of the elder Cyrus, Alexander, or Genghis-Khan. When our own shores were menaced with invasion, the rulers of our great outlying province in the East might well look upon the times as critical, and unsuited to ordinary scruples and self-restraints.

Such was the condition of India when Lord Mornington became Governor-General. The native governments were in a state of the utmost confusion; anarchy and absolute dissolution reigned in every part of the Peninsula; the only semblance of power was in the hands of marauding tribes, or recent usurpers. Nowhere was to be found that union of might and right which could present a respectable front against attack. Amidst all this weakness, there was one power established in the Peninsula, which, could it but have its swing, could at once overthrow every obstacle, without so much as feeling it. But, —like the trained elephant of India that is to trample the condemned malefactor to death,—this gigantic force had been held back; at first, by the trammels imposed by the India House, afterwards by English public opinion. These bonds were now slackened. The flood, which had risen above the level of the plain, and had been held in by artificial dams, was suddenly let loose to pursue its natural course.

All this is not to be understood as depreciating the services of Lord Mornington. On the contrary, he was the very man for the work to be done. A timid, or irresolute, or narrow-minded man, in his place, would have been unequal to the crisis. Great as was the power he wielded, that power would undoubtedly have been ineffectual unless well-directed: and to direct it well required all the more ability, since it was a new power, which had never yet been brought into play, and the exercise of which, therefore, was facilitated by no precedent. But Lord Mornington

was not the man to need precedents, or to walk timidly along an unexplored path. He was constitutionally firm and strong-willed, and he was fearless, because conscious of integrity. When his duty called him to take unusual, and invidious, and even objectionable courses, he took them boldly, because he knew that, though he might be blamed by others, his singleness of purpose would at least acquit him to himself. He had a rare self-reliance, coupled with an equally rare degree of confidence in those he selected as his instruments. And these qualities were prevented from degenerating into obstinacy, by the strength and soundness of his judgment. Altogether, he was precisely the man to wield despotic power in troubled times.

Lord Mornington's political opinions were such as naturally prompted a peculiar dislike and dread of revolutionary France. He had not been long in his Vice-royalty, before he found reason to be on his guard against her machinations in India. He learnt that one of the principal Mahometan sovereigns, the Viceroy of the Deccan, who owed his crown originally to British intervention, and was a tributary and dependent of ours, kept in his pay a considerable body of troops under French command. He discovered that Tippoo Sultaun, the most powerful and able of the native princes, had opened a negotiation with the French governor of the Mauritius, which had for its object the expulsion of the British from India. Everywhere, in short, he found the French, and the friends of the French, emboldened by the wonderful successes of their countrymen in Europe, and plotting mischief against their rivals in the East.

The enmity of Tippoo presented a more serious aspect than anything else. This prince possessed an advantage which, at almost any previous period, would have enabled him to make himself master of India: he was the able and ambitious son of an able and ambitious father. The abilities of Hyder Ali had raised him from a menial station to the Viziership of the Hindoo kingdom of Mysore,—a territory which lay too far to the South to have been penetrated by the arms of Aurungzebe or his successors. To be the Vizier was in effect to be the monarch. The rightful prince was held in a kind of honourable captivity, whilst Hyder, in

his name, but for his own advantage, exercised all the functions of royalty. His exertions raised Mysore to the rank of a first-rate power; considerably enlarged her borders; and held the English Presidency of Madras, and the Mahratta tribes,—the enemies between whom he lay,—in perpetual anxiety. All that Hyder acquired in his long reign had passed quietly to his son, to whom he also bequeathed his implacable hatred of the British. Tippoo had walked in his father's footsteps; till at length he had suffered a severe check from Lord Cornwallis, and had been compelled to cede half his territory in order to save his capital. Still, he retained his treasures, his troops, and his fortress, and was perhaps not so much weakened as exasperated. He was at peace with the Mahrattas; the English were on ill terms with them; and he reckoned the times favourable for a rupture, and himself still a match for any force that could be brought against him.

The measures by which Lord Mornington broke the power of Mysore have been the subject of great and deserved praise for their skill and energy. He concentrated all the British resources in India; so disposed his armies that they might co-operate to the best advantage; spared no exertion to provide the sinews of war on the largest scale,—for that purpose doing what no previous Governor had ever ventured on,—unloading the Company's ships of treasure meant to be traded with, and using it for the exigencies of the campaign; came personally to the theatre of the war, leaving Bengal in charge of a deputy; and, by his vigorous and well-timed exertions, inspired confidence in his friends, and terror and irresolution in his enemies. Wavering allies were encouraged to declare themselves on our side, or deterred from declaring themselves against us. Tippoo himself, it was remarked, seemed disheartened, and displayed little of that rapid energy and daring, which had made him so formidable in all previous encounters. The result of the first campaign was decisive. The sovereign of Mysore was compelled to abandon the open field, and entrench himself at Seringapatam, and to rest his last hope on the strength of the fortress which he fondly deemed impregnable. Here he was to learn his mistake. The dogged courage of the British, and the discipline of

the Sepoys, carried all before them. Seringapatam was stormed; and Tippoo, disdaining to survive his fall, was killed by a common soldier in the trenches. With him fell for ever the power of Mysore. Resistance ceased; and the territory was parcelled out between the British and their allies; the former getting the lion's share.

This decisive stroke put an end to the hopes of the French party in India. Lord Mornington lost no time in clearing the Peninsula of those dangerous intriguers. The French corps under the Viceroy of Deccan was disbanded, the officers sent to Europe, and a British force substituted. Napoleon's dream of a march overland to India was, about the same time, dissipated by his repulse before Acre, and the necessity for his return. Nelson's victories rendered it hopeless for the French to approach India by sea. The fall of Tippoo taught the Indian princes that reliance on France was vain and dangerous. From that time, French influence in the East was at an end.

Lord Mornington now had only native enemies to deal with. Of these, there were none that could be considered formidable, except the Mahratta chiefs. These mountaineers,—who presented themselves to the eyes of the dwellers in the plains as mere lawless freebooters, who occasionally swept over them in forays, and either carried off all they could lay hands on, or levied a heavy tribute as the condition of a brief respite from attack,—had by degrees become numerous and powerful enough to be organized as a regular state. Their government, like that of the old Highlanders, seems to have been based on the primitive institution of clanship. A few heads of families exercised all the functions of royalty over their respective clans, while they acknowledged an allegiance, more nominal perhaps than real, to one common head, the representative of their original marauding leader. The very titles of these heads of clans remind one of the Highlanders: they were designated by their family name, as, The Holkar, The Scindia. The two just named were the most powerful of the Mahratta chiefs: they held large territories, and had become virtually independent princes. Still, they were nominally subjects of the Mahratta Rajah; and the English, who carried into India a most misplaced

—yet often convenient—regard for Western constitutional forms, no sooner found these Chiefs preparing to throw off their formal subjection, than they hastened to take part with the Rajah, their ally. To this, it would be ridiculous to deny that they were impelled by very different motives from that of pure benevolence. Scindia and Holkar were dangerous to the peace of India; and any plausible pretext for crushing them was most acceptable to Lord Mornington. War was declared. The mountaineers fought manfully, but it was in vain they struggled against British discipline and Sir Arthur Wellesley. Those brilliant victories, which first obtained for the English commander his now world-wide celebrity, effectually crushed the last remnant of Indian independence.

Lord Mornington now proceeded to take those steps which led to so vast an enlargement of the British territory in India; steps which have been much admired, or violently censured, and both, we think, much more than they deserve. The measures in question were too easy and obvious to deserve the admiration due to great efforts: they were too beneficial to India to deserve any very serious censure. Large districts, already under British influence, and in which the rulers were held upon their thrones by British bayonets only, were converted nominally, into what they had long been actually,—British possessions. It was done by a stroke of the pen. It relieved the natives from an intolerable load of oppression and misgovernment. If the act was arbitrary, it was to a great extent justified by repeated breaches of faith, and violations of treaty, on the part of the monarchs we dethroned. In this manner, Oude, the Carnatic, the Deccan, and the Dooab, became subject to the British crown. If, to these domains, be added the territory gained by conquest from Tippoo and the Mahratta chiefs, it will be found that the British dominions in India were more than doubled during the administration of Lord Mornington.

We may here quit the subject of our Indian wars and aggressions; and perhaps an apology is due to the reader for the prominence we have given to this least satisfactory portion of Lord Mornington's public life. So far as he himself is concerned, we are disposed to acquit him of the

guilt of aggressorship: he found himself already committed to a course of conduct which it was necessary to persevere in; and the responsibility must rest with those whose rapacity, at an earlier period of our intercourse with India, brought us to a point from which there was no receding. It would be unjust, indeed, to describe the British empire in India as being entirely founded in usurpation and unscrupulous ambition: it was in some measure forced upon us from the very beginning. Still, after all has been said in extenuation of our conduct, it cannot be denied that there is much guilt to be answered for; that the unasked interference of the stronger in the affairs of the weaker is in itself an injustice; that the necessity, which has been our constant plea for each new step forwards, has been frequently a necessity of our own making; and that we have too often deprived ourselves, by misgovernment, of the right to use the best argument in our own favour,—the superiority of British rule to that of the native princes. All that can be said, is, that there has long been a growing wish, and an honest endeavour, to atone for the misdeeds of the past by present amendment, and provision for yet further improvement in time to come.

In the eyes of our posterity, probably, Lord Mornington will be much less remarkable as the aggrandizer of Great Britain in India, than as the first who attempted to perform one of the most sacred duties which a governor owes to the governed,—that of Education. Not Seringapatam, nor Oude, nor the Mahrattas, but Fort William College will be remembered to his praise. It proves the largeness of Lord Mornington's views, and the elevation of his character, that he was the first to perceive the defect which lay at the root of Indian misgovernment,—the want of education in the governors. The clerks and servants of the East India Company had insensibly been converted from commercial underlings into agents of government: they now filled the parts of diplomatists, judges, or Secretaries of State. Never was Sicily more at the mercy of Verres, than were the Indian provinces, with their millions of inhabitants, at the mercy of this handful of Europeans: but the men who held these responsible stations had mostly been trained for merchants' clerks. Some had

received the rudiments of a liberal education; but they had been taken from school very early, and had no facilities for completing their studies in India. Others, less fortunate still, had only received that no-schooling which passes under the name of a commercial education: their parents had wisely thought that, as their sons were to be merchants, it was unnecessary to teach them things which it was not essential for a merchant to know; they measured the value of education by the amount of knowledge infused,—letting the training and enlargement of the mind by study go for nothing. Youths thus brought up were ever the subjects of Lord Mornington's unqualified pity and distrust. He thought their minds must be hopelessly cramped by a course of training, which, aiming only to make merchants, and often failing even to do that, confines the intellect to one set of ideas, vulgarizes the tone of thought by concentrating it on pecuniary gain, and loses sight of the fact that men do not live merely to make money.

By way of remedy for this state of things, Lord Mornington resolved to establish a College in India, for the education of the Company's Cadets. To enforce the attendance of students, he made it imperative on all who should come to India in the Company's service, to spend their first three years within the walls of the College; during which time they were to receive the same amount of salary as if their hours had been spent at the counting-house. By a slight stretch of power, the Governor-General even sent those youths who were already in India, but had not been there three years, to complete their education at the new seat of learning in Calcutta. This he took care liberally to endow: professorships were established for most of the Asiatic languages, as well as for Greek and Latin, and the literature and sciences of modern Europe. All was done on a great scale, worthy of the nation on whose behalf it stood, a monument of dominion worthily exercised.

The establishment of this University had a twofold operation; while it was qualifying young Europeans for the posts of rulers, teaching them the languages of those they were to govern, the laws they were to administer, and the religious prejudices they were to respect, it was also

opening a new world of thought to the natives themselves. Mussulman and Hindoo eagerly flocked to this fountain of knowledge, no less greedy to acquire the languages of Europe, and those dead tongues which embalm so vast a store of wisdom and poetry and eloquence, than were their conquerors to master the learning of Hindostan. If this result were anticipated by Lord Mornington, it was a stroke of profound policy. The college, as a mere instrument of government, would have been more powerful than the largest standing army we could raise. It is not by force or by political organization that institutions, whether of government or religion, can permanently stand; if they are meant to take a firm root, they must be woven into the domestic life, and mingled with the daily concerns and interests of the mass of the people. Every government is strong in proportion as it rests on ideas held in common with the multitude. The Mussulman rule in the East was transient, because it was never thus brought in contact with the people; and perhaps our empire in India will stand or fall according as we adopt or reject the policy in which Lord Mornington took the first step.

It is lamentable that so noble a design should have failed in the very outset, from faults in the execution. It has added another to the long list of examples, in which a large-minded and generous policy has unjustly suffered the brand of impracticability, from mere slovenliness or haste in working out the details. Lord Mornington indeed was not the man to do his work inefficiently; he was not one of those who think that the education of a people is a matter to be slurred over with a paltry economy, or marred by a feeble spirit of compromise; but he was not sufficiently careful to avoid exciting a just and natural opposition in those who could thwart his designs. Instead of first seeking the consent of the East India Company, which was only due to them, he erected the College by his own authority, and without even making his intentions known beforehand in Europe. The consequence was, that the Directors, with whom the Governor was already not on the best of terms, and who found themselves thus unceremoniously saddled with a large expenditure, for objects which they

probably deemed chimerical, no sooner heard of the new College than they sent peremptory orders for its abolition. Lord Mornington was furious; he remonstrated, he struggled, he refused to execute the mandate, he loaded the Directors with reproaches, he denounced their conduct in public, he appealed to the Ministry; but it was all in vain. He could only gain a respite of two years; after which the establishment, which had already done so much, and opened so fair a prospect of good to come, ceased to exist. Some years afterwards indeed the Directors paid a tardy tribute to the justness of Lord Mornington's views, and in some small degree adopted them, by establishing a finishing school for their Cadets in this country, for the purpose of teaching them the Indian languages, and otherwise qualifying them for their stations. Still, little or nothing has yet been done towards opening, for the natives of Hindostan, a way to the knowledge of the West.

The proceedings with regard to the College completed the estrangement between the Governor-General and the Directors. It had begun with the dissatisfaction occasioned by some of Lord Mornington's acts of arbitrary power. The Directors had not been pleased to have their trading funds employed in the war-service, nor to find the interests of their commerce systematically thrown into the background. They were dissatisfied to observe the Governor disregarding the ordinary rule in the promotion of the civil servants, which was the rule of advancement by seniority; and they complained with some show of reason, that he showed an undue anxiety to push forward his own friends and relatives. On this subject at least the public feeling cannot now be much on their side. Few people will be disposed to complain of the favour shown to Sir Arthur Wellesley, which was the means of making his abilities known, and thus enabled him to earn that further promotion which has been of so much service to his country. Advancement by seniority has rather a show of fairness than the reality; old incapables are apt to think themselves wronged by seeing younger men promoted over their heads; but till there shall be some contrivance for reducing all men's abilities to an equal level, every one who has not the capacity for a front place must submit to drop into the

rear. A rule which might do no great harm so long as the Company's servants were mere commercial agents, might be most pernicious now they were become the instruments of government. However, the Directors thought Lord Mornington's method of patronage too much adapted to aggrandize his own importance and diminish theirs. Besides, they found his tone and whole method of procedure too independent. Like Lord Ellenborough, he was not afraid to speak out in his despatches to the India House, in a language which often irritated the pride of those who still looked upon the Governor of India as a mere servant of theirs. This led to replies at which Lord Mornington's Irish blood took fire. He had not been long in India before this estrangement began, and he had repeatedly tendered his resignation. Till the Peninsula was reduced to a state of quiet, however, he had been prevailed upon to remain. But now, his services being no longer indispensable, and the ministry having refused to support him in the matter of the College, he determined on quitting India. In 1805, after a prosperous reign of seven years, Lord Mornington, now Marquess Wellesley in the British peerage, set sail for England.

From this point it may be said that Lord Wellesley's life ceases to be matter of historical interest. Abroad, his individual mind had coloured the fortunes of states, and stamped itself upon great national transactions. At home, he was but the subordinate member of an administration. There was nothing in his character that qualified him to take a lead in matters of opinion; we may conjecture that his influence over the deliberations of the cabinet was not great. His talents of action were greater than his talents of thought. He was not one of those who believe that the world is governed by the few who think. He was at home in the bustle of Indian warfare: he was all abroad amidst that intellectual movement of the English people, which, in the beginning of the century, took the direction of politics. He found himself struggling with forces he did not comprehend. Comparing himself with his colleagues of the Liverpool ministry, and with his coevals, statesmen reared in the same school with himself, he saw himself in advance

of them in liberality of opinion. Comparing himself with younger men, and with that public opinion which began to find some faint echo even in the House of Lords, he felt himself constantly dropping further in the rear. It is often the fate of the long-lived to be at length invested with a kind of monumental interest ; to be the living relics of a state of society that has gone by. Lord Wellesley before he died might have been pointed out as the type of a class now extinct ; the hereditary oligarch, the senator of our old " Venetian republic."

We cannot quit the notice of Lord Wellesley without some tribute of admiration for his character as a man. His faults were such as are almost inseparable from that firm texture of the mind to which he owed his greatness : he was strong-willed, a lover of power, impatient of opposition, proud, and somewhat irritable. He shared one weakness—if it be a weakness—with Cardinal Wolsey ; he was " lofty and proud to them that loved him not ;" but he also had the Cardinal's redeeming feature, " to those friends that sought him, sweet as summer." His kindliness and suavity were remarkable, and were the more captivating from being united to a lofty integrity which may justly be called chivalrous. Placed in narrow circumstances by the extravagance of his father, he steadily persevered in a course of life that should enable him to pay off debts which he was not bound by law to pay ; and, at the same time, while his position in India made it easy for him to have amassed wealth by means that would have done him no harm in the eyes of the world, he even refused gains to which every one, except his own fastidious sense of propriety, considered him fairly entitled. The operations against Seringapatam had all been arranged by him ; the treasure taken in the storming of the fort was immense, and the share of prize-money allotted to Lord Mornington amounted to no less than £100,000 : but this he positively refused to touch, desiring that it might be divided amongst the soldiers who had earned it, in his opinion, by endangering their lives at the siege. His magnanimity on this occasion was the more conspicuous, from the disgraceful rapacity displayed by the chief military officers, who divided

the spoil so unfairly, allotting so undue a proportion to themselves, that it was in the serious consideration of the English ministry to make them refund a portion of their unjust gains. Such conduct as this of Lord Wellesley's furnishes the best reply to those who charge him with unworthy motives in the promotion of his brothers.

ART. V.—HARE'S SERMONS ON THE VICTORY
OF FAITH.

The Victory of Faith. By Julius Charles Hare, M. A.
Second Edition. 1847.

WE have two objects in taking up these remarkable Discourses. True views of the nature of Faith affect the essence of practical Religion. Religion is entirely a matter of Faith. Its Truths are revealed to Faith. Its Duties are enforced by Faith. Faith animates the Hopes it whispers. Without Faith, or an apprehension by the spiritual nature of man of Ideas and Realities which lie beyond the province of Demonstration, Testimony, and Sensation, Religion would be a word to which no conceivable meaning would attach. One hears much ponderous contempt of what is called Transcendentalism. But every man who believes in a God is a Transcendentalist. His belief *transcends* the senses and the logical intellect. It is elicited by the appeal of God and His Universe to the witness spirit which the Father of spirits has made in the likeness of himself. The attempt to connect *logically* a belief in God with deductions from sense or intellect is to reason in a circle. For God is assumed in the premises. Confidence in sense and intellect is itself an act of Faith. Whatever be the instruments and avenues of our knowledge, Faith lies at the foundation of them all. Our only security for the reality of their communications is our Trust in God. The most irreligious of men unwittingly ground the certainty of Sense and Intellect upon a religious foundation, upon faith in the truth and holiness of the Author of their being. To be ignorant of the nature and province of Faith, is so far to obliterate or obscure the very organ of revelation in man.—And it is to mistaken views of the power and office of Faith that we owe the separations which divide Christ's Church into hostile, jealous, factions, and set men at enmity with one another—all whose deepest and holiest affections are fixed upon the same objects, and who ought to be engaged as fellow workers in one cause.

It was a fatal accident in the history of religion that substituted *Credo* for *Confido*, belief for trust, intellectual assent for spiritual vitality. The life of religion in individual hearts, and the peace of Christendom, were both left behind when the thoughts of men took that false direction. The Intellect can never be the atoning, reconciling, principle even in man's individual nature. It is the trust of the Heart, the purpose of the Will, that unites the faculties. Much less can the Intellect be the bond of Unity to mankind at large. A common aspiration upwards, a common trust in the objective reality of the revelations of the human soul, a common devotion to holiness and God—in these men may be of one heart. Faith unites them. On the character of its Faith, depend both the life and the peace of the world.

Our other object in giving some account of these Sermons is to direct attention to the views entertained by no inconsiderable section of the Church of England, of which Archdeacon Hare is one of the most distinguished representatives. It is a difficult matter even to enumerate with certainty, the parties of which the Church of England is at present composed. Omitting the minor mixtures and combinations of tendencies and opinions, the marked divisions are at least four in number. There is the old orthodox Churchman; the modern Evangelical; the more modern Puseyite: and a race of strong men making great efforts for their freedom, and really moving with wonderful grace, vigour, and abandonment, considering that they know the length of their tether, and carry fetters on their limbs. Some of these profess a large, indeed unlimited, liberalism, yet, on grounds of expediency, adopt and recommend a conservative policy in regard to submission to existing institutions, and a tacit acceptance of unmanageable creeds. The anonymous author of the *Vindication of Protestant Principles* is, perhaps from his concealment, the most explicit advocate of the system of carrying two faces under a hood. We do not charge him with direct dishonesty. He makes an entire separation, in effect a dishonest one, between religious Truth, and administrative Religion, regarded as an organized instrument for expressing the worship, and acting on the morals of a Nation. If this

distinction is necessary, administrative Religion is Anti-Christ, the enemy of Truth and Progress,—and the sooner Churches perish the better, and all common worship is confined to the family. Others, of whom are Arnold, Hampden, Milman, Maurice, Trench, Manning, Hare, Tait of Rugby,—men of much learning, much liberality, and some tincture of philosophy, with a genuine religiousness of nature,—live and write contradictions which they never attempt to reconcile, and which from the open, unhesitating, way in which they bring them into the closest juxtaposition, making them kiss one another on the meeting pages when their books are closed, we willingly believe they do not even perceive. The contradictions we speak of, consist in the most incongruous mixtures of spiritual Christianity and dogmatic Theology, of large principles and narrow propositions, of Catholicity of temper and confinement of view, of salvation by Faith always narrowed down at last into salvation by Doctrine. Of two pages staring at one another, the one will open the deepest fountains of the religious life, bring the spiritual nature into direct intercourse with God, and rest, absolutely, every thing momentous upon a heart touched by the power of Christ, as the Son of God and the Son of Man, the image of the one, the perfection of the other,—whilst the next page drops into the drowsiest conventionalism, and with the most provoking placidity takes it for granted that this life of God in the Soul, this practical devotion to Christ as the Image of the Father and the consummation of humanity, can exist only in co-existence with some rootless, lifeless notions, transplanted from the Schools, respecting our fallen Nature, and the necessity for God substantially to inhabit it, and personally sacrifice Himself, before His spirit could raise it up. You are first placed in the purest air of heaven, and when you begin to feel it on your soul, you are suddenly forced into some narrow, stifling, channel, and quietly assured as a thing settled and well known, that only through that choked passage will it breathe upon you. It is as if you placed a man on a mountain top, and left him for a few moments to the free enjoyment of transfiguring impressions and ethereal breath, and then proceeded to treat him as if it was a thing conceded that he

could only look at the prospect through a fixed tube, and take the air through an adulterated pipe. It is a positive pain to accompany these eloquent men through one of their own books, from the rapid alternations of elevation and bathos, expansion and confinement, exhilaration and stifling, pure gleams of living truth and sudden plunges into the abysses of blank dogmatism, to which you are successively subjected. Whilst proceeding with your head in the skies, a stupid stumbling-block is thrown before you, and you fall heavily to the earth, with a shock that both hurts and provokes you. Your feelings towards your author too are a sore distress; it is so impossible to reconcile them. One moment you are all veneration, and the next all nausea. You love him, and you almost loathe him,—so stolid seem his inconsistencies. You feel his superiority with a wholesome reverence, and surrender yourself to be borne upwards on his spirit, and by some unexpected wheel in his flight become painfully sensible of the inferiority of his position to your own. You gratefully recognize the power and the purity of his nature, but you see, when you least are looking for it, that he is tethered to fixed points, masses of dead matter, traditionary tenets on which his Church is built, around which all his revolutions must be made. We wish these distinguished men were acquainted with this fact, that they might take it into consideration, in order to see whether it does not require some modification of their sympathies,—of the arbitrary and exclusive conjunction which they always make of a spiritual faith with the acceptance of traditional views of the *history of redemption* which, whether true or false, do not touch the springs of life. We accept their views of Faith, we are moved by the same affections, our hearts and lives are set upon the same objects, our God is theirs, unmeasured in his love but inviolable in his holiness, our Standard and Example is theirs, a man in spiritual union with his Heavenly Father:—our Faith makes these, living impulses within us, and objective realities without us—but we cannot in our own case intellectually associate this *faith* with some of their *creeds*. Spiritually there is union—intellectually there is diversity. And they themselves maintain with resistless

power that Faith is not the assent of the Intellect,—but spiritual life in the Affections, the spiritual movement of the Will. Will they persist in asserting, or rather in assuming, for they do not face the point, that spiritual sympathy can be found only in connection with one set of theoretical conceptions? Will they, in the blind temper of schism, make the faith of the heart, the aspiration of the spirit, the devotion of the life to exactly the same objects, to be all nullified by some intellectual differences? Ought it not to lead them to new reflection that we accept their fundamental ideas of Religion, of the living relations of the soul to God and Christ, and question only some of the intellectual forms to which these living essences attach? Not that we think it necessary that they should abandon their opinions, but only that they should be true to their first principles, and recognise that the living spirit of Religion may in all its plenitude be found in connection with other opinions,—that God and his Christ act directly on the soul, through its organs of conscience, and hope, and love, and aspiration, and not through the intellectual media of dogmatic conceptions.—To Archdeacon Hare's views of the nature and province of Faith, we give our cordial assent, and we shall detail his doctrines at some length, largely for the sake of showing the extent of our agreement in vital principles with one in his position. There is a religious literature proceeding now from a section of the Established Church, full of freshness, earnestness, and power, an acquaintance with which will enlarge the hopes and sympathies of all liberal inquirers. We have already said that there is often a painful discord, amounting to obvious contradiction, between the inherited theology of its Authors, and the natural atmosphere of their minds. We do not mean that their theology is irreconcilable with their spirit, but that they are constantly assuming that the spiritual sympathies, which they regard as the very fountains of life, cannot co-exist with any other theology. We find ourselves in union with Archdeacon Hare in all his expositions of the seminal principles of the religious life: but to reconcile this with the manner in which he speaks of the essential importance of dogmas, which, whether true or false, have not their roots in man's

spiritual nature, is a task beyond us or him. We wish he would consider whether our spiritual sympathies, or our theoretical diversities, should avail in determining the question of our Christian Communion.

I. Faith, according to our Author, is not belief in Creeds, is not the assent of the Intellect to religious Truths. It is trust, living, operative, real *trust* in the spiritual intimations which God makes to us through our own souls, or by Jesus Christ, His image and our Ideal. It is to rely upon the testimony of our own spirits when they tell us of the divinest realities; to give our confidence to those who in life, glory, and endeavour, correspond to these inward whisperings of heavenly promise, purpose, and destiny; to *trust* our Reason, our hearts, our hopes, our aspirations when they tell us of supersensual things, as we trust our senses when they communicate to us their own objects. Faith and Reason have not different spheres, but commensurate spheres. The objects of Faith are not beyond Reason, but beyond *Sight*. And it is the office of Faith not to dethrone Reason, but by *trusting* Reason, by vivifying and realizing its Ideas, to dethrone the Senses, and overcome the World. Faith is the prompt confidence that assigns an objective reality to the communications of our spiritual nature, to the revelations of God to us. It consists in animating Love, Hope, Conscience, Aspiration, the ideas of Duty; and *its* works appear in *their* fruits. It is, moreover, an original part of Man's nature, and required only its fitting object to do its great work of spiritual regeneration. For Christ came to fulfil human nature.

"As our Lord, when he came to set up the law of Love, and the law of Holiness among mankind, did not come to destroy man's nature, but rather to fulfil it,—to fulfil its deepest cravings, its inmost, unconscious yearnings, yearnings of which it only became conscious when it felt his fulness within them,—yea, to fill it, as the light fills the hollow chasms and yawning abysses of darkness,—we might infer that, as in both these cases he came to strengthen and purify, and hallow what, however frail and feeble, and imperfect, were already the best things to be found among mankind, and almost the only things which preserved them from being trampled to the ground and crushed by the iron hoof of sin,—we might infer that in like manner when he chose Faith as the chief motive prin-

ciple of the new life which he desired to awaken in man, he would in this case also take a principle that had already been stirring within him."—P. 13.

These views of Faith bring our Author into direct collision with those who identify it with a *belief* in religious truths not on grounds of reason, but upon testimony. He, very naturally, cannot comprehend, and denies as contrary to all experience, that intellectual assent of this kind could work the wonders attributed to Faith.

"They who regard Faith in this light, proceed to lay down that religious Faith is an intellectual assent to certain truths, beyond the reach of reason, concerning God, and His will, and His dealings towards mankind, delivered by inspired witnesses, whose inspiration is proved by the evidence of miracles. Now assuredly such a definition of Faith, instead of affording us any insight into its mighty workings,—instead of enabling us to conceive and understand how it can be ordained to act such a leading part in the moral and spiritual regeneration of man,—only makes the mystery still more mysterious, still more incomprehensible, and utterly repugnant to every thing we know of man, whether from searching our own hearts, or from observing the conduct of others."—"We all know but too well,—every one whose life has not flowed away in listless inanity, every one who has ever struggled against the evil within him, must have felt but too vividly—too vividly, though very far from vividly enough,—that our intellectual convictions, clear and strong as they may have been, have never of themselves been able to shake the foundations of a single sin, to subdue a single vice, to root out a single evil habit."—"The subjection of the self-relying, isolating understanding, which would fain draw all truth out of itself, is a portion of that sacrifice of our carnal self-centred nature, which must precede the birth of a higher spirit. But is this all? Can this be all that is meant by Faith? Is it possible that the Faith by which man is to be justified, the Faith by which the world is to be overcome, should be nothing more than the assent of the intellect to the truths revealed in the Scriptures? How is that assent to act upon the heart, to stir it, to new-mould it? How can this be, my brethren? What testimony do your hearts, do your consciences, give upon this point? Do they not cry aloud,—Time after time our Understandings have seen and acknowledged many of the truths of the Gospel; we have been thoroughly satisfied of their truth; we have not felt the slightest disposition to question it: but our convictions have availed us nothing: they have passed like wind through an archway: our conduct has been unchanged: our hearts

have continued unmoved, torpid, dead . . . dead as the lifeless carcase in which Galvanism for a moment awakens a shadow and semblance of life."—Pp. 15-17.

Our next extract traces the manner in which Faith lost its living power, and degenerated into the belief, that an intellectual recognition of Gospel truth was the instrument of salvation. Out of this conception arose all those dry treatises, called Evidences, which attempt to prove a divine Revelation without once appealing to any higher faculties than those that determine the value of testimony.

"When heresies sprang up, and it became necessary to define the doctrines of the Church by the promulgation of Creeds, as the reception of those Creeds was deemed indispensable to true Christian Faith, that reception, the belief in the doctrines thus ascertained and defined, was held to constitute this Faith, and was identified or rather confounded therewith. This notion was further promoted by the objective use of the word *Faith*, to signify the sum of those doctrines which are the object of belief, as well as the act whereby the mind and heart receive them. Thus, Faith being narrowed to the intellectual operation, and thereby deprived of its moral power, the provinces of Faith and of practical life grew to be regarded as totally distinct; and good works, being disjoined from Faith, were held to require some other source, in Hope and Love; which yet themselves can only rise out of Faith. For how can we love, or how can we hope, unless we have already believed in Him whom we love and hope in? The inevitable result of this severance was that a dead Faith on the one hand was responded to on the other hand by dead works; inasmuch as neither can live, except in union with the other: cut them asunder, and they both die. Such was the dismal condition of the Church in what are called the Middle Ages; until Luther, arising with the spirit and power of Elias, lifted up his voice in the wilderness, which in those days was spread over Christendom, and preached the doctrine of Justification by Faith alone. On this doctrine he rested wholly and solely, esteeming all other things of less account in comparison with Faith in Christ, and confident that all the grace of the Kingdom of Heaven would spring up in those who have that Faith graven on the living tablets of their hearts. From this doctrine he derived his strength: and then again it was seen, that Faith is indeed the Victory which overcomes the world. The bonds and shackles of dead ordinances fell off from those who were baptized with this purificatory fire. But the progress of knowledge and civilization produced its usual effect. The pride of Knowledge bred the lust of Knowledge; and the lust of

Knowledge pampered the pride of Knowledge : and again it became a very general opinion that the belief of the Understanding is one and the same thing with Christian Faith ; and that this belief is to be grounded on testimony. Hence we were inundated with dissertations on the external evidences of Christianity ; in which it was treated like any other historical fact, and witnesses were sifted and cross-examined ; but without regard to the main witness, the witness in the heart of the believer himself, in his infirmities, his wants, his cravings,—the witness along with which the Spirit bears witness in groanings that cannot be uttered. This, the only witness in which a living Faith in Christ can be established, was left out of sight : and so it is little to be wondered at if the Gospel half melted away into a system of philanthropical morality.”—P. 24.

A series of scriptural examples are adduced, in proof that the seat of Faith is not in the Understanding alone, but much more in the affections and the will. This is implied in our Lord's thanks to God, that what he has hidden from the wise and prudent he has revealed unto babes. It is also implied in the censure upon Thomas, for, if the conviction of the Mind was the most important element in faith, then the more direct the evidence the more valuable would be the belief. Whereas Thomas's belief was valueless, because it wanted the one essential element of spiritual apprehension and sympathy. It is implied in every case in which the strength of Faith is commended, or its feebleness rebuked, in the fears of the disciples on the sea of Galilee, and the confidence of the centurion when he implores his servant's life. And it is directly asserted in the words, that “it is with the *Heart* that man believeth unto righteousness.”

II. It follows from this that Faith, by its very definition, is a *practical* Principle, the animating power in man. Salvation by Faith is Salvation by Works,—but by works that without Faith could not be produced. There is no contrast between Faith and Reason : they are co-ordinate. There is no contrast between Faith and Works : they are related as the Will and the Act. The contrast is between Faith and Sight, and the office of Faith is to give the power of reality to objects and ideas not communicated by the Senses. It is Faith then that makes operative the suggestions of Hope, Love, and Conscience : and without this

realizing power in the Will, they are mere phantoms of the intellect.

"Were Faith nothing more than the assent of the Understanding, then indeed we should be forced to grant that it is not a practical principle. But this consequence of itself is enough to prove how totally inadequate that definition of Faith must be. In truth, if we look thoughtfully through the history of the Church, or even of the world, we shall find that this, under one shape or other, has ever been the main principle and spring of all great and magnanimous action, even Faith. The persons in whose character Love has been the predominant feature, have not seldom been disposed to rest in heavenly meditations and contemplations. Unless, too, it be corrected and nerved by Faith, Love shrinks from giving pain, from giving offence. But the great stirring motive spirits in the history of the world, the angels, who have excelled in strength, and who have done God's commandments, hearkening to the voice of His word, have been those who, by way of eminence, may be called the heroes of Faith, those who by Faith have dwelt in the immediate presence of God; in proof whereof I will only remind you here of those two great captains in God's noble army, Paul and Luther. Nor is it difficult to perceive why this is and must be so. For Faith, and Faith alone, gives us the very thing which Archimedes wanted, the standing-place out of the world, whence the world is to be moved. He who lives in a spiritual world, will desire, in proportion to the vividness and fulness of his life, to realize that spiritual world in the world of forms and shadows which he sees around him. He will desire to impress others with the truths, by which he himself is strongly possessed,—to rescue them from the debasement, from which he himself has been delivered,—to make them partakers in the priceless blessings, which he himself is enjoying."—"Thus, by giving a substantial reality to that which is invisible, to that which is no object of the Senses, or of the natural Understanding, and by animating the Heart with an unshakable assurance of that for which it looks in hope, Faith performs the task assigned to her of overcoming the world."—P. 32.

All true Love rests on Faith, and Faith supports it when its object passes out of the world of Sense. This spiritual view is beautifully conveyed.

"Love, in all its forms, every feeling that deserves the name of love,—looks beyond what it sees, as it were, to the hidden sun, that is still lying below the horizon. The whole world of sight cannot satisfy it. Were there not something more, something better, something nearer akin to the soul, it would starve. Beautiful as the

dawn may be, we still feel that the beauty of the dawn is the work of the unseen sun, and that the dawn perishes and fades quickly away, but that the unseen sun is everlasting. The true object of love is altogether an object of Faith, an object that we cannot know or perceive, except by Faith, the heart and the soul. In fact the very idea of man is an object of Faith. That which constitutes a man is not what we see and handle, not the hair and the flesh, the arms and the legs, the mouth and the eyes, but the unseen spirit, whereby all these members are united and animated and actuated. And this unseen spirit or soul is the only object that we can truly love; as the love of this unseen immortal soul, which likewise can only be apprehended by Faith, is the one thing that true love can desire and hope for. They who lust after such things as are objects of sight, are like brute beasts that have no understanding, no Faith, no power of conceiving, or imagining, or believing in any thing beyond what they see. To such men, all the beauty and loveliness, and brightness and glory of this world, are in very sooth so many pearls cast before swine: they know not their worth, trample upon them, and defile them. But love, unless it be falsely so called, is not the creature of the eye, or of any other of the senses. It does not rest upon that which it can see and grasp: nor does it fall to the ground, when that support is taken away. Being rooted in Faith, in a Faith in the moral nature of its object, it manifests itself by acts of Faith, by reverence for the sacred purity of that moral nature, by ready self-sacrifice, by joyful self-denial. It lives and flourishes in the absence, as well as in the presence, of its object, after its death, no less than during its life. Having recognized that the beauty of the dawn is the work of the unseen sun, it still feels, when evening darkens into night, that the sun is not lost, not extinguished,—that though hidden, it is lying below the horizon, and that in the fulness of time it will rise out of its hiding place again. As it is only by Faith that we can love those who are with us in the body, so by Faith may we still love those who are laid in the grave. This is another of the Victories whereby Faith overcomes the world. It conquers Death, and wrests his victims from him. This, however, it cannot do, unless there be a power from above to strengthen it; unless we have learned to believe that Death has already been conquered, and that he who conquered it conquered it for us; in other words, unless we believe that Jesus is the Son of God.”—P. 118.

So the Social affections rest on Faith.

“Still, as at the beginning, it is not good for man to be alone. It is not good for his earthly happiness: it is not good for his moral wellbeing. If he does not see the image of God in his brother, he will worship it, shattered as it is and disfigured, in himself. But he

who is without Faith in his brethren is alone. His companions only make him feel how utterly alone he is. He is as much alone, as if he were lying in his grave; and sees nothing about him but rotten hearts, and mouldering worm-eaten souls."—P. 120.

And all practical Morality rests on Faith.

"Indeed all the primary principles and ideas of morality belong wholly to Faith, never come within the ken of the Senses; nor can they be elicited from the senses, or their objects, by any abstractions of the Understanding. Unless we feel them in ourselves, unless we have full faith in our inward consciousness, unless we rest, heart and soul and mind, on the truths it declares to us, we have no foundation to build on. The first principles inhere in our spiritual nature: we cannot pick them up without us: and in this, as in other departments of Knowledge, the business of reasoning is to evolve the truths involved in those first principles, and to shew their consistency and harmony. If a man will not believe that he has a Conscience, you cannot convince him of it, as you might convince him that he has a spleen, by an anatomical process: you cannot cut open his soul, and lay it bare to the bodily eye."—P. 122.

It is a direct consequence from the practical nature of Faith, that before Faith can render any Truth operative, that Truth must be in felt harmony with our spiritual Consciousness, with the Reason and the Heart. They are the ideas of Reason, the inspirations of the Heart, that Faith trusts and realizes. This Archdeacon Hare not only admits, but contends for. He declares that Faith can apprehend no Doctrine that is at variance with the calmly exercised Reason and Consciousness of Mankind:—

"... nor will any right-minded teacher of the Gospel be content to prolong the discord between the word of God, and that voice which rises from the depths of man's soul. As St. Paul, at Athens, took occasion from the altar dedicated to the Unknown God, to declare that God to the Athenians, whom they were already worshipping without knowing Him, so will every teacher who has the spirit of St. Paul, examine and interrogate the voice in man's heart, until he makes it bear witness to the truth of God's word. He will tune the strings, before he begins to play on them."

Two great evils have arisen from confounding Faith with the assent of the Intellect to religious propositions. In the first place, a necessary conflict has arisen from the natural progress of Thought, and the arbitrary fixedness of

Creed; and Faith has been set to do an impossible work, to vivify views and representations that are no longer the ideas of Reason or the objects of the Heart.

"Many of the struggles and conflicts in the history of the Church have arisen from this,—that, while the mind of man in its progressive evolution was necessarily passing through new modes and phases of thought, attempts were made to perpetuate forms of doctrine, which belonged to antecedent epochs, and were at variance with the new one. It was attempted to uphold, not the pure spiritual doctrine of the New Testament, which is everywhere set forth in its essential universality, by being set forth in its living reality, and is thus capable of assimilating with every metempsychosis of human thought, but certain definite forms of words, in which that doctrine had been promulgated at some particular epoch, and which had not the same expansive assimilative power. It was attempted to force the man into the clothes of the boy, which cramp and fetter him, and which at every motion he rends and bursts. In Christianity, as in every thing else that enters into the region of time, there is one side which is variable and progressive, as well as one which is permanent and unchanging."—P. 62.

The other evil that results from confounding Faith with the assent of the Understanding, and that not on grounds of Reason, but on grounds of Testimony, consists in a misdirection as to the natural means of increasing Faith,—in diverting us from practical and spiritual efforts for this purpose, and leading us to argumentative ones.

"Faith, as a practical power, can only be strengthened practically: and this of itself is a conclusive proof that Faith is mainly a practical power. A single act of Faith, a single prayer offered up from the bottom of the heart, a single exertion of self-denial, of self-control, for Christ's sake, a single effort to walk in the footsteps of our Lord and Master, will do more to strengthen and establish our Faith than all the learning of all the theologians."—P. 52.—"For only so far as his Faith exceeds his own conception of it, can it have any living power: and that conception itself will withhold him from taking the only course whereby his Faith might be enlivened and invigorated. He will not cry to God from the bottom of a yearning heart, *Lord, I believe! help Thou my unbelief.* Instead of this, such a person would think over the evidence on which his belief is grounded, and would remind himself again and again how thoroughly convincing it is,—a process just as likely to accomplish his object, as laying bare the roots of a tree would be to

promote its growth. Indeed it is a general law of our nature, that, while every power, the legitimate exercise of which is followed by a corresponding action, is strengthened thereby, on the other hand every power which is checked in this its appropriate manifestation, is weakened and gradually deadened. A tree that has been blighted spring after spring, ceases even to bud. A conviction that has failed of producing acts conformable to it, becomes less convincing every time it is appealed to : experience establishes its nullity. And as this must be the effect of such a notion on individuals, so, as was again proved in the last century, will it spread a chill and numbness through the body of the Church. They who believe only with the Understanding, soon cease almost to believe at all. Even the knowledge, which is only the knowledge of the Understanding, dwindles and sickens and shrivels. This was evinced in the shallowness and feebleness of our theology, which was prone to turn aside from the peculiar truths of the Gospel to general propositions about the divine nature and attributes, such as belong to what is not very accurately termed Natural Religion. For these propositions, being inferences arrived at by reasoning, must be matters of a merely speculative faith : nor does this Natural Religion call for more, inasmuch as it does not place man in any immediate personal relation to God."—P. 72.

Another consequence of this lifeless conception of Faith, from confounding it with the assent of the Understanding, was that the Poor fell away from an abstract, notional, theology. They found nothing to warm their hearts, and prick their consciences, and stir their hopes, and they had no appetite for the husks of knowledge. The objective realities of Religion were attenuated into barren speculations, on which the poor starved.

"And when it pleased God to call up men of a living Faith within the bosom of the Church, and to send them forth for the edifying of his people, the holders of a notional belief regarded them as enthusiasts and fanatics, and pointed the finger of scorn at them, and almost cast them out from the communion of Christian fellowship. At times indeed there may doubtless have been extravagances of doctrine,—there may have been extravagances of manner and conduct,—whereby some of these men gave needless offence ; for Zeal does not always measure and count her steps, or walk hand in hand with Prudence. But often, it is to be feared, what was most offensive in them, was the witness they bore in behalf of a living, as opposed to a notional Faith. Else their extravagances might easily have been excused, and, if mildly dealt with, would have been

lessened and checked. In fact, no small part of these very extravagances was owing to the opposition they encountered. For this is the curse of all hostility, that it is almost sure to put both parties in the wrong. Even those who previously occupied an impregnable position of right, quit it for the sake of snatching a temporary advantage, or of inflicting a blow on the enemy."—"A living Faith seeks unity, which implies diversity, and manifests itself therein: whereas a notional Faith imposes and exacts uniformity, without which it has no ground to stand on. God grant that this principle of union may still continue increasing in strength amongst us, and that it may go on producing its perfect work, the Unity of the Body of Christ; wherein all the gifts of all its members shall find their appropriate office. And if we want a common enemy to combat, we have one, a mighty one, a terrible one, meeting us at every step, lying in wait for us at every moment, besieging our houses, prowling about our chambers, riding in triumph through our streets, thickening like a pestilence where multitudes swarm together, and yet rising like the malaria out of lonely and desolate places, and finding its way into the student's solitary cell,—even Sin, in all its deadly manifestations both within and without us. To fight against this enemy will require all our united forces: and the only victory whereby he can be overcome, is the victory of Faith."—P. 75.

With equal truth and acuteness our author connects the great Doctrine of Justification by Faith with the intellectual characteristics of the age in which it appeared, or revived. It belongs naturally to a reflective, subjective mind, to a reflective, subjective age, conscious of sin in the inward parts, and that no outward forms or works can purify unclean fountains.

"Changes and revolutions in the Church, if they are wide-spreading and lasting, are ever coincident with analogous revolutions in the general history of the human mind. In them we see, as in a clock, the progress of Time's great circle; in them we as it were hear the striking of one of its epochal hours. Indeed, as the former revolutions are the most vivid and distinct types of the latter, so are they commonly the primary agents in bringing them to pass. Both light and clouds gather about the hills, before they descend into the valley, and overspread the plain. Now if we consider the peculiar character which has marked the European mind for the last three centuries, especially in Protestant countries, we may discern how the doctrine of justification by Faith could not but be the religious expression of that mind. To describe that character by a single word: it has often been observed that what peculiarly distinguishes the

modern European mind is its predominant *subjectiveness*, as contrasted with the greater *objectiveness* of former ages. This pervades all the forms of life, all the regions of thought. There has been a far deeper self-consciousness which has often approached to a self-devouring disease: there has been a more minute self-analysis, a more piercing self-anatomy. Speculation has turned its eyes inward, has become more and more reflective. If we cast a look on the two main provinces of intellect in the great age which followed the Reformation, we find that in Philosophy the grand achievement of that age was the purifying the method of investigation, the gaining a deeper insight into the laws of thought. Whereafter in another generation Consciousness was asserted to be the ground of all existence; and an attempt was made to expand the proposition, that Thought involves Being, into a complete system of philosophy." — "Now the effect of such reflexion on religious minds must needs be a deeper consciousness of sin: and this is just what we find in the great Protestant, as compared with the Romanist divines. In the latter, as has often been remarked, there is mostly somewhat of a Pelagian tendency; while to the Reformers this was an utter abomination: whence he, among the Fathers of the Church, who was the leading antagonist of Pelagianism, became their chief, almost their only favourite. For the more our inward eye is sharpened, the more exceeding sinful does sin become: the more we analyse our motives, the more iniquity do we detect in them. When we merely look at the surface of man's heart, it may often seem to be tranquil, and to glitter in the sunshine: but when we dive into its recesses, we pass away from the region of light, and only find deep below deep, cavern beyond cavern, quicksand beneath quicksand. This must ever be the effect of a thorough conviction of sin. We feel that the death is all round us, yea, that it is within us, that our souls are imprisoned helplessly in it, that it has coiled round every nerve, and crept into every vein. In an earlier, more superficial state, we may deem that there is a value in our services, in our fasts and penances, in our mortification and self denial, in retirement from the world and almsgiving. But such things brought no satisfaction to St. Paul. They brought no satisfaction to Luther. Hence he pined and wasted away, until the aged monk reminded him of the consolation which he had daily on his lips, though he had never yet tasted its sweetness, the consolation afforded by that article of the creed, *I believe in the Forgiveness of Sins*. From that moment the assurance of Justification by Faith dawned upon him. He had hitherto been seeking for it, but had been drawn away by self-reliance, by trusting in outward means, in what he himself was to do or suffer. Now he found it as the free gift of Grace: and

thus, from that time forth, it became the animating soul of his whole life, inward and outward."—P. 70.

III. Faith, as the atoning principle in man's nature, uniting all his faculties in devotion to the true ends of his being, must have an adequate object, trust in an adequate person, to whom it may cling, and by whom it may support and elevate itself. Under Natural Religion man's faith centered on ideas. Under Christianity these ideas have become realities, and Faith, which before had only subjective ideals, now adhered to *persons*, to living objects—to a God who is in personal relations to his children,—to an Example who was touched by our infirmities, tempted in all things even as we are, yet without sin. 'This is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith. Who is he that overcometh the world, but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of God?' It is only through trust in him who himself solved the great problem of life, that the like victory can ensue to us. Faith itself had no living being to appeal to, until the Author and Finisher of our Faith appeared, and taught us to confide in our own souls when they tell us of the perfection for which we are ordained. The way that God took to strengthen human faith was by fulfilling it. Faith had its perfect work in the Son of Man, and now a living man upholds it, and it is no more a flickering flame of ideal musings, unwarranted by experience. Scepticism cannot chill it, by uttering the word, Unreality. In Christ, God made the truths of Faith manifest in the flesh. Faith saw the Desire of its eyes. God fostered Faith, so that through it man might overcome the world, by openly giving the victory over the world to a spiritual man. When he sought to strengthen Faith within the soul, he came with manifestations of spiritual power in one of like nature with ourselves.

"The Lord came not in the strong wind. The Lord came not in the earthquake. The Lord came not in the fire. A babe was born in a stable at Bethlehem; and shepherds were called to look thereon. In this manner did the King of kings bow the heavens and come down, to overcome the world. This was the pomp of his coming, this his army, this his retinue. This was his first lesson to all such as were to believe in him, admonishing them how they were to overcome the world. And as his birth was, such was his life.

Poor, lowly, destitute, forsaken, reviled, persecuted, homeless, driven from place to place, an object of scorn and hatred, mocked, scourged, crucified, an outcast from the world, put to death by the world,—how did he overcome the world? By patience, by meekness, by long suffering, by purity, by holiness, by perseverance in well-doing, notwithstanding all that the world could do to hinder and deter him,—by unweariness in all the offices of love towards his enemies, no less than his friends. Then did the powers of hell tremble on their seat, amid the rolling sea of everlasting darkness, when the Spirit of God, descending upon him who had shown his purpose to fulfil all righteousness, declared him to be the beloved Son, in whom the Father was well pleased. Then were the gates of brass broken, and the bars of iron cut in sunder, to let out those whom the world held in the bondage of its lusts and passions, when the voice of him who was hanging on the Cross was heard beseeching his Father to forgive his murderers; for that they knew not what they did.”—P. 169.

One more Extract will complete our author's view of the Victory of Faith, when Christ, the Son of Man, the realized Ideal of humanity, provides it with an adequate object, and supports it by his living power.

“In him we see how the world may indeed be overcome, how the Kingdom of Heaven may descend upon Earth, and how the throne of God may be established within it. But when we look at ourselves what do we see? except how we have been overcome by it in all manner of ways,—overcome by its charms, overcome by its bribes, overcome by its lusts, overcome by its darkness, overcome by its glare, overcome by its flattery, overcome by its scorn, overcome by its terrors,—how we have been fettered and manacled and bound to its car,—nay, how we have rushed forwards of our own accord, and cast ourselves under its thundering wheels, and have bid them roll over our souls, and have even deemed we were rejoicing, when writhing beneath them. Thus on being taught to discern the true relation between man and the world, do we discover that we have been shamefully overcome by it. And how and why have we been thus overcome? Through our want of Faith: through our want of Faith in that which is invisible, and our giving up our hearts to visible things: through our want of Faith in the future, and our prostration before the present: through our want of Faith in reason, in conscience, in hope, in love, and our persuasion that material, palpable, sensual pleasures,—pleasures that we can see with our eyes, and grasp with our hands, and taste with our palates,—pleasures that pamper our carnal hearts, and flatter our self-will,

and magnify us in our own estimation,—are the only true realities. And as it is through our want of Faith, that we have been overcome by the world, so through Faith alone can we rise out of this disastrous defeat, and overcome that whereby we have hitherto been overcome; through Faith in Him who is invisible,—through Faith in that heavenly peace and joy which await all such as endeavour through Faith to attain to them,—through Faith in Reason and its laws,—through Faith in Conscience, as the voice of God,—through Faith in the beauty of holiness,—through Faith, as the ground of that Love, which after the example of Christ, will also believe all things, and hope all things, and endure all things, and never fail. This Faith God has graciously vouchsafed to strengthen, by manifesting that grace, which before had been hidden, in the person of his only begotten Son, and by showing us in him how man ought to live, in order to feel the atoning power of Faith, in order to find peace in himself, and favour with God.”—P. 174.

Archdeacon Hare's theology troubles him with the difficulty, that, after all, Christ, as God, cannot be an example of Faith. His answer is no answer, for a man who is also God is not a man, in any conceivable sense. According to his own definition, this is not an Idea which even Faith can apprehend. It is not a Truth of Reason, or Consciousness, or spiritual conception; and he has laid it down that Faith and Reason, or spiritual consciousness, have the same domain.

“Our Lord, it may be said, has not set us an example of Faith. This however is only true, so far as a state of imperfection is the necessary condition of Faith, only so far as Faith is essentially incompatible with that divine intuition which belonged to Christ as God. So far as Christ was man, his whole life was a life of Faith. As the Son of Man, he alone lived, as every child of man ought to live, wholly by Faith, by Faith in God, showing forth the inexhaustible riches of his Faith towards his human brethren, coming to them again and again with every demonstration of power and love, if so be he might awaken the better spirit which was slumbering in them oppressed by the weight of sin, and might rouse them out of the sleep of death,—undeterred by the ghastly apparitions of evil, which met him whithersoever he turned his eyes,—persevering unto the end for the joy set before him of gathering his redeemed from all the quarters of the world. That which he did through divine intuition, we can only do through Faith.”—P. 186.

We have made our article chiefly of extracts, and this we

have done, because we are delighted to show the extent of our agreement with Archdeacon Hare; because the views of Faith that prevail in all Denominations require, more or less, the corrections he has passed upon them, the vitality and fulness he has imparted to them; and partly because we are glad, upon occasion, to mingle the living influences of religion with the more speculative, dissertational, and historical matters, which largely occupy our pages. These eloquent Discourses were delivered before the University of Cambridge. They were devised for the benefit of youthful hearers, to purify young hearts, to direct the first fervid energies of youth towards worthy things, and sustain them by unfailing trusts. One cannot think without a throb of hope at the heart, of such high words as these, addressed, from the seat of authority, by a man whose genius only graces his more exalted qualities of piety and zeal, to the youth of England.

"You will go forth into all parts of the land: and on the manner in which you fulfil your appointed task, the weal and prosperity of England for the next, nay, for many generations, will in no slight measure depend.—If you serve her faithfully and strenuously, with zealous hearts and holy lives, the calamities which at times appear to be threatening her, may through God's blessing be averted. If you are faithless, if you betray and forsake the service of your country, to serve your own lusts, to gain pleasure for yourselves, or riches for yourselves, or power or honour for yourselves,—then . . . O may God vouchsafe to raise up others, who will serve her better than you! In her eyes, in the eyes of England, my young friends, your souls are very precious.—Cast them not away on vanity and frivolity; starve not, nor wither them in the toils of interest or ambition; yield them not up to be defiled and rotted by the lusts of the flesh: watch carefully lest such precious jewels be injured or polluted by any manner of impurity: and pray continually to God, that, as He has called you to His Salvation, so He will vouchsafe to fulfil His good work in you, and to render you faithful and zealous to serve Him in whatsoever path He may ordain for you."
—P. 128.

"O, if such a body as I now see around me, so gifted, so fitted out with human learning and knowledge, as, unless you grievously misspend and waste your time, you may be, before you leave this University,—if such a body were to go forth with united hearts, hearts united by Faith in Christ and by the Love of God,—if you,

my brethren, were to go forth in this spirit, on your various missions,—then might we hope that manifold blessings would be poured down on your labours, and that the heart and soul of England would arise in freshness and joy out of the death-sleep which is lying so heavily on many parts of the land. Go forth in this spirit, my dear young friends; and may God bless you with His choicest blessings! Go forth in Faith to overcome the world, strong in the Lord, and in the power of His might: and may Christ give you, as he has promised to them that overcome, to eat of the Tree of Life, which is in the midst of the Paradise of God.”—P. 203.

ART. VI.—NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

I. An Attempt to ascertain the Number, Names and Powers of the Letters of the Hieroglyphic or Ancient Egyptian Alphabet. By the Rev. Edward Hincks, D.D.

The Defacement of Divine and Royal Names on Egyptian Monuments. By the Rev. Edward Hincks, D.D.

On the Three Kinds of Persepolitan Writing, and on the Mode of expressing Numerals in Cuneatic Characters. By the Rev. Edward Hincks, D.D.

The twenty-first and twenty-second volumes of the Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy, contain several important communications from the Rev. Edward Hincks, D.D., on the subject of Egyptian and Persepolitan antiquities. Of the former, one relates to the effacement of royal and other names on Egyptian monuments. The most curious instances of this are those in which the change appears to have been connected with revolutions of religious opinion. Thus on one set of monuments the name of the god Amoun, where it entered into the composition of royal cartouches, has been systematically obliterated. On another, the figure of the god Seth (as it is supposed) the Typhon of the Greeks, has been effaced, indicating, as Bunsen thinks, a change in the theological system, by which Seth, who had previously been considered as a beneficent god, became identified with the principle of evil. The other paper relates to the phonetic value of the hieroglyphic characters, and could not be made intelligible, without entering into the history of the discovery of the Egyptian alphabet. Its chief object is to show, what had not been noticed by Champollion, or Lepsius, that the phonetic characters had certain expletives added to them, which in reading must generally be treated as quiescent. The establishment of this principle, which Dr. Hincks illustrates with great research and ingenuity, will of course introduce very important modifications into the mode of reading proper names, and the identification of phonetic

groups with words of the Coptic or other languages. In his papers on the Persepolitan inscriptions Dr. Hincks has contributed valuable aid towards the great work begun by Grotefend, and nearly consummated by Rawlinson, of decyphering the cuneiform character. His discovery of the numerals is the most important, and we see that its value and originality have been fully recognized by Major Rawlinson.

II. The Works of Henry Ware, jun., D.D. 4 vols. Boston. 1846-7.

In a former Number we reviewed at length the life and labours of Henry Ware. We recur to the subject only for the purpose of directing attention to this convenient and valuable edition of his collected writings. With the exception of his *Life of the Saviour*, which we trust is to form a fifth volume, it contains all that he had published during his lifetime. The additions are chiefly Sermons, marked by that grave earnestness, simplicity, and seriousness of spirit which have enabled Mr. Ware to exercise the beneficent power of a practical teacher of Religion over so many minds. When Mr. Ware deals with the speculative difficulties that affect religious thinkers we cannot say that he is satisfactory or far-seeing, but when he addresses the conscience and the life he has the deep solemn tones of reality and power, which show that the affections of a fervid heart, and the conviction of a calm and stedfast intellect, have been strengthened, tested and mellowed amid the trials, endeavours, and experiences of the practical Christian.

We copy some very touching lines written by Mr. Ware in his last illness.

“ It is not what my hands have done,
That weighs my spirit down,
That casts a shadow o’er the Sun,
And over earth a frown ;
It is not any heinous guilt,
Or vice by men abhorred ;

For fair the fame that I have built,
A fair life's just reward ;
And men would wonder if they knew
How sad I feel with sins so few.

“ Alas ! they only see in part,
When thus they judge the whole ;
They cannot look upon the heart,
They cannot read the soul ;
But I survey myself within,
And mournfully I feel
How deep the principle of sin
Its root may there conceal,
And spread its poison through the frame
Without a deed that men can blame.

“ They judge by actions which they see
Brought out before the sun ;
But conscience brings reproach to me
For what I've left undone,—
For opportunities of good
In folly thrown away,
For hours misspent in solitude,
Forgetfulness to pray,—
And thousand more omitted things,
Whose memory fills my breast with stings.

“ And therefore is my heart oppressed
With thoughtfulness and gloom ;
Nor can I hope for perfect rest,
Till I escape this doom.
Help me, thou Merciful and Just,
This fearful doom to fly ;
Thou art my strength, my hope, my trust,—
O, help me, lest I die !
And let my full obedience prove
The perfect power of faith and love.”

Vol. i. p. 318.

III. *Dialogues on Universal Salvation, and Topics connected therewith.* By David Thom. Second Edition. 1847.

This is the Second Edition of a very ingenious work, which first appeared in 1838. We have already in our

Notices of the Author's 'Divine Inversion,' and 'Three Grand Exhibitions of Man's enmity to God,' indicated the peculiarities of his Theology, and the distinguishing character of his intellect. By preserving inviolate the Goodness of God he makes Calvinism conduct him to Universalism, by the *destruction*, in every descendant of Adam, of human nature "swallowed up in the divine and generous nature of the Son of God." Neither with his first principles, nor with his method of reasoning from words to things, have we any affinity—but the Calvinism of Eternal Torments he has met upon its own ground, and beaten to the dust. John Foster rejected this horrid Doctrine, on the ground of its absolute irreconcilableness with Christian sentiment, without attempting to explain all the Scriptural expressions concerned in the controversy. Our Author is more bold and thorough, and conducts his argument by the letter of Scripture.

IV. A Letter to the Right Hon. Lord John Russell, on some Circumstances injurious to the Usefulness of the Established Church. By Henry Stebbing, D.D., F.R.S., 1847.

This Letter must have been called into existence by indignation at the proposal to create new Bishops, where working Clergy are required. It is a very plain-spoken statement of gross abuses in the Church—abuse of Patronage—abuse of Revenues—abuse of place and station by the pride, selfishness, and grasping rapacity of Dignitaries. These are not our allegations, but Dr. Stebbing's, himself not an undistinguished Clergyman.

He speaks thus of patronage, in the times that are passing away :—

"These haughty prelates—these worldly and ill-informed Ministers of the Church, had been for the most part enriched with preferment by a mere act of power ; by patrons who would as soon have thought of questioning the worthiness of the candidate for Church preferment, as the courage of a butler or the refinement of a steward. The bishop had been tutor to a nobleman, and what more was

needed to his exaltation but the advancement of the nobleman in power?"—P. 7.

The abuse of patronage *at present*, he describes thus:—

"Not satisfied even with conferring livings upon their family connexions and private friends, those who enjoy the greatest share of Church patronage offend even still further in the abuse of their sacred trust: they act with uninquiring, reckless caprice in the disposition of that which remains to them after they have provided for their immediate favourites. Instead of taking pains to discover where the toil-worn curate, or where the patient, unpresuming scholar, may be found, they listen to any recommendation which may be whispered in their ears by some wealthy neighbour, or ostentatiously give the vacant benefice to the first clergyman who may happen to please them by his manners and address."—P. 28.

Of the abuse of *Revenues*, he speaks thus:—

"If the Church be in the condition which some of their own body take pains to describe; if there be so many spiritually destitute parishes in the Kingdom; so many overworked and almost starving clergymen; then it must be plain to every man of common sense, that the Church cannot afford to pay even to the highest of its ministers, such sums as £18,000, £12,000, £10,000, or even £8,000 a-year. Nay, it must be evident that with a clergy, a vast number of whom have not wherewithal to find bread, it is scarcely decent that preferments, of any kind whatever, should exist to any large extent, by which the means of the Church are exhausted to support some few families in affluence and luxury."—P. 14.

Of the 'Lottery' system, in such favour with Sydney Smith, he speaks thus:—

"It is perfectly awful to find how small a number of men have obtained any fair position in the Church because of their real value and legitimate claims. There are preachers of whom the world speaks with devout admiration. These excellent men have been passed over as not deserving a thought on the part of powerful patrons. There are curates whose simple piety, whose spiritual endowments, would grace a saint, who have been allowed to struggle with hopeless poverty; while the most worldly and even the most sensual of men, have been preferred to benefices, and pampered on the spoils of the Church."—P. 16.

And here are the results. First—the religious character of the laity in the Church:—

"The members of the Church, generally, are less under the disci-

pline of spiritual government, than any of the rest. So too, I fear, if a real examination could be instituted as to the amount of religious knowledge among them—as to their real acquaintance with the doctrines professed, or with the Scriptures upon which they rest—the members of our Church would, for the most part, be found inferior to those of other denominations.”—P. 11.

Secondly—the character of the Clergy :—

“ I will tell you, my lord, what we really find as chiefly marking the different classes into which they are divided. Pride and selfishness have been as common to the episcopal dignity in modern times, as profound humility and fatherly tenderness were its ornaments in the Apostolic age. To many of the clergy, alas ! who have been enriched by wealthy benefices, we might apply almost the same characteristics, but that they are modified by their diplomatic efforts to rise higher, or by their disposition to enjoy as much as possible the quiet luxuries of their position. Let, however, the ambitious Archdeacon, the wealthy rector, the prebend, or canon, meet in society the poor curate, the preacher, or the possessor of some humble benefice, and no one, unacquainted with the truth, would ever suspect that all these men belong to the same order; are nominally brethren; and have been called to carry forward the same great work of charity and religion.

“ If pride and austerity, an air of superiority and conceit, characterize a large number of the wealthier clergy, those of a humbler rank prove by their demeanour, almost approaching to servility, that their spirits are bowed to the very dust; that they know their case to be a desperate one; that they must keep well with their masters, or they may be deprived even of the scant morsel which supplies their wants.”—P. 18.

Whether this degrading picture of high and low in the Church has general truth we are not able to say, but it is profoundly melancholy that such should be the impressions and representations of a Minister of its own Communion, in good repute for character and learning.

The remedies proposed are, an increase of the working clergy,—and a more adequate provision for them, out of the grossly-abused revenues of the bishops, dignitaries, and beneficed clergy.